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Summary
E¢ cient pricing of a resource incorporates both marginal cost of extraction and scarcity rents. Since
groundwater resources exhibit natural supply constraints, scarcity rents must be imposed on current
users. Given the di¢ culty of establishing clear groundwater ownership rights, scarcity value frequently
goes unrecognized and is di¢ cult to estimate. This results in ine¢ cient pricing and misallocation of the
resource. This thesis builds on three di¤erent methods to develop appropriate theoretical and empirical
models relevant for indirect estimation of these shadow scarcity rents, which we consider as the initial
and most challenging step towards e¢ cient groundwater management. Empirical analyses are based on
economic and hydrological data from the island of Cyprus, representative of semi-arid regions.
Chapter 2 critically assesses previous theoretical and empirical attempts to derive the increase in
social benets from e¢ cient pricing of groundwater and examines the potential for groundwater man-
agement. This potential is seriously challenged by Gisser-Sanchezs E¤ect (GSE): i.e. net benets from
optimally managing groundwater are insignicant for all practical purposes. Chapter 3 attempts a re-
examination of GSE by developing a dynamic model of adaptation to increasing groundwater scarcity,
when backstop technology is available. Both groundwater scarcity rents and management benets are
derived by simulating the optimal and competitive-commonality solutions. Results point to the absence
of GSE in aquifers facing complete exhaustion in the near future.
Chapter 4 proposes a renement of revealed preference methods of valuation, by combining the
hedonic and travel cost methods, and applies the rened model to derive the willingness to pay for
groundwater quality. It is claimed that hedonic valuation of quality attributes can be misleading when
the exogeneity assumption, with respect to these attributes, to sample selection is violated. Hence,
the simultaneity between hedonic valuation and sample selection is modelled in the context of producer
behaviour and investigated empirically in the case of land demanded for use as an input either in
agricultural production or touristic development. The empirical analysis suggests that failing to correct
for sample selection results in a biased valuation of groundwater quality. In chapter 5 duality theory
is employed to develop the distance function methodology of deriving shadow groundwater scarcity
rents. The empirical application of the model involves estimating a stochastic input distance function
from which the in situ shadow price of groundwater is derived. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by
comparing and contrasting the magnitude of groundwater scarcity rents and willingness to pay for
scarce groundwater quality, derived from the models put forward in this research.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: The Potential for
Groundwater Scarcity.
Water is essential to human life. It is also a thread which inextricably links economic and
natural systems. Water resources are key to the survival of both systems and both the quantity
and quality of water resources are impacted upon by economic and natural systems. The earths
renewable supply of water is governed by the hydrologic cycle, a system of continuous water
circulation (gure 1.1). Enormous quantities of water are cycled through this system, though
only a fraction of circulated water is available each year for human use. Available supplies are
derived from two rather di¤erent sources: surface water and groundwater. This thesis focuses
on groundwater resources.
Groundwater constitutes about 89 percent of the freshwater on our planet, discounting that
in the polar ice caps1, and is accumulated in underground aquifers that lie between layers of
rock. Groundwater systems are dynamic with groundwater continuously in slow motion from
zones of recharge to areas of discharge. Tens, hundreds, or even thousands of years may elapse
in the passage of water through this subterranean part of the hydrological cycle, since ow
rates do not normally exceed a few meters per day and can be as low as one meter per year2.
Groundwater is primarily a depletable resource stock, although as a small proportion (less than
1Global hydrogeological information reported in this chapter are derived from Mays (1996) and Spulber and
Sabbaghi (1998).
2These groundwater velocities compare to rates of up to one meter per second for river ow.
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5 percent) can be withdrawn each year and renewed by seepage of rainwater or snow melting
into the aquifer. If the rate of groundwater use is less than or equal to the rate of recharge, water
use from aquifers can be sustained indenitely. If, however, withdrawals exceed the natural rate
of recharge, groundwater is a nonrenewable resource. Hence groundwater can be regarded as a
replenishable but depletable resource.
Figure 1.1: The Hydrologic Cycle.
Source: Cyprus Water Development Department (1999).
In certain parts of the world groundwater supplies are being depleted to the potential
detriment of future users. Supplies, which for all practical purposes will never be naturally
replenished, are being mined to satisfy current needs. Moreover, quantity is not the only
problem. Quality is also a problem, as much of the available groundwater is polluted with
chemicals, radioactive materials, salt or bacteria. Thus it is important to keep in mind that
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groundwater scarcity has an important qualitative dimension that further limits the supply of
usable water.
Abundant surface water in proximity to the location of the groundwater could serve as a
substitute for groundwater, e¤ectively setting an upper bound on the marginal cost of extrac-
tion. The user would not pay more to extract a unit of groundwater than it would cost to
acquire surface water. Unfortunately, while on a global scale the amount of available water
(surface and groundwater) exceeds current aggregate rates of demand, in many parts of the
world where groundwater overdrafts are particularly severe, the competition for surface water
is already keen because of climatic conditions, geography, patterns of use, and water pricing
policies.
Is this described allocation of groundwater e¢ cient or are there demonstrable sources of
ine¢ ciency? Answering this question requires us to be quite clear about what is meant by an
e¢ cient allocation of groundwater resources.
1.1 The E¢ cient Allocation of Scarce Groundwater.
When groundwater withdrawals exceed recharge, the resource will be mined over time until
either supplies are exhausted or the marginal cost of pumping additional water becomes pro-
hibitive. The similarity of this case to the increasing-cost, depletable-resource model allows us
to learn something about the e¢ cient allocation of groundwater over time. The rst transfer-
able implication is that a marginal user cost is associated with mining groundwater, reecting
the opportunity cost associated with the unavailability in the future of any unit of water used
in the present. An e¢ cient allocation considers this user cost, which e¤ectively signals the in
situ scarcity of the resource, which is alternatively dened as the resources scarcity rent. Thus
e¢ cient pricing of groundwater entails a unit price equal to the sum of marginal extraction cost
plus this scarcity rent. The e¢ cient extraction path for constant demand involves declining use
of groundwater over time. Marginal extraction cost (the cost of pumping the last unit to the
surface) would rise over time as the water table fell. Pumping would stop either when the water
table ran dry or when the marginal cost of pumping was either greater than the marginal benet
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of water use or greater than the marginal cost of acquiring water from some other backstop
source. The di¤erence between the e¢ ciency price of the water and the marginal extraction
cost, which equals groundwater scarcity rents, would decline over time, reaching zero at the
switch point (if a substitute were available) or the point of exhaustion (if were not).
Is the e¢ cient allocation of groundwater likely to be achieved in real world economies? If
groundwater could be purchased in a perfectly functioning market, e¢ cient pricing and alloca-
tion of the resource would be achieved through Adam Smiths invisible handand groundwater
management would not be an important policy matter. However, the di¢ culty of establishing
clear ownership rights in groundwater exploitation makes it improbable or even impossible for
markets for this resource to function competitively. For common property resources, the neo-
classical economic paradigm suggests that scarcity rents are ignored, which has several direct
consequences for groundwater allocation: pumping costs would rise too rapidly, initial price
would be too low, and too much water would be consumed by the earliest users.
The discussion above can be graphically summarized in terms of gure 1.1.13. The time
path of marginal extraction costs from existing conventional groundwater sources, such as
irrigation wells, is given by the marginal extraction cost curve. However the availability of a
backstop technology provides groundwater users with an alternative source of water, other
than irrigation wells. Unlimited quantities of water can be produced from this alternative
source at the high (assumed time invariant in the gure) unit cost P1. The e¢ ciency price path
shows the social cost of water, incorporating extraction costs as well as in situ value (scarcity
rents). Suppose that, contrary to the common situation, a competitive market for buying
and selling groundwater existed; that is, all rights to in situ groundwater could be owned
and sold independently of overlying land. The question would then be how much must a new
groundwater user pay to gain access to groundwater now used by another user. This payment
will be bounded at the high end by what prospective buyers are willing to pay, and at the
low end by what sellers are willing to accept as payment for the marginal unit of groundwater.
Consider a potential buyer contemplating a capacity addition to the level Q2. Under the supply
conditions just outlined, the buyer can either purchase water rights covering an existing source,
3A somewhat similar exposition can be found in Bowen et al. (1991).
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with extraction cost AQ3, or use the available backstop at cost CQ2. Thus for the incremental
source at capacity Q2, the buyers maximum willingness to pay, over and above extraction costs,
for existing rights is represented by the distance CA4.
Figure 1.1.1: E¢ cient Allocation for Scarce Groundwater.
The owners willingness to accept compensation in exchange for rights to a well is also
a¤ected by the scarcity situation. If todays rate of use increases by one unit, the aquifers
water table will fall (assuming negligible aquifer recharge) and the buyer will incur sooner
higher costs of extraction. Thus the instantaneous cost of water pumping currently equals the
4 If the backstop technology was not available then the buyers maximum willingness to pay for existing rights
would not be bounded by the backstop unit cost; instead the maximum willingness to pay would be bounded by
the marginal benet derived from consuming Q3. Net benets for an individual would be derived by plotting
the vertical distance between the marginal benet curve and the marginal cost of acquiring groundwater at a
given point in time. This distance depicts the maximum willingness to pay for existing groundwater rights over
and above extraction costs, in the absence of a backstop source for water. This distance becomes zero when
extraction costs become prohibitively large.
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increase in present value of future extraction costs, and identies the scarcity value attached to
the marginal well. Adding marginal extraction costs to scarcity value yields the e¢ ciency price
of extracted water depicted in the gure. The ownersreservation price at Q2, is determined
by their (assumed) awareness that any prospective buyer will have to pay more, and sooner,
for even the next-least-costly well if they refuse to sell. At (marginal) capacity Q2, potential
scarcity rent is the distance BA and represents the sellers minimum willingness to accept
payment, over and above marginal costs. The shaded area represents total scarcity value of the
resource for the time period during which the aquifer is used as the source of water; that is
before the adoption of the backstop technology.
If groundwater was available in unlimited quantities at constant cost of extraction, no
scarcity value would be generated for in situ groundwater. However, since groundwater re-
sources exhibit natural supply constraints, the scarcity rent of that water must be imposed on
current users. Only in this way will the proper incentive for conservation be created and the in-
terests of future generations of water users be preserved. Under appropriate market conditions,
the e¢ ciency price would also be the market price of extracted water, and if marginal extraction
cost was known, one could easily determine scarcity rent as a residual. But in the absence of
clear ownership rights and viable e¢ cient markets, including the scarcity value in groundwater
prices is rather di¢ cult because there are no price and quantity data from which the benet
of foregoing water usage currently as a means of reducing future costs of acquiring water, can
be estimated. In this thesis, we propose and apply three di¤erent methods which aim to an
indirect estimation of the in situ groundwater scarcity value: dynamic optimal control, hedonic
pricing and the distance function approach. The empirical analyses are based on economic and
hydrological data from the island of Cyprus, representative of semi-arid regions.
1.2 Measuring Groundwater Scarcity: Plan of the Thesis.
Chapter 2 focuses on a paradoxical empirical result that persists in the groundwater litera-
ture since 1980, when it was rst identied by Gisser and Sanchez. In essence, Gisser-Sanchezs
e¤ect (GSE) states that although serious depletion of aquifers is a major threat to many fresh-
water ecosystems all over the world, the numerical magnitude of benets of optimally managing
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groundwater is insignicant. That is, the empirical di¤erence between social benets derived
from groundwater use when current users incur the full social cost of their extraction, and those
derived under competitive-commonality conditions where scarcity rents are not fully accounted
for, is small. This result can be obtained if at least one of the following is true: (a) the hydro-
geological physical structure of aquifers is such that eliminates the pre-mentioned externality
e¤ects, (b) the marginal benet curve derived from groundwater use is very steep and as a
result not signicantly sensitive to the increase in the price of the resource implied by adding
marginal scarcity rents to marginal extraction costs, (c) the marginal value of in situ scarcity
of the resource is insignicantly small and as such its addition on marginal extraction cost
does not cause signicant behavioural changes in the market for water, (d) another positive
externality is involved in groundwater extraction that reduces the e¤ect of common property
externalities, and/or (e) there is a major fault in the way the literature attempts to measure
management benets.
Chapter 2 critically reviews both the theoretical and empirical attempts to address the GSE .
It highlights the fact that in the theoretical literature the single most important cause for the
presence of the GSE is the prevalence of very steep marginal groundwater use benet curves,
which imply that groundwater usage is not very sensitive to price. This cause amounts to point
(b) mentioned above; however there exist circumstances that its e¤ects can be eliminated. Thus
the case for di¤erent theoretical investigations is put forward. In the same chapter we also point
at various misconceptions, inaccuracies and omissions of the current state of the literature that
could potentially resolve part of the existing puzzle.
Chapter 3 assesses the GSE theoretically and empirically via simulations, in a dynamic
model with backstop technology availability. The empirical illustration of the model indicates
that in the absence of a backstop technology, the GSE is eliminated when the assumption of
innite hydraulic conductivity -commonly adopted in the groundwater literature- is not imposed
on the relevant dynamic model and natural recharge of the aquifer is sustained in the indenite
future. Intuitively, this result implies that when complete depletion of the aquifer is probable, it
is welfare increasing to manage extraction. The model developed in chapter 3 is richer and more
realistic than ones already available, because it explicitly incorporates the four main features of
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aquifersexploitation, features which have previously been studied independently but have never
before - to the best of our knowledge - been put together in a single model. These features
are, quantity and quality externalities in a common-pool aquifer, demand for groundwater
which is changing over time through endogenous adaptations to increasing resource scarcity,
and availability of a backstop technology. The solution technique used is that of multi-stage
optimal control. Simulation results from the Kiti aquifer in the island of Cyprus, suggest that
situations where the competitive solution of the model leads to complete extinction of water in
the aquifer, are likely in such semi-arid regions. Therefore the social benets from managing
the aquifer and achieving a steady-state of positive groundwater extraction to the indenite
future by sustaining aquifer recharge, are empirically signicant. This result is sharper where
groundwater scarcity is very acute and depletion of the resource is due in the near future. We
suggest that this constitutes an important element in the resolution of the GSE .
As argued in the introduction of this chapter, groundwater scarcity has an important qual-
itative dimension that further limits the supply of usable water. Chapter 4 attempts to derive
the willingness to pay (WTP) for improvements in the in situ groundwater quality, which arises
from the scarcity of this environmental attribute together with its contribution to enchancing
individualswell-being. Groundwater quality may a¤ect the productivity of land as an input
in production. Where this is so, the structure of land rents and prices will reect these envi-
ronmentally determined productivity di¤erentials. Hence, by using data on land rent or land
value for di¤erent properties we can in principle identify the contribution which the attribute
in question, fresh groundwater quality, makes to the price of the traded good, land. This iden-
ties an implicit or shadow price for the attribute fresh groundwater quality. Commonly used
to implement this approach, are the hedonic technique and the travel cost valuation methods.
Chapter 4 reviews these approaches and proposes that the hedonic approach with sample selec-
tion bias elements from the travel cost valuation method, is the most appropriate in the case of
groundwater as a land attribute, where the exogeneity assumptions would otherwise seriously
bias the results.
More specically, chapter 4 of the thesis models hedonic valuation and sample selection
simultaneity in the context of producer behaviour, and investigates empirically the case where
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land is demanded for use as an input either in agricultural production or in touristic develop-
ment. The quantiable water quality attribute is salinity. Salinity is ceteris paribus increasing
with sea proximity, which is an attribute itself valued in tourist development but not agricul-
tural production. This is the source for sample selectivity bias. The empirical econometric
analysis, based on data collected from surveying 282 owners of land parcels, uses Heckmans
two step estimation procedure and validates the hypothesis that failing to correct for sample
selection results in a biased valuation of groundwater salinity. The estimated marginal (WTP)
for fresh groundwater derived from the applied econometric analysis when correcting for sample
bias is statistically not di¤erent from zero, whereas without this correction this value appears
to have a signicant positive e¤ect on the value of land. This result indicates that ignoring
selectivity correction ignores the fact that the cost of lower groundwater quality can be o¤set by
an increasing probability of switching to the more lucrative tourism industry. It is also worth
mentioning that arguments raised in this part of the thesis have implications for hedonic price
analysis applied to housing and other goods whose quality characteristics can a¤ect sample
selection.
Moreover, the estimated WTP for groundwater quality derived from the hedonic model
corrected for sample selection, is not only statistically insignicant but also low in magnitude.
It is argued that the low private marginal WTP for improvements in groundwater quality derived
from the hedonic valuation method with sample selection, is indicative of the signicance of
the dynamic commonality e¤ect of groundwater resources in contrast to the GSE . That is,
it constitutes evidence that extraction behaviour is myopic; hence extracting agents are not
willing to pay for marginal improvements in groundwater quality today because other free-
riding agents might use the preserved groundwater quality in the future, or because they are
thinking of switching to other productive activities that use other water sources (e.g. tourism).
Chapter 5 employs duality theory to derive the in situ shadow price of unextracted ground-
water, through modelling the technology of vertically integrated agricultural rms that both
extract and use groundwater as an input in their production. The key extension of this model
on existing literature is the use of methods that do away with the need for behavioural assump-
tions, such as conventional cost minimization, which maybe violated in ine¢ ciently managed
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or regulated industries, such as agriculture. In these cases the estimation of traditional cost,
prot or revenue functions could be misleading. The method put forward uses the distance
function approach, which allows production units to operate below the production frontier, i.e.
to be ine¢ cient. By using Shephards input distance function to represent technology rather
than a cost function, we can employ a dual Shephards lemma to retrieve natural resource input
specic shadow prices. Another useful advantage of distance functions in empirical applications
is that they do not require price data to compute the parameters; only quantity data, which is
often more readily available in natural resource industries, is needed.
The empirical application of chapter 5 involves estimating a stochastic input distance func-
tion by using panel microeconomic data on agricultural production in the region of Kiti, and
deriving an estimate of the individual producers valuation of the marginal unit of groundwater
in the aquifer. Estimation results conrm the existence of signicant technical ine¢ ciencies in
production, and thus provides support for the use of the distance function in estimating nat-
ural resource shadow prices. The estimated unit shadow scarcity rent of groundwater for year
1999, is again much lower than the optimal shadow price of the resource derived by simulating
the optimization model of chapter 3, thus conrming previously derived evidence of myopic
groundwater extraction by the agricultural sector.
The concluding chapter of the thesis attempts a brief summary comparison of the mag-
nitude of in situ groundwater scarcity values and shadow price of in situ scarce groundwater
quality, derived from the three di¤erent models proposed and applied in our research. Moreover,
empirical results are used to derive inferences on extracting behaviour and assess the need for
managing the resource under consideration. The main conclusion of the work presented in this
thesis amounts to the following statement:
When groundwater scarcity is very acute and complete depletion of the aquifer is due
in the near future, the GSE disappears; thus evidence of the empirical prevalence of
myopic groundwater extraction should constitute a signal for the need for managing
groundwater resources. Implementing optimal extraction is going to be neither easy,
nor costless, hence future work should be directed towards deriving cost and benets
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of di¤erent regulatory regimes of groundwater extraction5.
1.3 Scarcity of Groundwater Resources in Cyprus.
The empirical analyses of the thesis are based on economic and hydrological data from the
island of Cyprus. Cyprus is representative of arid and semi-arid regions in general, typied by
lack of rain, spatial separation of supply and demand, irrigation-based agriculture, and overuse
of groundwater sources. Annual precipitation ranges from 290 millimeters (mm) in the west
to 1190 (mm) in the central Troodos mountains6. The mean annual long term precipitation is
515 (mm), which corresponds to 4650 million cubic meters (MCM) of water per year7. More
than 80 percent of this returns to the atmosphere as loss through evapotranspiration and less
than 20 percent, i.e. about 900 MCM; can be considered as the actual water available for use.
From this 600 MCM is surface water and the rest 300 MCM ows into the aquifers. From
the latter, about 70 MCM is lost in the form of sub-surface ow into the sea, leaving about
230 MCM for exploitation through wells, boreholes and springs.
Groundwater in Cyprus has not only been a freely accessed resource, but also a reliable
and clean one. As such, it was the rst targeted water source for exploitation in the island.
The result is that all aquifers in the island have been pumped for thousands of years and
exploited beyond their safe yield. Recent archeological ndings show that Cyprus was one of
the rst countries where boreholes were possibly dug as long ago, as 6000 years. This long term
exploitation of groundwater has caused sea intrusion into most of the coastal aquifers. However,
the extraction of groundwater continues to be a very important element of water supply, both
through o¢ cial boreholes undertaken by the government, but also legally and illegally, through
private boreholes with no control of the quantities of water extracted.
5Additional directions for future research that emerge from this thesis, are discussed in the concluding sections
of each of the consecutive chapters.
6Hydrogeological information for the island of Cyprus reported in this thesis are gathered from Hydrological
Year Books of Cyprus (Water Resources Division) for the period 1964-1999, as well as from personal interviews
with o¢ cials of the Cyprus Water Development Department.
7The island covers an area of 9250 square kilometers (km2): The south of the island is governed by the
Government of Cyprus (5727 km2) and the north is administered by the Government of Turkey (3423 km2).
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Thus the notion of common property characterizes ownership of groundwater reserves, as
the doctrine of absolute ownershipgoverns the islands land law 8. Although the doctrine con-
ditions ownership of groundwater on ownership of land overlying the aquifer (thereby limiting
access), in all other respects owners of land, own groundwater as a common property resource
subject to the rule of capture9. As argued in section 1.1, this creates a pumping cost exter-
nality among groundwater users, thereby causing a traditional market failure. The existence
of this market failure makes the scarcity rent of groundwater resources implicit; however this
rent exists as it is apparent from the fact that current extractions exceed replenishable supplies,
which implies that aquifers are being irreversibly drained. Ignoring scarcity rents in ground-
water pricing means that prices are too low, thereby inducing excessive extraction, capacity
investment and consumption. Even if water users were aware of the concept and importance
of scarcity rent, the absence of market-determined groundwater prices makes the valuation of
scarcity rents very di¢ cult. As already argued, the main aim of this thesis is to investigate the
importance of these scarcity rents and propose di¤erent approaches to measuring them.
1.4 Acknowledgments.
This brief survey of evidence suggests that water scarcity is not merely a problem to be faced
at some distant time in the future. In Cyprus, as well as in many parts of the world, it is already
a serious problem and unless preventive measures are taken, it will get worse. Moreover, given
Cyprus accession to the European Union it is worth mentioning that a thorough restructuring
process concerning European Water Policy is on the way, and a new Water Framework Directive
8As far as water-related legislation in Cyprus is concerned, it has tended to develop on an ad hoc basis. There
is no umbrella law covering water; most water related laws were enacted before 1960, and there have been only
minor modications since. These laws remain in force under Article 158 of the Constitution of the Republic, and
form the basis of resource development, interaction between the government and users, and establishment of local
water bodies. They state that all surface water, groundwater and wastewater is vested to the government which
has power to construct waterworks and undertake their management. However, private individuals have the right
to apply for permits to sink boreholes or dig wells, and it is further stated that all springs and several surface
and groundwater sources constitute private property in the form of registered water rights. At the same time,
the Government has the power to declare some groundwater aquifers to be under Special Measuresand impose
restrictions on borehole drilling and water abstraction. (Information gathered from the General Attorneys O¢ ce
of the Republic of Cyprus).
9 In section 2.2.2 of chapter 2, we provide the exact denition of this property rights regime and discuss its
e¤ects on the magnitude of commonality externalities in an aquifer.
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will be the operational tool, setting the objectives for water protection well into the next century.
What is arguably one of this Directives most important innovations is the introduction of full
cost recoverypricing. That is, by 2010 Member States will be required to ensure that the price
charged to water consumers - such as for the abstraction and distribution of freshwater and
the collection and treatment of waste water - integrates the true costs, which include scarcity
rents10. The problem of identifying and imposing these costs is not insoluble, though to date
the steps necessary to solve it have not been taken. I consider this thesis as a step towards this
direction and special thanks are due to those that made its completion possible. Since ideas
can be understood only in relation to pre-established knowledge I owe an immense, if implicit,
debt to earlier natural resource and environmental economists, as well as economists in general:
the references are partial acknowledgment of that debt.
I am also indebted to my advisor, Dr. Paul Seabright for his excellent supervision. He
has always been most generous with his time and help. He has provided me with the support,
assistance and stimulation necessary to complete this thesis. I can record with pleasure his
invaluable encouragement and assistance in helping to set straight the analyses presented in
this thesis. I am also grateful to Prof. Bob Rowthorn who had the patience to go through the
mathematical models of this thesis. I would also like to thank Prof. Richard Green and Prof.
Timothy Swanson, for helpful comments and suggestions during the time they individually
supervised this thesis. Prof. David Newbery and Prof. David Pearce examined an earlier
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Chapter 2
The Potential for Groundwater
Management: The Gisser-Sanchez
E¤ect Reconsidered.
The Gisser-Sanchez e¤ect (GSE) refers to a paradoxical empirical result, present and per-
sisting in the dynamic solutions of groundwater exploitation under di¤erent extraction regimes,
since 1980. Namely, although serious depletion of aquifers is a major threat to many freshwater
ecosystems all over the world, the benets from managing groundwater extraction are numer-
ically insignicant. Clearly, if the GSE extends to a general rule then the role and scope of
water management are severely limited. This is even more evident when we take into consider-
ation that implementing optimal extraction is not going to be costless. As argued in chapter 1,
section 1.1, allocating groundwater e¢ ciently implies a unit price equal to the sum of marginal
extraction cost plus the marginal user cost (scarcity rent) of groundwater extraction, reecting
the opportunity cost associated with the unavailability in the future of any unit of water used
in the present. Absence of management of this common-pool resource, or alternatively pres-
ence of a competitive extraction regime, refers to a situation where current users incur only
the extraction costs of their groundwater use. That is, they free-ride on the relevant scarcity
rent and as a result they impose an externality on future users. How then can it be that
the no-management (competitive) solution of groundwater exploitation is almost identical to
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the e¢ cient management (optimal control) solution, which imposes both extraction costs and
scarcity rents on current users?
The identication of this e¤ect can be rationalized in a number of alternative ways: (a)
the hydrogeological physical structure of aquifers is such that eliminates the pre-mentioned
externality e¤ects, (b) the marginal benet curve derived from groundwater use is very steep
and as a result not signicantly sensitive to the increase in the price of the resource implied
by adding marginal scarcity rents to marginal extraction costs, (c) the marginal value of in
situ scarcity of the resource is insignicantly small and as such it does not cause signicant
behavioural changes in the market for water, (d) another positive externality is involved in
groundwater extraction that reduces the e¤ect of common property externalities, and/or (e)
there is a major fault in the way the literature attempts to measure management benets. The
main aim of this chapter is to investigate which of the above reasons can be put forward as
possible explanations of the GSE and identify additional possible factors that could potentially
reduce or eliminate this e¤ect.
Moreover, the scope of this chapter is broader than an attempt to rationalize the GSE . It
also aims to investigate the broader potential for managing groundwater, given that in chapter
1 we have established that an e¢ cient allocation of groundwater is not likely to be achieved in
real world economies. Section 2.1 focuses on factors that reduce the likelihood that voluntary
agreements will be initially sought, then negotiated and nally enforced, in order to achieve an
e¢ cient groundwater allocation. Hence some form of intervention may be needed to correct the
workings of the free market. The rst step towards this goal is to understand the resources
behaviour and the behaviour of the agents involved in its exploitation. Section 2.2 identies
a number of factors that increase the complexity of this initial step. More specically, it
identies the diversity of externalities, the diversity of groundwater property rights structures,
the diversity of behaviour models for extracting agents, as well as the heterogeneity of aquifers
hydrogeological characteristics.
Given the inherent di¢ culty and complexity of managing groundwater, it is important
to establish whether there is indeed scope for managing this resource? As already argued,
this question was confronted by the economics profession in 1980s and the result was the so-
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called Gisser-Sanchez e¤ect, which essentially states that there may be negligible numerical
di¤erence between competitive and socially optimal rates of water pumping. This implies that
the numerical magnitude of the various pumping costs and common property externalities is
insignicant and that marginal cost pricing of the resource is approximately e¢ cient. Section
2.3 presents Gisser-Sanchezs model and discusses its caveats and robustness, while section
2.4 examines the models long-run robustness. Section 2.5 examines the robustness of this
e¤ect when groundwater is modelled as a di¤erential game and section 2.6 re-examines the
e¤ects robustness for tributary aquifers and for the case of conjunctive use of groundwater
and stochastic surface supplies. Section 2.7 concludes the chapter and motivates the remaining
research in the thesis.
2.1 The Di¢ culty of Managing Groundwater.
As indicated in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the issue of groundwater man-
agement is a practical concern in arid and semi-arid regions throughout the world and water
managers continue to grapple with the question of how to manage this resource. The extensive
use of groundwater in many parts of the world and related environmental harm (i.e. water
level drawdown1, aquifer mining2, saltwater intrusion3, stream baseow reduction4 and land
surface subsidence5) implies the di¢ culty of e¢ ciently and equitably dening, allocating and
1As groundwater is pumped, the water table (i.e. the top edge of the saturated medium) will typically decline.
If pumpage greatly exceeds recharge (ow into the aquifer), drawdown can be signicant. Drawdown is a concern
for two reasons: rst, lift costs increase, and second, if the water table drops below the screened depth of the
well, the well may have to be reworked or even abandoned and replaced.
2Aquifer mining refers to the withdrawal of groundwater from conned aquifers (aquifers bounded above and
below by impervious layers) and aquifers with minimal recharge rates, resulting in aquifer storage decreases.
When such aquifers are used, groundwater miners face continually higher lift costs as water levels decline, and
ultimately, turn to alternative surface water sources, reuse schemes, conservation plans, or abandonment of the
water-intensive use.
3Saltwater intrusion results as fresh groundwater is drawn down and saline water ows in to replace it. Costly
osmosis or catalysis methods have to be applied in order to treat brackish water and make it once again usable.
4Surface streams can include artesian springow from underlying aquifers. However, if the aquifers are pumped
in excess of their recharge rates, the springow, or stream baseow, can be reduced. Pumpage by upland or
upriver well owners can seriously interfere with use by those who hold rights to downstream surface water ows.
Moreover, reduced springow or stream baseow may threatened populations of rare species that live in artesian
pools.
5As groundwater is pumped and withdrawn from the pore spaces of aquifer clays, sands, and other media,
these spaces often collapse. When they collapse, overlying strata, and ultimately the land surface as well, drop.
Land surface subsidence in coastal areas can cause inundation, and in inland regions, it can damage building and
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protecting rights to a common, uid resource through market mechanisms without guidance
from publicly agreed and enforced rules. It is doubtful that groundwater pumpers are unusually
irrational or perverse. Why then well owners continue to pursue heavy groundwater use, despite
attendant to the environmetal problems mentioned above? Why do pumpers appear to ignore
these problems and fail to take steps to reduce the damage or compensate those harmed? Why
have e¢ cient well supply schemes, such as coordinated spacing arrangements, not been more
widely adopted? Why have more e¢ cient water use policies and conservation devices not been
employed? Failing these measures, why havent those responsible for the harm faced injunctions
or damage judgments?
A norms-based answer to some of these questions may simply be that the problems are just
not severe enough to merit concern or response. This argument and related research will be
critically reviewed in sections 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 of this chapter. Alternatively, it may be
the case that the problems and feasible solutions are seen, but cannot be agreed upon. We
now turn to a number of factors that reduce the likelihood that voluntary agreements will be
initially sought, then negotiated, and nally enforced and obeyed.
For many years, there was little understanding of groundwater sources, quantities, and be-
haviour. Pumpers were unaware of the e¤ects of groundwater use and unlikely to consider, much
less enter in on agreements to coordinate their use with a¤ected parties6. As time has passed,
understanding of groundwater dynamics has improved greatly, and ignorance has become less
of an excuse for groundwater abuse. Still, though, knowledge is somewhat restricted to the-
oretical generalities and aggregate supply and use gures; that is, key factors in groundwater
availability and ow often turn on site-specic and widely varying parameters such as storativ-
ity7 and conductivity8. Although not precise, knowledge about groundwater and consequently
knowledge about benets derived from groundwater management, remains costly to acquire.
road foundations.
6As a nineteenth century United States court decision laments: : : :the existence, origin, movement and course
of such waters, and the causes which govern and direct their movements,: : :are secret, occult, and concealed,
Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 311, (1861).
7Storativity is a function of the pore space volume in an aquifer and a good indicator of the amount of water
held in the aquifer, and can vary by a factor close to 3,000.
8Hydraulic conductivity is an expression of the ease with which water will ow through an aquifer, which can
uctuate by a factor of over 5,000,000.
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The costs include technical expenses such as well monitoring, aquifer computer modelling, legal
costs for negotiating and drawing contracts for surface canal and allocation of yield shares may
also arise.
Secondly, the classical prisoners dilemma can be used to frame the options facing one
pumper considering whether to cooperate with a second pumper. The prisoners dilemma is a
typical game of strategy in which individual incentives lead to a non-optimal (non-cooperative)
outcome. If a bargain for coordinating or reducing pumpage can be reached, this dilemma can
be used to describe the choices available to each pumper, considering whether to comply with
the deal he has made or not. In such a case the benets of defection are tempting (i.e. a
prompt supply of water at an individually convenient ow rate and location can be developed
immediately) and the risks of defection are quite slight (i.e. monitoring compliance with a well
pumpage scheme would be di¢ cult, given the great number, wide spacing and private location
of wells). Conversely, the benets of cooperation are di¢ cult to show given that they rely on
site-specic aspects of an aquifer and on data-intensive monitoring of pump ow rates, well sites
and screen depths, and they will only be evident in comparison with the lone-ranger pumping
scheme which the contracting pumpers have supposedly abandoned.
A third factor, related to prisoners dilemma, is introduced by the limits of self-help and
enforcing agreement. That is, if a pumper suspects that his neighbour is not complying with
a supply or use agreement, he has few e¤ective ways to enforce that agreement. First, it is
di¢ cult to identify who is defecting from the agreement. Second, even if a pumper knew who
the culprit was, he would have limited means of forcing his cooperation. In Coases (1960)
words:
...In order to carry out a market transaction, it is necessary to discover who it is
that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what
terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to
undertake the inspection needed to make sure that terms of the contract are being
observed, and so on. These operations are often extremely costly9.
9Transactions in groundwater markets (if they exist) are also costly (or even impossible if no relevant market
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Coase, 1960, p. 15.
Moreover, the di¢ culties of negotiating a cooperative agreement with another pumper and
subsequently complying with that agreement are compounded if other, third-party pumpers
are considered. The individual harms of shunning agreements or subsequently defecting from
agreements will seem small relative to the cumulative aquifer e¤ect and the pumpers foregone
wellwater. Here the pumper faces a situation similar to the paradigm posed by Hardin (1968),
referred to as the tragedy of the commons. In his words:
...Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him
to increase his herd10 without limitation - in a word that is limited. Ruin is the
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a
society that believes in freedom of the commons.
Hardin, 1968, p. 1247.
Finally, the e¤ects of racing (rule of capture) also limit the likelihood of successful voluntary
agreements for the exploitation of groundwater resources. If a pumper shares his groundwater
supply with others, he can no longer be sure that unused groundwater will remain for his use
tomorrow: another pumper may have already pumped it. His opportunity cost quickly becomes
uncertain, and more so as the number of competing pumpers grows and the size of the aquifer
diminishes. Other, more general factors may also reduce the opportunity cost: high interest
rates and dubious survival of the groundwater-dependent business may contribute. Ultimately,
there may remain little reason to forestall todays pumping to allow future withdrawals.
Viable alternative management options outside groundwater use and agreements might re-
lieve the pressure to compete with individual, group, and future pumpers. Possible options
include: (1) reducing consumption needs through conservation measures, (2) restoring the
quantity and quality of groundwater to allow future use, and (3) turning to surface sources
exists). Thus, groundwater cannot be e¢ ciently allocated through the workings of the Coase Theorem, which
states that if transaction costs are zero then location of ownership makes no di¤erence to resource use and income
can be redistributed without a¤ecting resource use.
10Hardin (1960) used the famous example of cattle-grazing to illustrate his point.
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or in the absence of abundant surface water, producing water by adopting available backstop
technologies. Each, however, has signicant costs which could make these options unattractive.
2.2 The Inherent Complexity in Modelling Groundwater Ex-
ploitation.
As it is obvious from the above brief discussion, groundwater management is an inherently
interesting resource issue, and thinking about it in broad terms provides insights to larger
questions of resource management. However, the rst step towards managing a resource is
to achieve a realistic modelling of its ow. Groundwater is analytically similar to biological
resources such as sh because the water is rechargeable as the sh are reproducible. But unlike
sh, the recharge rate of the water is not biological; that is, not stock dependent11. In this
sense, the water is like minerals or gas in the ground. But unlike these, the natural growth
(recharge) rate is not zero.
The theory of the intertemporal allocation of groundwater has been developed and studied
extensively during the last forty ve yeas12 (Milliman, 1956; Kelso, 1961; Renshaw, 1963;
Scott, 1967; Smith, 1968; Burt, 1964, 1967, 1970; Burt and Stauber, 1971; Brown and Deacon,
1972; Cummings and McFarland, 1974; Gisser and Sanchez 1980 a, b; Feinerman and Knapp,
1983; Allen and Gisser, 1984; Nieswiadomy, 1985; Worthington, Burt, and Brustkern, 1985;
Kim et. al., 1989; Burness and Brill, 1992; Provencher and Burt, 1993; Brill and Burness,
1994; Knapp and Olson, 1995; etc.). In most of the dynamic mathematical models employed
in this literature, groundwater is modelled as a resource to be depleted in a mining era before
moving to a stationary-state era. Moreover, in these models the mobility of groundwater leads
to interdependence among users; one users withdrawals inuence the conditions of production
experienced by neighboring pumpers in the future. As argued in section 1.1 of chapter 1, in
11
 However, the recharge rate can be stock dependent if the aquifer becomes nearly full and develops leaks
to the surface. This possibility however is not relevant for aquifers in arid and semi-arid regions that face
the threat of depletion. We further discuss this point in chapter 3, section 3.4.
12At its current state this theory is the twin sister of the sheries models, introduced by Gordon (1954).
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the absence of restraining property institutions the individual user tends to ignore the e¤ects
of his present pumping on the future stock of groundwater, in his private calculations of gains
and losses from groundwater use. Hence he does not incur the total social cost of his pumpage
and as a result an ine¢ cient allocation of the resource emerges.
2.2.1 Diversity of Externalities Involved in Groundwater Exploitation.
The type of externality that emerges in commonly owned aquifers has been discussed
extensively in the literature of groundwater economics and, as suggested by Gisser and Sanchez
(1980 a, b) one could consider the case of pumping an aquifer as lying between shery harvesting
at one extreme and the cutting of privately owned timber at the other. The nonexclusiveness
of the shing grounds leads to dissipation of rent as well as a possibly ine¢ cient distribution of
e¤ort over time (Cheung, 1970), whereas in the case of privately owned timber owners maximize
the present value of all future income streams. In an aquifer, exclusiveness is present to a very
large extent when only farmers who own land overlying the aquifer can pump water and as a
result other farmers are excluded from the resource. But exclusiveness is not as complete as
in the case of privately owned timber. As a result : : :the individual farmer cannot expect to
have more water in storage for him next year if he pumps less this year. Consequently, instead
of maximizing present value, farmers simply pump water each year, satisfying the condition
that the marginal cost of pumping equals the marginal physical product of water(Gisser and
Sanchez, 1980(b), p.638).
This kind of externality has been discussed in the literature before the appearance of Gisser
and Sanchezs seminal paper (Burt, 1964, 1967, 1970; Burt and Stauber, 1971; Brown and Dea-
con, 1972; Cummings and McFarland, 1974 ) and thereafter was implicitly adopted by most
researchers in the eld (Feinerman and Knapp, 1983; Allen and Gisser, 1984; Sloggett and
Mapp, 1984; Nieswiadomy, 1985; Worthington, Burt, and Brustkern, 1985; Caswell and Zil-
berman, 1986; Kim et. al., 1989; Burness and Brill, 1992; Brill and Burness, 1994 ). Clearly
their description uses the rule of capture argument. However, Gisser and Sanchezs math-
ematical model considers another type of externality, namely the pumping cost externality13.
13See below for the exact denition of the pumping cost externality and section 2.3.2 for Gisser and Sanchezs
29
Such inconsistencies between the theoretical and mathematical representations of these exter-
nalities were the rule rather than the exception in the reviewed literature, until Provencher
and Burt (1993) achieved a clarication of the di¤erent externalities relevant in groundwater
extraction.
In particular, they point to three externalities that prevent e¢ cient allocation of groundwa-
ter resources: the stock externality, the pumping cost externality14 and the risk externality15.
The stock externality, is identical to the externality described in Gisser and Sanchez (1980)
by employing the rule of capture argument. This externality arises because the pumping
decision of each rm using the groundwater resource is constrained by the total groundwater
stock. By pumping the marginal unit of groundwater stock in period (t), a rm reduces the
set of pumping alternatives available to other users in period (t+ 1). Attempts by a rm to
increase its welfare by storing groundwater are futile because other rms may gain access to
the stock; that is, a rm may lay claim to a unit of groundwater stock only by pumping it. The
pumping cost externality, is the externality described by the mathematical representation in
Gisser and Sanchez (1980 a, b) which arises because the cost of pumping groundwater depends
on the groundwater stock. By pumping the marginal unit of groundwater stock in period (t),
a rm a¤ects the cost at which other users may pump groundwater in period (t+ 1). Firms
withdraw water too quickly because, while a rms decision to reduce its rate of pumping lowers
the future pumping costs of all rms, it is not compensated for its conservation.
The risk externality was completely overlooked by the literature until the early 1990s, when
groundwater was rst treated as a contingent source of water16; i.e. as a bu¤er to seasonal
and annual revenues against the vicissitudes of surface water supply. This externality ulti-
mathematical model.
14Actually Bredehoeft and Young (1970) were the rst to identify the distinction between the stock and the
pumping cost externalities in groundwater extraction, without calling them that. However, their treatment of
these externalities was only descriptive.
15Before the taxonomy introduced by Provencher and Burt (1993), Negri (1989) discussed the strategic exter-
nality. This refers to pumping more water because of the understanding that leaving it in the ground stimulates
the pumping of ones neighbours, whereas the stock externality arises due to the niteness of the groundwater
stock. This strategic behaviour arises even when the groundwater stock is innite. Provencher and Burt treat
this strategic externality as an outcome aggravating already existing ine¢ ciencies, rather than as the source of
a distinct externality.
16See section 2.5 of this survey, on models on the allocation of groundwater when stochastic surface water
inows are the primary source of water.
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mately arises because the income risk of all water using rms is a¤ected by the total amount of
groundwater stock available for pumping. Each additional unit of groundwater stock available
for future consumption lowers income risk of all rms by increasing the bu¤er against risk, pro-
vided by the total amount of groundwater stock available for future pumping. But of course, in
its decision-making a rm considers only the private benet of risk reduction, and consequently
fails to extract groundwater at the socially optimal rate.
In the taxonomy of Smith (1969), these three externalities are all stock externalities, because
they ultimately arise due to the e¤ect of the resource stock on the pumping decisions of the rms.
However, as it became obvious from the latest developments in the groundwater literature,
their distinction is quite informative when the e¢ ciency of alternative management regimes is
considered17. The sum of these external e¤ects reects the scarcity value of groundwater, which
should be imposed on its current users if an e¢ cient dynamic allocation of the resource is to
be achieved.
2.2.2 Diversity of Possible Structures of Groundwater Property Rights.
The literature on intertemporal allocation of groundwater focuses on the e¢ ciency e¤ects
of one or more of the externalities identied above, which are assumed to arise because of the
common-property natureof the resource. As argued by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) however,
The term common property resourceis a glaring example of a term that is repeat-
edly used by political economists to refer to varying empirical situations including:
(1) property owned by a government, (2) property owned by no one, and (3) prop-
erty owned and defended by a community of resource users. The term is also used
to refer to any common-pool resource used by multiple individuals regardless of the
type of property rights involved.
Schlager and Ostrom, 1992, p. 249.
The confusion in the use of the term common propertyhas been addressed frequently (Ciriacy-
Wantrup and Bishop, 1975; Runge, 1981; Bromley 1982, 1986, 1989 ) without much impact,
17We return to this point in section 2.5.2 of this survey, when the e¢ ciency of a private property rights regime
in managing extraction from an aquifer, is considered.
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however, on its careless use. Groundwater is a characteristic example of a common-pool resource
used by multiple individuals for which economists use the term common property to characterize
its ownership structure, regardless of the exact form of property rights involved. Indeed, a
number of ownership structures can arise which lead to di¤erent degrees of exclusiveness in
groundwater exploitation. Di¤erent degrees of exclusiveness give rise to varying external e¤ects.
The magnitude of these external e¤ects is important because it a¤ects the scarcity value of the
resource.
Exclusiveness may be vague, or it may be tightly and clearly dened, depending on the
common-law doctrine governing the allocation of groundwater. Gisser (1983) argues that
groundwater rights should clearly specify the right to (a) use, (b) exclude, and (c) transfer.
Measurement (quantication) and enforcement are required in order to render this deni-
tion meaningful (Cheung, 1970). Do the three most frequently used common-law doctrines
of groundwater ownership, satisfy Gissers three-dimensional denition of a water right? The
absolute ownership (English) doctrine gives the land owner the right to pump any amount of
water from an aquifer that underlies his land and transport it elsewhere. This implies that the
element of quantication is missing from this doctrine. The reasonable use doctrine modies
the absolute use doctrine by constraining an overlying landowner to pump groundwater for a
reasonable use only. The courtsinterpretation of the term reasonable useis that landowners
cannot transport water away from the land from which it was taken if other landowners overly-
ing the same common aquifer were thereby injured18. Quantication is also missing from this
doctrine.
Gisser argues for the superiority of the prior appropriation doctrine: The main strength
of the prior appropriation doctrine is its intrinsic economic logic and its internal consistency;
it is capable of providing a stable framework for a viable groundwater market, no matter what
technology and the economy may bring in the future (Gisser, 1983, p. 1026-27). In its
general form, the appropriation doctrine establishes priority by time of application from the
18A further renement of the reasonable use doctrine gave rise to the so-called correlative rights doctrine.
Water rights to an allowed amount are distributed in proportion to the ownership share of the overlying land.
When there is a water shortage due to drought, the landowners share the burden by proportionately reducing
their use. When there is excess supply, allocation to non-overlying areas is permitted.
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appropriate state agency (rst in time, rst in right). Permits are granted if the new use is
benecial(has economic value), and if it does not conict with the rights of higher priority
users or the public interest. This doctrine establishes groundwater rights exclusively owned
and quantied based on consumptive use. Consumptive useequals pumpage minus water
inows (i.e. return ow plus natural and/or articial recharge) in the aquifer. Specically, a
groundwater user may not pump water for the purpose of transporting unlimited amounts to a
distant location; instead, he may sell his limited consumptive userights in whole, or in part,
to such a user. This implies that while ownership of consumptive use may change hands, total
depletion per unit of time may not exceed a certain upper limit. The economic e¢ ciency of the
prior appropriation regime is discussed in some detail in section 2.5.2 of this survey, where we
describe the private property rights regime as it applies to groundwater extraction.
The vast majority of papers modelling groundwater extraction assumes that only farmers
who own land over the aquifer are allowed to exploit the aquifers groundwater, whereas other
agents are excluded from pumping water from the aquifer. That is, the term common prop-
erty in the groundwater literature refers to a resource exploited by a well-dened, nite set
of rms, each of which freely chooses its rate of exploitation, hence assuming absolute owner-
ship property rights. However, the possibility implied by both the absolute and reasonable use
common law doctrines, of land not overlying the aquifer being irrigated from aquifers water, is
rarely examined in this literature. This possibility can easily reduce the extent of excludabil-
ity in the exploitation of an aquifer and give open access characteristics to the system. The
distinguishing feature of open-access resources from common-property resources is the appear-
ance of congestion externalities in the former. By allowing entry in a model of groundwater
exploitation, rivalry between di¤erent farmers increases with congestion and as a result one
farmers pumping further detracts from others pumping possibilities. Hence, the congestion
externality is an additional externality present in groundwater aquifers that have open access
characteristics, which can potentially make groundwater aquifers similar to shing grounds.
Naturally, together with the limited attention to the open access characteristics of aquifers,
the theme of the optimal level of aggregate groundwater rights associated with potential users
has also been neglected by the groundwater literature. The common practice is to tacitly assign
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the role of xing the aggregate demand curve for groundwater to Platos philosopher-king. A
notable exception to the neglect of congestion externalities by the groundwater literature is
Brown (1974), who recognized the issue of congestion externality and recommended a tax to
induce the correct level of aggregate activity. Gisser (1983), a second attempt to discuss the
open access characteristics of aquifers, argues that for a Pareto-optimal allocation a criterion
function is needed, that takes into consideration the area under the demand curve of both
incumbent and potential users. A version of water law that would allow potential users to
bargain with incumbent users over a compensation in exchange for fresh groundwater rights
would be Pareto optimal. This possibility is actually provided by the prior appropriation
doctrine.
2.2.3 Variety of Behavioural Models for Extracting Agents.
In addition to the diversity of possible types of property rights and corresponding external
e¤ects, the groundwater literature exhibits a number of alternative behavioural models that
describe di¤erent congurations of extracting agentsactions in a common-pool aquifer. By far
the most popular behavioural model is the one in which the rms using groundwater execute
myopic pumping decisions; that is, the state equation does not enter the rms decision problem
(see, for instance, Gisser and Sanchez, 1980; Feinerman and Knapp, 1983; Llop and Howitt,
1983; Allen and Gisser, 1984; Nieswiadomy, 1985; Worthington et al., 1985 19). At rst glance
this assumption seems rather peculiar. One could argue that a rational rm will eventually learn
that its pumping decisions do a¤ect the stock of groundwater and will bring this information
to bear in its pumping decision. On the other hand, one might expect this model of behaviour
to perform reasonably well when the groundwater resource is exploited by a large number of
small rms, just as the assumption of competitive price takingbehaviour no doubt accurately
depicts the situation in many input and output markets. In other words, each rm is too small a
part of the whole to give serious consideration to how its pumping decision a¤ects future water
supplies. Support for this model comes from a survey of farmers in Kern County, California,
conducted by Dixon (1989). He found that, in the absence of government control, farmers
19See section 2.3 of this survey, for further discussion on these papers.
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are apparently unconcerned with how their groundwater pumping a¤ects the future availability
of the resource; hence groundwater scarcity value is completely ignored. As it will become
apparent in the consecutive chapters, the same behaviour implications are derived from the
empirical work in this thesis.
Although myopic groundwater pumping may be a good approximation of behaviour when
the groundwater resource is exploited by a large number of small rms, and although this may
be the typical case, the appropriate characterization of pumping behaviour when the number
of rms is small remains an interesting theoretical question which is empirically relevant in
aquifers of small storage capacity. Dixon (1989), Negri (1989), and Provencher and Burt (1992)
all discuss the open and closed loop models of pumping behaviour under the common property
arrangement. In both of these models that have emerged in the literature, rm behaviour is
memoryless, in the sense that each rms pumping behaviour depends only on the current
state of nature. Firms pursuing open loop (path) strategies take the extraction paths of their
rivals as given. On the other hand, rms pursuing closed loop (feedback) strategies take the
state-dependent extraction rules of their rivals as given, where an extraction rule expresses the
groundwater pumping decision as a function of the observed groundwater stock. The closed
loop model appears to be the more realistic of the two because usually rms do not commit to
particular paths of groundwater extraction, instead they base their extraction decisions on the
observed state of nature20.
Other models of behaviour are also possible. For instance, a small number of rms or
individuals may overcome the di¢ culties mentioned in section 2.1 and cooperate to achieve
the economically e¢ cient allocation of a groundwater resource over time. Bromley (1991) for
example, points out that a nite set of users may ultimately exploit a resource at the e¢ cient rate
by developing rules governing the use of the resource. Likewise, Schlager and Ostrom (1992)
discuss the prevalence of cooperative behaviour to allocate the commons. Moreover, Dixon
(1989) discusses non-cooperative behaviour involving the use of trigger or punishment
strategies, where the credible threat of retaliation keeps all rms pumping groundwater at the
e¢ cient rate. This section intended to discuss the diversity of behavioural models relevant
20See section 2.5 of this survey for further discussion on game theoretic models of groundwater extraction.
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to the common property arrangement, and to emphasize that myopic behaviour, favoured by
the literature, represents the worst case scenariounder the common property arrangement.
That is, the myopic rm internalizes none of the social marginal user cost in its groundwater
extraction decision, while in other behavioural models the rm internalizes at least part of this
cost (for instance, the part which is private).
2.2.4 Heterogeneity and Diversity of AquifersHydrogeological Character-
istics.
Another prevalent characteristic of the reviewed literature is that it employs what hydrol-
ogists often call lumped parametermodels, as contrasted to detailed modeling of the aquifer
using many small sub-areas among which hydrologic interdependencies are taken into account.
Lumped parameter models assume that groundwater quickly adjusts to a common depth
above sea level after a local perturbation, such as caused by pumping from a well. However,
true hydraulic equilibrating ows are often slow and subject to great variability among and
within aquifers. Moreover, a basic hydrology law (Dracys Law) suggests that the amount of
lateral movement of groundwater from beneath one landowners property to anothers should
be rather modest if they are pumping at about the same rate per hectare and the local region
of the aquifer is homogeneous. Hence, when lateral groundwater movement is slow, externality
e¤ects are insignicant and private decisions of rms approximately maximize social welfare.
If aquifers are heterogeneous and water demands among users variable (which is often the
case), water in the future might have to be pumped from a greater depth and thus at greater
cost, or it may prove physically unavailable at any depth, because of losses through lateral
movement. Neighbours over deeper parts of the aquifer could rapidly pump the water from
beneath their own property, creating a large di¤erential hydraulic head and an associate lateral
movement of the groundwater. These physical and economic circumstances create considerable
risk for the individual rm in an uncontrolled pumping situation because involuntary losses of
groundwater from beneath its land can cause greater pumping costs in the future, as well as the
possibility of water becoming physically unavailable. Unfortunately such realistic hydrological
features have not been considered in economic models of groundwater extraction, perhaps due
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to the need for an interdisciplinary approach towards their construction and solution21.
What is apparent from section 2.2 as a whole, is that the task of modelling groundwater
exploitation is a complex one, facing a diversity of property rights structures and corresponding
externalities, a diversity of behavioural models possible under di¤erent ownership structures,
and a diversity of hydrogeological features possible for di¤erent aquifers22. The inherent di-
versity and complexity of this resource problem increases the di¢ culty of deriving its true in
situ scarcity. However, derivation of an exact measure of this value is needed if intervention in
the market is deemed necessary for achieving a dynamically e¢ cient allocation of groundwater
extraction. That is, scarcity rents have to be imposed on current users of the resource, over
and above extraction costs, so that they pay the full social cost of their extraction.
Sections 2.1 and 2.2 establish the di¢ culty and diversity of e¢ ciently managing groundwater,
respectively. However, an even more important question has to be answered rst before we
establish the usefulness of the discussion in these two sections of this chapter. Is there scope for
managing this resource, or is it the case that all the identied di¢ culties are irrelevant? This
would be the case if the free market allocation of the resource was approximately e¢ cient in
empirical investigations. As already argued in the introduction of this chapter, this question
was rst confronted by the economics profession in 1980 and the result was the so-called Gisser-
Sanchez e¤ect (GSE), which essentially states that there may be negligible numerical di¤erence
between competitive (myopic) and socially optimal rates of water pumping and hence little
scope for managing this resource. In section 2.3, we concentrate on the ndings and consecutive
research resulting from the seminal paper of Gisser and Sanchez (1980, a, b), which identied
this e¤ect and e¤ectively dominates the relevant literature. Section 2.4 examines the long-run
robustness of GSE. Section 2.5 reviews the research initiated by Dixon (1989), Negri (1989),
and Provencher and Burt (1992), and examines the robustness of GSE in a game theoretic
21A brief section on possible costs of using lumped parametermodels can be found in Provencher and Burt
(1994).
22However, as already argued to date most of relevant models in the literature assume that access to the
resource is limited (either institutionally or by virtue of the high cost of pumping and moving groundwater
around) to those individuals or rms with land overlying the resource. Usually left implicit is the myopic
extraction behaviour of rms under the common property arrangement. Moreover, the term common property
refers to a nite number of rms that exploit the resource without any of them holding exclusive rights to any
portion of it, and each and everyone of them free-riding on the scarcity value of the resource.
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framework, i.e. when the interaction between extracting agents is explicitly taken into account.
Section 2.6 reviews studies that examine the presence of GSE when the interlink between surface
and groundwater is recognized or the stochastic nature of groundwater recharge is acknowledged.
Finally, section 2.7 concludes the survey.
2.3 Gisser-Sanchezs Model, Caveats and Robustness.
The GSE essentially states that there is little scope for groundwater management because
the increase in social benets derived from optimally managing the resource is insignicantly
small, if compared to benets derived under no intervention in the resources market. As argued
in chapter 1, optimal management of groundwater means that current users incur both the
marginal extraction cost and the user cost (scarcity rent) of their groundwater extraction. At
rst glance, economic principles point to a number of reasons that could provide a justication of
the presence of the GSE : (a) the marginal benet curve derived from groundwater use is steep;
(b) the marginal scarcity value of in situ groundwater is insignicantly small and as a result
its addition to marginal costs of groundwater extraction cannot cause signicant behavioural
changes in the market for water; (c) there is a major fault in the way the literature attempts to
measure these benets; (d) another positive externality is involved in groundwater extraction
that reduces the e¤ects of negative commonality externalities in a groundwater basin; (e) there
is a major fault in the way the literature attempts to measure management benets. Before
an attempt to identify the cause of the GSE we rst review the work that cumulated to Gisser
and Sanchezs seminal article. Then we take a closer look at the actual model and thereafter
we discuss the models robustness.
2.3.1 Groundwater Models Before Identication of the Gisser-Sanchez Ef-
fect.
Historically, economists have taken it for granted that the divergence between the tem-
poral allocation of groundwater yielded by optimal control and the free market, is practically
signicant for social welfare because of the absence of well dened groundwater property rights
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and related resulting externalities, which lead current resource users to ignore or free-ride on
groundwater scarcity rents. As a result they acknowledged the need for the study of opti-
mal control (or equivalently, dynamic programming) of temporal groundwater allocation. Scott
(1967), Smith (1968) and Quirk and Smith (1969), suggested that the economic theory of
mining extractive natural resources can be applied to the problem of the temporal allocation
of groundwater. Problems of groundwater allocation have been studied in the context of the
theory of mine by a number of economists including Milliman (1956), Renshaw (1963) and
Kelso (1961). Then, Burt (1964, 1966, 1967, 1970) in a notable series of papers has drawn on
principles of inventory management to derive decision rules for the optimal temporal allocation
in a dynamic programming format23.
Extending Burts work, Bredehoeft and Young (1970) have incorporated a complex ground-
water model, taking account of the heterogeneity of a hypothetical aquifer24, into a simulation
program representing a groundwater basin system, and studied the e¤ects of di¤erent policy
instruments that might correct the misallocation of commonly owned groundwater. They found
that net benets from groundwater management, could amount to over $100 per acre but noted
that these benets would decline with increases in the interest rate or increases in the specic
yield coe¢ cient25 of the aquifer26. They also studied the e¢ ciency of a use tax (or extraction
fee) and a quota (or pumping rights). Their conclusions indicated that the quota policy yields
results similar to those from simulating a tax policy. However, they argued for the superiority of
a system of pumping rights, on the grounds of administrative simplicity and because it directly
removes an essential di¢ culty of common pool usage, i.e. the fact that property rights in the
23The case dealt with by Burt can be regarded as somewhat more complex than those cases studied in the
theory of the mine, in that groundwater stocks were treated as partially renewed by a stochastic process and the
value of the resource was imputed by reference to its role as an intermediate product (for production of irrigated
crops) by an industry composed of multi-product rms.
24Previous attempts to consider the problem of the optimal rate of pumping over time from a groundwater
basin have used simplied models of groundwater systems, which assumed uniformly distributed drawdowns (in
response to withdrawals) through the basin. However, as argued in section 2.2.4 of this survey, large di¤erences
in drawdown commonly occur in developing groundwater systems, which lead to great variations in water costs
and perhaps to localized economic and hydrologic failure.
25The specic yield (or alternatively, storativity coe¢ cient) of an aquifer indicates the storage capacity of a
particular aquifer.
26 In a second paper, Young and Bredehoeft (1972) applied a simulation model to a stretch of the South Platte
River in Colorado. With an innite time horizon and a real interest rate of 5%, their results suggested benets
approximately $102 per acre of irrigated cropland net of administrative costs.
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pool are ambiguous27. Building on Burts work as well, Brown and Deacon (1972) derived a
formula for a tax that should be imposed on groundwater (pumped) in order to yield the opti-
mal control solution. Then, as mentioned in section 2.2.2, Brown (1974) recognized the issue
of congestion externality in aquifers with open access characteristics, and suggested a charging
tax for the use of a unit of the variable factor to accommodate this externality.
At the same time other economists studied competitive solutions to the problem of temporal
allocation of groundwater, where scarcity rents are completely dissipated by resources users.
Gisser and Mercado (1972, 1973) in an extension of the work of Kelso (1961) and the model
discussed by Cummings and McFarland (1973), developed a competitive model for farmers
pumping water out of an aquifer by integrating the demand function for water with hydrologic
theory. They showed that in a free market, farmers will pump until the aquifer reaches an
unacceptable water level. When this point is reached farmers will either import supplemental
water or be restricted to use a smaller amount of water by being assigned water rights. Assuming
however, that at some future time farmers might reach the bottom of the aquifer anyway, they
might want to consider optimal regulation of pumping at times earlier than the actual time of
reaching the bottom. This argument poses an optimal control problem and warrants a solution
that should be compared with the case of no control. This was the departure point for Gisser
and Sanchezs work in 1980.
2.3.2 The Gisser-Sanchez E¤ect.
Indeed, it was not until Gisser and Sanchez (1980, a ,b) that the profession paused to
compare the temporal allocation of groundwater yielded by optimal control with the free market.
The basic model analyzed by Gisser and Sanchez is a simplied representation of the economic,
hydrologic and agronomic facts that must be considered relative to the irrigators choice of
water pumping. The irrigators benet function is represented by,
(t) = V [w(t)]  C[H(t)]w(t) (2.1)
27A previous study by Hirshleifer et al. (1960, p.66) also reached this conclusion.
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where (t) denotes prots at time (t) : Net farm revenues from water use w(t) (neglecting
pumping costs) is denoted by V (w) =
R w
0 p(x)dx, where p(w) is the inverse demand function
for water. C(H) is the average and marginal pumping costs per acre-foot of water, where H(t)
is the height of water table above some arbitrary reference point at time (t). The change in the
height of the water table is given by the following di¤erential equation, which represents the
hydrologic state of the aquifer (or equivalently, the environmental constraint of the problem),
_H =
1
AS
[R+ (a  1)w]; H(0) = Ho (2.2)
where (R) is constant recharge measured in acre feet per year, (a) is the constant return ow
coe¢ cient which is a pure number, (Ho) is the initial level of the water table measured in feet
above sea level, (A) is the surface area of the aquifer (uniform at all depths) measured in acres
per year, and (S) is the specic yield of the aquifer which is a pure number. Figure 2.3.1
illustrates aquifers inows and outows modelled by Gisser and Sanchezs model, where (SL)
indicates the elevation of the irrigation surface measured in feet above sea level.
More precisely, the aquifer in Gisser and Sanchezs work is modelled as a bathtub28, un-
conned aquifer29, with innite hydraulic conductivity30. Moreover, while the assumption of
constant return ow is not inappropriate, it is not innocuous in the presence of xed irrigation
technology. In particular, it suggests constant rate of water application31. As already men-
tioned, recharge is also assumed deterministic and constant, which is a reasonable assumption
28A bathtubmodel describes a single-cellaquifer, in which all users are assumed to pump from the same
aquifer and the return ow of water nds its way back into the same aquifer. Thus, implicit in a bathtubmodel
is the assumption of zero natural discharge. (Gisser and Mercado (1973) considered nonzero natural discharge.)
29 In an unconned aquifer the water table is free to uctuate as the aquifer is not bounded from above by an
impervious layer. If water from precipitation ows into the aquifer, the water level will rise. If water is withdrawn
from the aquifer, the water level will fall. The upper part of the aquifer, above the water table, is unsaturated
while the lower part is saturated.
30 Innite hydraulic conductivity implies that the aquifer will never dry up, irrespective of groundwater ex-
traction rates. This assumption is equivalent to the assumption of a bottomless aquifer. Following Brown and
Deacon (1972), Gisser and Sanchez justied their adoption of the bottomless aquifer assumption by arguing that
it is implied by the standard assumption in the literature that time goes to innity. However, if this is not the
case a steady-state solution might not be reached and as suggested by Gisser and Sanchez, either junior rights
must be called, or alternatively, if all water rights are of the same vintage, water rights should be restricted.
Moreover, Zimmerman (1990) showed that the optimal pumping rate can be substantially lower when the hy-
draulic conductivity is small enough to result in a signicant cone of depression around the well, where the water
height in the well is less than the height in the rest of the aquifer.
31English (1990) addresses this complex engineering issue.
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given that recharge is very small in the Pecos Basin32, the aquifer chosen for the application
of their model. In conjunction with the assumption of constant return ow, this implies con-
stant types of land use (i.e., no introduction of municipal and industrial uses), independence of
surface water and groundwater systems, and constant average rainfall. Moreover, sunk costs,
replacement costs, and capital costs in general are ignored, and it is implicitly assumed that
energy costs are constant. It is also implicitly assumed that the well pump capacity constraint
is nonbinding. As already mentioned, exclusiveness in Gisser and Sanchezs model is achieved
by assuming that only land overlying the aquifer can be irrigated, i.e., the demand curve does
not shift to the right over time. We believe that explicit recognition of these assumptions is
su¢ cient to make the point that Gisser and Sanchezs results should be used with caution on
real aquifer systems.
Figure 2.3.1: A model of an aquifer.
Source: Adapted from Gisser (1983).
32The Pecos Basin, located in the semi-arid region of New Mexico, is neither interconnected with surface water
nor beneted by substantial natural recharge.
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Given the above hydro-economic model, Gisser and Sanchez used the results from Gisser
and Mercados (1972) parametric linear programming to estimate empirically the linear de-
mand function for water in the Pecos Basin. They also used hydrologic parameters that were
considered realistic in the 1960s but have been revised since then. Assuming a discount rate
of 10 percent, they simulated the intertemporal water pumpage once under the assumption of
no control and once under the assumption of optimal control. The results of their simulations
were as follows:
No Control: H(t) = 1; 525 + 1; 875  exp( 0:000617)t
W (t) = 237; 000 + 213; 825  exp( 0:000617)t
Optimal Control: H(t) = 1; 538 + 1; 862  exp( 0:000613)t
W (t) = 237; 000 + 211; 056  exp( 0:000613)t
where (H) and (W ) represent the water table (measured in feet above sea level) and pump-
ing (measured in acre feet per annum), respectively. Notice that the trajectories under the
two regimes are almost identical. The wealth (present value of future income streams) was
estimated at ($309; 990; 007) under no control and at ($310; 002; 484) under optimal control.
The two gures are practically identical, implying that imposing on current groundwater users
the scarcity rents of their resource use over and above extraction costs, does not signicantly
increase welfare.
This result led them to conclude that there is no substantive quantitative di¤erence between
socially optimal (planning) rules for pumping water, wherein common property e¤ects are
considered, and the so-called competitiverates, where common property e¤ects are ignored;
hence the welfare loss due to the intertemporal misallocation of pumping e¤ort is negligible. This
conclusion amounts to the well-known Gisser-Sanchez E¤ect (GSE). More specically, Gisser
and Sanchezs comparison of the analytical solutions of the optimal control and competitive
strategies of groundwater extraction, showed that if equation (2.3) is true, then the di¤erence
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between the two strategies is so small that it can be ignored for practical consideration.

kC1(a  1)
AS
2
' 0 (2.3)
In the equation above (k) is the decrease in demand for water per $1 increase in price (i.e., the
slope of the uncompensated demand curve for groundwater), (C1) is the increase in pumping
cost per acre foot per 1 foot decline in the water table, and (a) and (AS) as given in equation
(2.2). Gisser and Sanchezs argument was that if (2.3) is true, then the rate of discount will
practically vanish from the exponents of the optimal control formulation of the problem. Thus
the exponents of the optimal control result will be practically identical with the exponents
of the competition result. As can be inferred from equation (2.3), this analytical derivation
implies that as long as the slope of the (uncompensated) demand curve for groundwater use (or
alternatively, the slope of the relevant marginal benet curve) is small relative to the aquifers
area times its storativity, then the Gisser Sanchez e¤ect will persist.
The upshot of this result is obvious: if there is no quantitative di¤erence between optimal
and competitive rates of water pumping, then policy considerations can be limited to those
which ensure that the market operates in a competitive fashion and concerns relative to rec-
tifying common property e¤ects are obviated. This is even more evident when we take into
consideration that implementing optimal extraction is not going to be costless. In other words,
the GSE establishes that the ine¢ ciency of private exploitation is not a su¢ cient condition
for public intervention since regulation of the resource would have to be based on an accurate
cost-benet analysis. This suggests that there is little or no role for water policy in the form
of pumping limitations, a conclusion which seems to contradict apparent common consensus
opinion that groundwater is becoming increasingly scarce with many aquifers facing depletion
in the foreseeable future33. At issue, of course, is whether such depletion is prematurein any
sense. To the extent that it is, then these observations are clearly dichotomous.
33See chapter 1.
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2.3.3 Testing the Robustness of the GSE :
The policy implications of the GSE arose considerable concerns that led to a number of
investigations which, at least in part considered the robustness of the e¤ect. Almost simulta-
neously to the appearance of Gisser and Sanchez paper, Noel et al. (1980) found that control
increases the value of groundwater in the Yolo basin in California by 10%, and Lee et al. (1981)
found that control raised the net benet of groundwater in the Ogallala basin by only 0.3%.
Moreover, both Feinerman and Knapp (1983) and Nieswiadomy (1985), compared the two so-
lutions by considering a wide range of parameter values in sensitivity analyses. In particular,
Feinerman and Knapp derived empirical estimates of benets from groundwater management
for Kern County in California34 with heavy reliance on groundwater supplies. Their sensi-
tivity analysis showed that these benets are quite sensitive to the water demand schedule
and interest rate35. However, in all cases considered the increase in welfare from groundwater
management was at most ten percent. Nieswiadomy (1985), utilized empirically the di¤erence
equation (2.2) given in section 2.3.2, in order to calculate annual water pumpage at the county
level from primary data. Then, using these water pumpage calculations, he estimated a water
demand equation and tested the GSE . Although his results indicated that groundwater man-
agement in the Texas High Plains36 would be unwarranted, he proceeded with a sensitivity
analysis on present value prots using di¤erent slope and intercept values for the groundwa-
ter demand curve. This analysis showed that benets from groundwater management do not
increase monotonically as the absolute value of the slope increases.
A basic assumption in Gisser and Sanchezs model is the linearity of the demand curve for
irrigation water. To study the e¤ect of this assumption on Gisser and Sanchezs conclusions,
Allen and Gisser (1984) compared optimal control and no-control strategies using a non-linear
34The Kern County in California is a major agricultural area with approximately 0.9 million acres of farmland,
which rely on both groundwater and highly variable surface supplies for irrigation water. The basin in this area
is not interconnected with surface water, but benets from substantial natural recharge.
35Bredehoeft and Young (1970) were the rst to discuss the sensitivity of the economic yield of a groundwater
basin to the interest rate and the sensitivity of the optimal temporal allocation of groundwater to the postulated
properties of the demand. They also mentioned the sensitivity of pumping costs and therefore the economic
yield, to the storage capacity (specic yield) of the aquifer, which is also one of the contributing factors to the
persistence of the GSE (see equation 2.3).
36The Basin in Texas High Plains is neither interconnected with surface water nor beneted by substantial
natural recharge. Groundwater supplies approximately 80% of all irrigation water in this region.
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demand curve and the same data. This comparison conrmed for the case of the nonlinear
demand function what had been demonstrated by the GSE for the case of a linear demand
function: namely, if the storage capacity of the aquifer is relatively large, the di¤erence between
a strategy of no control and a strategy of optimal control is small and thus can be ignored for
practical policy considerations. Furthermore, Allen and Gisser argued that optimal control may
be impossible in the real world because the true demand curve is not really known. In particular,
they demonstrated that even if simulated optimal control yields slightly better results than no
control, a strategy of no control is likely to yield better results than optimal control, unless one
can be sure that the estimated demand for groundwater is very close to the true demand. To
illustrate this point they used gure 2.3.2.
Figure 2.3.2: Simulated Optimal Control Versus No Control
Source: Allen and Gisser (1984)
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Suppose that the true and estimated demand curves for groundwater are the ones depicted in
this gure. MCoc andMCnc are the marginal extraction costs under the assumption of optimal
control and no control at a moment of time37, respectively. An optimal control management
imposes on current groundwater users both the marginal extraction cost denoted by AB; plus
the estimated marginal user cost (marginal scarcity value) denoted by BC. The sum of these two
marginal costs is then equated with the estimated value of the marginal benet of groundwater
measured by AC; hence, an optimal control regime would dictate constraining users to OA acre
feet per unit of time.
However, for the same marginal scarcity value of the resource, the true optimal level of
pumping ought to be OE acre feet per unit of time, which is consistent with equating the
marginal cost EF plus FG with the true value of marginal benet EG. A strategy of no
control would induce users to extract OH acre feet per unit of time, which is consistent with
equating the marginal cost of pumping under no control with the value of the marginal physical
product of water, marked by point K. Now, if the area times the storativity coe¢ cient of
an aquifer is large relative to natural recharge and the slope of the linear estimated demand
function is relatively small, then the likelihood that the distance between points E and H will
be smaller than the distance between points A and E is indeed high. Hence Allen and Gisser
concluded that even if simulated optimal control strategy yields a slightly greater wealth than
the simulated strategy of no control, since the true demand for water is unknown, no control
strategy has a good chance of yielding the highest wealth to users. This also implies that
the shadow user cost per unit of time, derived by the optimal control solution of the model
has no good chance of being an accurate estimate of the scarcity value of the resource under
consideration, unless the researcher is condent for the accuracy of his groundwater demand
curve estimation.
Moreover, not only a realistic estimate of the demand curve for groundwater, but also a good
approximation of the true cost curve of groundwater extraction are needed to make the com-
parison of welfare benets derived under di¤erent strategies of extraction reliable. Worthington
37MCoc is lower than MCnc because of the assumption that optimal control management will restrict farmers
to a smaller aggregate pumping, thus resulting in a higher water table trajectory than the one resulting under a
regime of no control.
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et al. (1985) applied dynamic programming38 to a model of a conned aquifer underlying the
Crow Creek Valley in southwestern Montana, to determine an optimal interseasonal allocation
of groundwater extraction from the aquifer. Firstly, their simulation results suggested that the
di¤erence between the two regimes may not be trivial if the relationship between the average
extraction cost and the water table level is not linear. In particular, they argued that although
in most groundwater studies a linear marginal pumping cost relationship is assumed, when an
aquifer is conned, the associated artesian pressure introduces an interval of sharp curvature
in the marginal cost function which contains groundwater stocks as the argument. Thus the
relationship between unit pumping cost and groundwater storage can hardly be linear. In this
study it was found to be highly nonlinear, having considerable impact on the shape of the
derived decision rule.
Secondly, their simulation results suggest that the di¤erence between the two regimes may
not be trivial if there are signicant di¤erences in land productivity. When land is assumed
to be homogeneous, the gross returns function with respect to water use tends to be nearly
linear. But with greater heterogeneity in productivity, the returns function is more concave,
and di¤erences in the optimal use policy under a common property setting are more pronounced.
This holds regardless of whether an aquifer is conned or unconned. From our point of view
this result points to the need of more theoretical work to resolve an asymmetric groundwater
pumping di¤erential game where the di¤erences in land productivity are taken into account.
The empirical evidence on the robustness of GSE until the mid-80s are summarized in table
2.3.1. The rst column in part (A) of the table reports the authors and publication dates of each
relevant research. The second column indicates whether the assumptions used in each particular
research, were signicantly di¤erent from those adopted in Gisser and Sanchezs formulation.
If not, then the model is called the baseline model. The third column presents the di¤erence
between the present value of returns from optimal allocation and the common pool allocation,
when the costs of optimal basin management are completely ignored. The interest rate (r)
38Dynamic programming represents the solution of the problem as an optimal decision rule where the rate
of water use per year is expressed as a function of the volume in storage each year. As such Worthington et
al. argued, that the dynamic programming solution of the problem provides much more information about the
decision process. By contrast, the time path solution derived from applying optimal control implies a time
path for a given initial state.
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adopted by each study is given in brackets. As already discussed, Gisser and Sanchez (1980)
found that control of the Pecos Basin of New Mexico would yield virtually the same level of
aggregate welfare as the no-control case. The follow-up study by Allen and Gisser (1984)
using a nonlinear specication for demand reached the same result. Moreover, in a study of the
southern part of the Ogallala aquifer in Texas, Lee et al. (1981) found that control raised the
net benet of groundwater by only 0.3 percent. Likewise Nieswiadomy (1985) in a study of the
Texas High Plains found that controlling groundwater pumpage would only increase prots by
0.28 percent.
However, not all studies have found such modest returns to groundwater management.
Among those studies to nd that control increases the value of groundwater by at least 10
percent are Noel et al. (1980), Feinerman and Knapp (1983), and Worthington et al. (1985).
While di¤erent basins (see column four of table 2.3.1) with di¤erent hydrologic characteristics
(see column ve of table 2.3.1) and economic parameters (see column two of table 2.3.1) were
employed in these studies, several general conclusions emerge. That is, under optimal control
management the possibility of negligible benets from groundwater management exists. This
implies that under specic circumstances, marginal extraction cost pricing of the resource leads
to an approximately e¢ cient allocation of groundwater over time. It also seems clear that man-
agement benets may di¤er from one basin to the next depending on the economic, hydrologic
and agronomic parameters. However, there are converging lines of evidence as to the sensitivity
of management benets, irrespective of the magnitude of these parameters. As indicated in
part (B) of table 2.3.1, management benets are quite sensitive to the slope of the demand
function and interest rate, moderately sensitive to aquifer storativity and size, and relatively
insensitive to other parameters. Taken together, the issues raised above suggest that a water
planner would be ill-prepared to determine the optimal allocation of groundwater over time.
However, a number of important and possibly enlightening issues, such as the long-run robust-
ness of GSE , alternative behaviour models of groundwater extraction and conjunctive use of
surface and ground water, have not been discussed yet. These are the issues we focus on in the
remaining sections of this survey.
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Table 2.3.1: Testing the Robustness of GSE (1980-1985).
Part A
Authors Model Welfare Gains1 Basin and Location Recharge
Gisser and Sanchez (1980) Baseline Model 0.01% (r=10%) Pecos Basin, New Mexico Negligible
Noel et al. (1980) Baseline Model 10.00% (r=10%) Yolo Basin, Calofornia Moderate
Lee et al. (1981) Baseline Model 0.30% (r=10%) Ogallala Basin, Texas Negligible
Feinerman and Knapp (1983) Baseline Model 10.00% (r=5%) Kern Basin, California Sustantial
Allen and Gisser (1984) Non-Linear Demand 0.01% (r=10%) Pecos Basin, New Mexico Negligible
Nieswiadomy (1985) Baseline Model 0.28% (r=10%) High Plains Basin, Texas Moderate
Worthington et al. (1985) Variable Productivity, Non-Linear Extraction Cost 28.98% (r=6%) Crow Greek Basin, Montana Moderate
1 Welfare gains = net returns (optimal allocation)   net returns (common pool). Does not consider costs of optimal basin management.
Part B
Sensitivity Analyses E¤ects on Welfare Gains Sensitivity Analyses (cont.) E¤ects on Welfare Gains (cont.)
Increase in Aquifer Area2 Negative & Moderate Increase in Energy Costs6 Positive & Small
Increase in Aquifer Storativity3 Negative & Moderate Increase in Interest Rate7 Negative & Large
Increase in Surface Inow4 Positive & Small Increase in Demand Intercept8 Positive & Moderate
Increase in Initial Lifts5 Negative & Small Increase in Demand Slope9 Positive & Large
2; 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 See for example, Feinerman and Knapp (1983). 8, 9 See for example, Nieswiadomy (1985)
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2.4 Long-Run Robustness of GSE.
2.4.1 Allowing Variable Economic Relations and Endogenous Rates of Change.
As mentioned in section 2.3.2, implicit in Gisser and Sanchezs model and in follow up
research, are the assumptions of xed economic relations (e.g. time-independent demand)
and/or exogenous and constant rates of change (e.g. constant and xed exogenous crop mix,
constant crop requirements, xed irrigation technology39, constant energy costs40, constant
exogenous types of land use, and constant hydrologic conditions). As in any long-run study
however, projected results become more tenuous as the steady-state is approached. Thus,
the estimated benet and cost functions used to derive the GSE that were based on current
observations, may bear little relation to the actual benet and cost functions when economic,
hydrologic and agronomic conditions are much di¤erent. More complex representations of
increasing resource scarcity incorporate opportunities for adaptation to the rising resource prices
that signal increasing scarcity. That is, in the long-run, adoption of new techniques, substitution
of alternative inputs, and production of a di¤erent mix of products o¤er rational responses to
increasing scarcity.
Kim et al. (1989) developed an optimal control model formulated in n discrete stages, that
incorporated the opportunity for adaptation to resource depletion41. In particular, the paper
disaggregated agricultural demand for groundwater into crop-specic linear demand curves,
and as the intertemporal shadow price of groundwater increased in a mining era, the number
of irrigated crops diminished in stages. The model suggested two supplementary traits to
a conventional intertemporal depletion path: the relative allocation of groundwater among
39Burness and Brill (1992) considered endogenous irrigation technology choice. Moreover, Shah et al. (1995)
integrated technology di¤usion within Hotellings exhaustible resource model, where the modern technology was
drip irrigation (conservation technology) used with groundwater. In their model, resource quality heterogeneity
and rising water prices were responsible for the gradual adoption of the modern technology, and under reasonable
conditions the di¤usion curve turned out to be an S-shaped function of time. Their results indicated that without
intervention, the di¤usion process will be slower than is socially optimal, and optimal resource use tax will
accelerate the di¤usion of the conservation technology and slow down excessive resource depletion caused by
market failure due to commonality conditions.
40Sloggett and Mapp (1984) discussed the implications of rising energy prices; however, they did not proceed
to an empirical investigation.
41This model is an extension of the work of Kamien and Schwartz (1981), Rossana (1985) and Tomiyama
(1985), who developed two-stage theoretical optimal control models that accounted for sequential changes
through time.
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irrigated crops and endogenous switch times describing an intertemporal cropping pattern. Both
planning and common property equilibria were derived and compared empirically. Their results
from an application to the Texas High Plains indicated that transition away from irrigation of
sorghum to dryland agriculture occurs twice as fast when done optimally. However, benets
from groundwater management were as small as $0.36 to $4.16 million (1-3.7 percent) as the
interest rate varied from 5-2 percent. Thus the GSE persists even when the opportunity of
adaptation to resource depletion is incorporated in the model under empirical investigation.
However, Kim et al. adopted the assumption of innite hydraulic conductivity and did not allow
for adoption of a backstop technology, which is realistic reaction to increasing resource scarcity.
In chapter 3 we extend this model towards these directions and re-examine the robustness of
the GSE .
Brill and Burness (1994) further explored the robustness of GSE under alternative hydro-
logic/economic hypotheses, and noted scenarios under which divergence of competitive and
optimal rates of water pumping was signicant. They found that a 2 percent annual demand
growth, laid to signicant di¤erence (16.85 percent) in socially optimal versus competitive rates
of groundwater pumping in the Ogallala aquifer42. They also found that considering declining
well yield laid to 2.95 percent divergence in net present value of benets between optimal and
competitive rates of groundwater extraction in the same aquifer. In addition, high social dis-
count rates diminished the importance of user costs and (future) pumping cost externalities in
their model, causing a convergence of competitive and planning pumping rates; conversely, low
social discount rates laid to marked divergence in these pumping rates.
2.4.2 The Issue of Discounting and Intergenerational Models of Resource
Exploitation.
As indicated above and in table 2.3.1, management benets are very sensitive to the choice
of the discount rate used in the optimal control model of groundwater extraction. Present-
value calculations and the broader issue of discounting, are central in understanding the long-
42More specically, they consider a case study of the ve countyarea in eastern New Mexico, consisting of
Curry, Roosevelt, Quay, Union, and Harding Counties, all of which overlie the Ogallala Aquifer.
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run limitations of GSE . Moreover, these issues are central in understanding the limitations of
the broader literature on the dynamic allocation of natural resources, which is handicapped
by assumptions that abstract from the realities of human demographics and the institutional
forces that guide economic development. This abstraction is not just an artifact of the historic
evolution of economic and environmental thought43. One might argue that this weakness has
its roots in the structure of the ethical framework that underpins conventional environmental
economics, i.e. utilitarianism.
Broad sense utilitarianism44 asserts that the welfare of a society at some point in time is
a function of the levels of utility of the members of that society. However, the issues with
which natural resource management in general and groundwater management in particular,
are concerned, involve choices which a¤ect di¤erent generations of people over time, so one
needs to understand utilitarianism in an intertemporal framework. The dynamic device used
in the groundwater literature, is to assume the existence of a representative agentwhose life
43Although the management of natural resources has been viewed as a dynamic problem amenable to solution
by the calculous of variation since early 1960s, it was not until Colin Clarks Mathematical Bioeconomics: The
Optimal Management of Renewable Resources(1st ed., 1976) that a mathematically consistent framework for the
dynamic solution of these problems emerged. During the formulation of this framework, however, environmental
economists agreed that resource scarcity and environmental degradation posed no signicant threat to the welfare
of future generations. See for instance, Harold Hotellings seminal article of 1931, where he o¤ered his well-known
counter-argument to Malthus (1798) and Ricardos (1821) concerns over the capacity of natural resources to
support sustained improvements in human well-being. According to Hotelling, competitive rms would manage
exhaustible resource stocks to maximize present-value prots. Competitive extraction paths would therefore
match those chosen by a social planner seeking to maximize intertemporal social surplus. In particular, Hotelling
noted that social and private discount rates must be the same for this result to hold. Subject to this caveat, the
equivalence between competitive markets and the work of a rational planner ostensibly meant that the invisible
hand was su¢ cient and policy intervention inappropriate. Moreover, Solow (1974), by introducing an exhaustible
resource to a standard model of intertemporal development, established that a sustainable consumption level
could be achieved, in principle, given su¢ cient substitutability between resource and capital inputs. Given these
results which suggest that resource scarcity and environmental degradation pose no signicant threat to the
welfare of future generations, environmental economists believed that they could safely abstract from questions
of intergenerational fairness. As a result, the profession focused on the e¢ ciency of intertemporal resource
allocation, without paying attention to intergenerational issues.
44Utilitarianism originated in the writings of David Hume (1711-1776) and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), and
found its most complete expression in the work of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), particularly in his Utilitar-
ianism (1863). Classical utilitarianism possesses three main components: (1) an assertion that outcomes can
be assessed only in terms of the extent to which they contribute to the social good, (2) a criterion as to what
contributes to the social good and (3) the principle that individual good or well-being is ordinally measurable
and comparable over persons and time. This framework has been criticized for the strength and restrictiveness
of its assumptions. Within orthodox microeconomics, the problem associated with the assertion that utility is
cardinally measurable have led economists to search for a theoretical structure that does not require one to make
such an assertion. A large part of modern economics does not require that utility be cardinally measurable.
Kneese and Schulze (1985) use the term neoclassical utilitarianism to describe such a weaker form of utilitarian
theory.
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spans from the present to the indenite future. This agent is characterized by preferences that
are additively separable in time with a positive rate of pure time preference. If ct is taken
as the individuals consumption level at dates t = 0; 1; :::, then individuals preferences are
expressed by the mathematical form
1P
t=0
u(ct)=(1 + r)
t where r > 0 and u(ct) represents the
agents instantaneous utility at each date. Although this specication is useful in the analysis
of certain problems given its simplicity and mathematical tractability, it is only one of many
possible alternatives and it is an analytical abstraction with nontrivial implications for economic
modelling (Koopmans, 1977). Yet, as far as the literature we survey is concerned, it is adopted
as a criterion for optimalgroundwater allocation without much attention to its links to ethical
theory.
Intergenerational issues did not concern the researchers in the groundwater literature, with
the exception of a short paragraph in Gisser (1983):
Unfortunately previous researchers, when they rushed to provide optimal-control
quidelines for groundwater management, assumed that aggregate demand for ground-
water is xed by some Platonic philosopher-king...There is the philosophical problem
of the inappropriateness of welfare maximization over an innite horizon. This is
the di¢ cult question of whether the current generation necessarily does a good job
of representing future generations.
Gisser, 1983, p. 1002.
Gisser also adopted Ferejohn and Pages (1978) argument that the use of the discounted present
value welfare function is inappropriate when dealing with welfare maximization over an innite
horizon, because it implies stationarity of the underlying social preference ranking. He con-
cluded however, that the only way out of this problem is to assume that the present generation
feels altruistic towards its descendants and thus represents the interests of future generations.
According to Howarth and Norgaard (1990) however, an adequate model for addressing
this problem must consider a sequence of generations with endowments of assets transferred
from each generation to the next. These generations must overlap, permitting the competitive
exchange of goods and services between them. Although overlapping generations models have
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become a standard tool in macroeconomic analysis, their use in natural resource and envi-
ronmental economics is a relatively recent development45 not yet adopted by the groundwater
literature. Given su¢ cient intergenerational transfers, cost-benet analysis may be used to im-
prove the e¢ ciency of groundwater allocation to the benet of both present and future persons.
An augmentation of transfers from present to future generations would probably drive down
the rate at which future returns from a basin are reduced to present value terms, and raise the
benets from groundwater management.
Concern over the e¤ects of current policy decisions of groundwater management on future
generations is intensied by the presence of suspected irreversibilities. For example, suppose
a particular aquifer is threatened by contamination. Remediation of the aquifer would be
extremely costly and natural bioremediation may take decades or longer. Also suppose that
the aquifer is not currently a signicant source of water for human use. There is a chance,
because of population growth, that the aquifer nevertheless may become a major source of
water for humans in the future. The uncertainty of future population growth combined with
the discounting process may result in very low weights being placed on the possible future
benets of protecting the aquifer from contamination, if the sustainability constraint46 is not
incorporated in the solution of this management problem. Consequently, a management policy
to protect the aquifer from contamination may not pass a standard cost-benet analysis, which
is the device employed by the literature for making policy decisions.
Moreover, Tsur and Zemel (1995) developed a theoretical model of optimal exploitation of
renewable groundwater resources when extraction a¤ects the probability of occurrence of an
45Using an overlapping generations framework, Kemp and Long (1980) illustrated the problem of dynamic in-
e¢ ciency for an economy constrained by an exhaustible resource. Cropper (1990) examined social willingness to
pay to reduce risks to life. Hultkrantz (1991) and Lofgren (1991) considered the problem of optimal forest man-
agement using closely similar models. Finally Burton (1993) illustrated the relationship between intertemporal
and intergenerational preferences in natural resource allocation.
46The principle of sustainable development is central in understanding the importance of using the analytical
framework of overlapping generations models when dealing with the dynamics of groundwater resources. Sus-
tainable development has emerged as a unied approach to environmental and development policy. While various
interpretations of this criterion have appeared in the literature, a common theme is that current decisions should
ensure that members of future generations have access to the resources required to enjoy life opportunities no
less satisfactory than our own (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). Given the asym-
metries of birth and time, the endowments of future generations are e¤ectively specied by their immediate
predecessors. Hence sustainability is largely a question of ensuring adequate transfers of assets from present to
future generations.
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irreversible event, where the term irreversible signies that the event occurrence renders the
resource obsolete. They found that uncertainty concerning the event occurrence has a profound
e¤ect. The expected loss due to the event occurrence is so high that it does not pay to extract
in excess of recharge, even though under certainty (i.e. when the stock level below which the
event occurs is known in advance) doing so would be benecial. Thus uncertainty about the
future availability of the resource does eliminate the GSE . This issue is further discussed in the
following section of this survey.
2.4.3 Total Economic Value of an Aquifer.
Krutilla (1967) argues that the various categories of value utilized in the determination of
total economic value are: (a) direct use value, (b) indirect use value, (c) option value, and (d)
existence value. All of these values relate to a particular decision making framework, usually
whether to conserve or convert some particular natural resource. Direct use values are those
which are comparable to those obtained from non-environmental goods and services; these ow
from individualized benets from consumption and production in the non-converted environ-
ment. The optimization models employed by the reviewed literature derive only these direct
use value of groundwater for the agricultural sector, although these are not the only values
relevant for deriving the total shadow price of the resource. Indirect use value relates to indi-
vidually received benets derived from systems remaining intact by reason of non-conversion,
e.g. the maintenance of the benets of a watershed. In chapter 4 of this thesis, we concentrate
on methods that aim to derive both direct and indirect use values for groundwater quality, in
an e¤ort to investigate whether the indirect component of use value increases signicantly the
social value of groundwater.
These rst two categories of value concern ows of services received by the current gener-
ation from the natural asset. As argued in section 2.4.2 however, current user of the resource
are not the only relevant agents whose welfare should in principle be considered in deriving
the total social value of a resource. In 1964 Burton Weisbrod introduced the concept of op-
tion value (OV), which refers to an additional value, over and above the expected value of a
goods consumption, that is attached to maintaining a goods future availability when faced
56
with uncertainty about its future demand or supply. As argued by Freeman (1993, p. 264)
however, ...it is time to expunge option value from the list of possible benets associated with
environmental protection47.
In 1974 Arrow and Fisher forwarded a di¤erent approach to option value, which represents
the value of retaining a given range of options while information is still arriving that may render
one of those options important in the future decision making. In particular they demonstrated
that relative to a situation in which the decision-maker ignores opportunities for learning, an
extra value is attached to preservation when it is realized that one may learn the true benets
of preservation. This extra value they called quasi-option value. Whether quasi-option value
exists or whether it is positive or negative for preservation depends on the nature of the uncer-
tainty48, the opportunities for gaining information, and the structure of the decision problem.
Quasi-option value is not a component of the values individuals attach to resource changes;
even if individuals utility functions were known, quasi-option value could not be estimated
separately and added into a cost-benet calculation. Quasi-option value is a benet of adopt-
ing better decision-making procedures. Its magnitude can only be revealed by comparing two
strategies where one of the strategies involves optimal sequential decision making to take ad-
vantage of information obtained by delaying irreversible resource commitments. Hence optimal
groundwater management, should be guided by not only the more traditional evaluation meth-
47Research on OV has shown that it derives from risk aversion (see for example Graham, 1981; Bishop, 1982;
Smith, 1983; Graham-Tomasi and Myers, 1990 ). Weisbrod apparently viewed the existence of positive option
value as being intuitively obvious. However, Schmalensee (1972), Anderson (1981), and Bishop (1982), showed
that even for a risk-averse individual, option value could be greater than, equal to, or less than zero depending
upon particular circumstances. Because of the theoretical contributions of authors such as Schmalensee (1972),
Graham (1981), Bishop (1982) and Smith (1987a, 1987b), we can now see that what has been called an option
value is the algebraic di¤erence between the expected value of the consumer surplus and the state-independent
willingness to pay (option price). Since these two points represent alternatives ways of measuring the same welfare
change, the di¤erence between their expected value cannot be a separate component of value. Furthermore, option
value cannot be measured separately; it can only be calculated if we have enough information on preferences to
calculate both option price and expected surplus. Finally, neither of these points on the willingness-to-pay locus
have any particular claim as a superior welfare measure.
48The type of uncertainty faced in a hydrogeological environment has been classied as either geological
uncertainty or parameter uncertainty (Freeze et al., 1990). Geological uncertainty refers to the uncertainty
associated with the location of boundaries between geological units, layers, or zones (i.e. there is an innite
number of potential geological environments). Parameter uncertainty refers to uncertainty in the parameter
values that are assigned to each of the blocks that make up the idealized representation of a hydrogeological
environment (see section 2.1 of this survey). The degree of uncertainty about either geological or parameter
uncertainty can be reduced through eld measurements and advancements in the science of hydrology. Moreover,
uncertainty arises with respect to the e¤ects of hydrogeological changes on the broader freshwater system an
aquifer belongs to, and those a¤ected by it.
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ods (such as cost-benet and environmental impact analysis) but by a pre-posterior analysis of
how future information and technology could alter the desired level of development.
Existence value, often referred to as nonuse value, is the residual category of value,
corresponding to a very wide range of motivations for which individuals might value a stock of
the resource. The majority of economists working in the eld of environmental and resource
economics accept the hypothesis of nonuse values, at least in principle, and many believe that
existence values can be large in the aggregate, at least in some circumstances49. If they are
large, ignoring them in natural resource policymaking could lead to serious errors and resource
misallocations. Beyond this, however, there is very little agreement among economists as to
terminology, denitions, what motivates people to hold these values and how to measure them
empirically. The relevant literature emphasizes the uniqueness or specialness of the resource and
the irreversibility of the loss. But there are problems in giving operational meaning to the idea of
uniqueness. In economic terms, uniqueness would be reected in the absence of substitutes and
a low price elasticity of demand. But there is no threshold on price elasticity that distinguishes
between the presence or absence of close substitutes. Similarly, long-term injury with slow
recovery could give rise to nonuse values that are of the same order of magnitude as those
associated with irreversible injury. Our understanding is that at the present time there is no
general method for determining whether groundwater is su¢ ciently unique or hydrogeological
change due to aquifer economic exploitation is of su¢ cient duration to generate important
nonuse values.
2.5 Groundwater Extraction as a Di¤erential Game.
2.5.1 Open-Loop and Feedback Nash Strategies.
During the last twenty years, environmental and resource economists have recognized that
the theory of dynamic games50 provides an extremely powerful framework for studying many
49Reviews of the evidence bearing on the hypothesis of existence values are Randall (1991) and Freeman
(1993).
50Dynamic game theory models are developed in both discrete and continuous time. The rst category encom-
passes both repeated gamesand di¤erence games, while the term di¤erential gamesapplies to the second
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of the classic questions in resource extraction, by providing economists with the possibility
to model the dynamic interactions involved in the allocation of scarce natural resources51.
As argued in section 2.2.3, this development has also attracted the interest of groundwater
economics and was employed in order to characterize pumping behaviour when the number of
rms is small. Moreover, interesting inference can be derived in comparing the steady-state
groundwater level under (a) optimal control, (b) uncontrolled strategic interaction and (c)
uncontrolled non-strategic interaction.
Dixon(1989), Negri (1989), and Provencher and Burt (1993), discuss open and closed loop
models of pumping behaviour under common property arrangements. In these papers, a rms
strategy is the groundwater extraction plan dening its behaviour in each period of its planning
horizon. An equilibrium in Nash strategies is a set of (M) admissible groundwater extraction
plans, the jth element of which maximizes the value of groundwater to the jth rm, given the
other (M   1) groundwater extraction plans in the set. The precise nature of the equilibrium
depends on whether rms pursue path or decision rule strategies. Nash equilibria in path
strategies reect the inclination of rms to take the extraction paths of the other rms exploiting
the resource as given. Nash equilibria in decision rule strategies reect the inclination of rms to
take the decision rules of the other rms exploiting the resource as given. In essence, path and
case. One of the big advantages of di¤erence and di¤erential games is that they can take into account the fact
that most externalities exhibit some form of structural time dependence. That is, not only the ow of external
e¤ects is important for the level of environmental damage and depletion, but also the stock or concentration of
external e¤ects. To model the dynamic features of these games an analytical framework which can handle in-
tertemporal objective functionals with dynamical constraints (like optimal control theory) is needed. In essence,
a di¤erential game results from the combination of an optimal control problem and a game. To be able to solve
general di¤erential games, one has to resort to solution techniques developed for optimal control problems with
only one decision maker. The two main solution techniques are Pontryagins minimum (maximum) principle and
Bellmans dynamic programming. For an optimal control problem these two methods yield the same solution
because of the principle of optimality, but for a di¤erential game the outcomes are generally di¤erent. In fact
Pontryagins minimum (maximum) principle (which amounts to a set of necessary conditions that hold only on
optimal paths, thus satisfying the Hamiltonian equation) assumes an open-loop information structure, whereas
Bellmans dynamic programming by construction leads to a feedback Nash equilibrium. In particular, the central
concept in Bellmans dynamic programming is the value function that denotes the costs-to-go for a player at time
(t) starting at time (t), given that from time (t) onwards the equilibrium strategies will be played. In continuous
time the value functions have to satisfy the so-called Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman equations.
51By the early eighties, in the analysis of private exploitation of common property resources the hypothesis
of myopic behaviour had already been replaced by the hypothesis of rationality by authors such as Levhari and
Mirman (1980) in their analysis of restricted access shery, and Eswaran and Lewis (1984 ) in their study of
a common property nonrenewable resource. Hartwick (1980), Berck and Perlo¤ (1984), Clemhout and Wan
(1985) and Van der Ploeg, (1987) are other examples in the shery literature, and McMillan and Sinn (1984),
Reinganum and Stokey (1985) and Bolle (1986) in the nonrenewable resource literature.
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decision rule formulations of playersstrategy spaces correspond to extreme assumptions about
playersabilities to make commitments about their future actions. The use of path strategies
corresponds to the assumption that commitments extend over the entire future horizon; the
use of decision rule strategies corresponds to the assumption that no commitment at all is
possible52.
However, it is becoming apparent in this literature that Nash equilibria in path strategies
are not good approximations of extracting behaviour, because it is doubtful that under the
common property regime the rms exploiting the groundwater resource will jointly commit to
a set of path strategies, especially in light of the stochastic processes which place a premium
on exibility in decision making. The alternative equilibrium concept is a type of Markov-Nash
equilibria, in which the decision rules of rms at time (t) are a function of only the current values
of the state variables53. Given that rms usually base their extraction decisions on the observed
state of nature, feedback equilibria seem to be a more realistic description of actual behaviour
and as a result appear more prominently in the groundwater literature. Moreover, as shown
in Negris groundwater pumping di¤erential game where open-loop and feedback equilibria
are theoretically compared, the open-loop solution captures only the pumping cost externality
whereas the feedback solution captures both, the pumping cost externality and the strategic
externality54, and exacerbates the ine¢ cient exploitation of the aquifer compared to open-loop
solution. Although the existence and uniqueness of the feedback solution are assumed rather
than proven by Negri, his result allows us to distinguish between cost and strategic externalities.
In Provencher and Burt (1993) optimal and feedback equilibria, computed using discrete-
52Both approaches have been used in the industrial organization literature. For example, path strategies have
been used to study investment in a new market (Spence, 1979), the learning curve (Spence, 1981; Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1982), the extraction of nonrenewable resources (Crawford et al., 1980; Dasgupta and Heal, 1979;
Lewis and Schmalensee, 1980; Loury, 1980; and Salant, 1979), limit pricing (Flaherty, 1980), and cost-reducing
investment (Flaherty, 1979). Decision rule strategies have been used to study the arms race (Simaan and Cruz,
1975), the extraction of renewable resources (Levhari and Mirman, 1982) and nonrenewable resources (Stokey,
1981; Eswaran and Lewis, 1984), oligopoly theory (Clemhout et al., 1973), and research and development
(Reinganum, 1981, 1982). The last four papers describe situations in which the path and decision rule equilibria
coincide (in general, open-loop Nash equilibria and linear feedback Nash equilibria di¤er, unless players do not
inuence each others state, so that the game aspect from a di¤erential game disappears). The two types of
strategies were rst compared and contrasted in Kydland (1975).
53Karp (1990) refers to such Markov-Nash equilibria as memoryless feedbackequilibria, because the decisions
of rms do not depend on the past behaviour of other rms.
54See section 2.2.3 of this survey for the exact denition of these externalities.
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time dynamic programming, are compared. The authors explore dynamic ine¢ ciencies via
Kuhn-Tucker conditions55. They conclude that if the value function is concave56 then strategic
behaviour increases the ine¢ ciency of private groundwater exploitation. They further conclude
that the steady-state groundwater reserves attained when rms use decision rules strategies are
bounded from below by the steady-state arising when rms are myopic and from above by the
steady-state arising from optimal exploitation.
Moreover, Dixon (1989), examined other equilibria involving decision rule strategies known
as punishment strategy (trigger strategy) equilibria. In the context of groundwater exploitation,
these equilibria are typically (though not necessarily) characterized by the result that aggregate
welfare is maximized by the credible threat of all rms to pump groundwater at sub-optimal
rates if any rm defects from the optimal rate of groundwater pumping. These equilibria are
not memory-less because in a stochastic environment the decision rules of rms in period (t)
depend on more than just the state of nature in period (t); they also depend on past behaviour
of rms, or equivalently, on the state of nature in period (t  1). However, as economic intuition
suggests, Dixon found evidence from a survey of farmers in Kern County, California, that when
the number of rms using the groundwater resource is large, trigger strategy equilibria are
unlikely to evolve.
It has been usual in the di¤erential game literature to resort to linear strategies to obtain
feedback equilibria (see for instance, Levhari and Mirman (1980), Eswaran and Lewis (1984)
and Reynolds (1987))57. However, since the publication of Tsutsui and Minos (1990) paper,
55Kuhn-Tucker conditions are the rst-order conditions necessary for the solution of a concave programming
problem, i.e. a problem where function constraints are set as weak inequalities and these constraints as well as
objective functions are all concave.
56The concavity of the value function (which represents the present value of net returns over an innite planning
horizon under an optimal policy) is intuitively appealing for models of groundwater extraction, because it implies
diminishing returns to the resource stock. Nonetheless, the properties of the value function must be derived,
not assumed. Beckmann (1968) presents the conditions for the concavity of the value function as: (a) a concave
criterion function, and (b) a convex constraint set, or as suggested by Kennedy (1986), a negative or equal to
zero second derivative of resource stock in period t+ 1 with respect to resource stock in period t. In Provencher
and Burts dynamic game, although it is easy enough to assert that the criterion function is concave, the relevant
constraint includes the equilibrium solution of the game so it cannot be assumed that a convex constraint set
exists. This impasse is broken only when the number of identical extracting rms falls to one, in which case the
equilibrium solution is eliminated from the constraint of their maximization problem.
57Much research in game theory has focused on the question of whether, in a dynamic context, cooperative
outcomes can be made self-enforcing, so that the prisoners dilemma disappears. The main result in repeated
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calculation of nonlinear strategies has become more frequent. Tsutsui and Mino examine, for
a di¤erential game taking place in a duopolistic competitive environment with sticky prices,
whether it is possible to construct a more e¢ cient feedback equilibrium using nonlinear strate-
gies. They conclude that it is not possible to construct a feedback equilibrium which supports
the cooperative or collusive price, in other words, it is not possible to get a result equivalent
to the Folk theorem in repeated games. Nevertheless, they nd that there exist feedback equi-
libria which approach the cooperative solution more than the open-loop equilibrium. In the
context of environmental economics literature Dockner and Long (1993) have obtained results
identical to the ones shown by Tsutsui and Mino for a symmetric di¤erential game of inter-
national pollution control with two countries, and Wirl and Dockner (1995) have proved that
cooperation between an energy cartel and a consumersgovernment is not necessary to reach
the e¢ cient long-run concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. These precedents point to possi-
bilities of future research as far as the groundwater di¤erential game is concerned. That is one
could compute the feedback equilibria of the groundwater pumping di¤erential game resorting
to nonlinear strategies, with the aim of examining whether strategic behaviour plays against
the e¢ ciency of the solution and increases the probability of elimination of the GSE , as has
been established by Negri and Provencher and Burt; or whether strategic behaviour plays for
the e¢ ciency of the solution and further increases the probability of persistence of the GSE , as
seems to happen in Tsutsui and Mino, Docker and Long and Wirls papers.
games is the well-known folk theorem; that is, playing trigger strategies any feasible, individually rational payo¤
can be sustained in a (subgame-perfect) Nash equilibrium as long as each player has a payo¤ at least as large
as what that player can guarantee for him/herself and as long as the players are su¢ ciently patient (Fudenberg
and Maskin, 1986). However, a similar result has not yet been developed for di¤erential games. Some research
has been done on closed-loop memory equilibria in which the players can condition their actions not only on the
current state but also on the past states. In this framework equilibria exist which are a Pareto improvement over
the linear feedback Nash equilibrium, but this line of research was not pursued any further. The most promising
development has been the discovery of non-quadratic value functions that satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equations of a symmetric linear-quadratic di¤erential game with one state variable and an innite horizon. These
value functions lead to non-linear feedback Nash equilibria that can almost sustain the cooperative outcome
(Tsutsui and Mino, 1990). To be precise Tsutsui and Mino showed that, as the discount rate approaches zero
there exists a steady-state feedback equilibrium that asymptotically approaches the steady-state cooperative
or collusive price. A drawback of this approach, is that equilibrium strategies become very complex and it is
questionable whether they have any practical relevance. Ces¸ar (1994), however, showed how simpler trigger
strategies can be used to make cooperation sustainable in a di¤erential game. By considering outcomes on the
Pareto frontier only, he proves that the folk theorem holds for a particular type of di¤erential games. Theses game
theoretic developments could provide us with interesting ways to secure cooperation in groundwater extraction
models.
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Furthermore, the combination of the literature of dynamic game theory with the literature
on uncertainty/irreversibility, can give interesting insights to the problem of how to secure
cooperation to reduce groundwater depletion and how to respond to the considerable uncertainty
about the extent of resulting damages of groundwater depletion on the various users interlinked
through wetland ecosystems. Ulph (1998) shows that by combining the two literatures, some
of the results from the separate literatures are not robust. Specically, the conclusions about
the di¤erences in resource depletion rates between cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria
carry over to a world of uncertainty and learning, as do the conclusions about the benets
from cooperation. However, the conclusions from the literature on uncertainty, irreversibility
and learning for a single decision maker do not generalize to a world of many players acting
non-cooperatively: in a non-cooperative equilibrium better information could make all players
worse o¤. This possibility of information having a negative value arises when externalities
have very di¤erent implications in terms of costs and benets for di¤erent players, which, as
argued in section (2.2.4), is a plausible conguration in the extraction of groundwater from a
heterogeneous aquifer. Once again we point to the need for more theoretical work to resolve an
asymmetric groundwater pumping di¤erential game under uncertainty and establish whether
irreversibility and learning plays against the e¢ ciency of the non-cooperative solution of the
extracting game; a result that could eliminate or reduce the signicance of the GSE .
2.5.2 Private Property Rights Regime in a Commons Aquifer.
The remedy usually prescribed by the literature for the ine¢ ciencies arising in common
property groundwater extraction, is central (optimal) control by a regulator, who uses taxes
or quotas to obtain the e¢ cient allocation of resource over time. When di¤erential games
are used in the general environmental literature, the instrument considered to implement the
full-cooperative outcome is, apart from side payments, a tax or a tradable permit scheme58.
In the context of groundwater depletion Young and Bredehoeft (1972), Smith (1977)59, Gisser
58For example, Hoel (1993) studied the impact of imposing a carbon tax and showed that a tradable permit
scheme can achieve the same result as a tax.
59Smith (1977) was the rst to suggest privatizing the groundwater resource.
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(1983), Anderson et al. (1983)60, Provencher (1993)61 and Provencher and Burt (1993, 1994),
suggested a similar institutional arrangement in which private shares to the groundwater stock
are established. In these works privatization does not mean that groundwater users are assigned
particular units of groundwater stock - say for instance, those units directly beneath their land.
Such a scheme would be impossible to operationalize, due to the fugitive nature of the resource.
Nor did they mean that rms hold permits assigned each year by a regulator controlling the
annual aggregate level of groundwater pumping62. In their framework, rms are granted an
endowment of tradeable permits to the in situ groundwater stock, which they control over
time63. Each rms bundle of permits represents its private stock of groundwater. This private
stock declines due to groundwater pumping and increases to reect the rms share of periodic
recharge. It also changes in response to the rms activity in the market for groundwater stock
permits, increasing when permits are purchased and decreasing when permits are sold. As a
practical matter, the market price for permits serves to allocate groundwater over time.
This particular regime is economically ine¢ cient; both the pumping cost externality and
the risk externality (present in stochastic frameworks, where groundwater is treated as a bu¤er
to surface water drought) persist after the allocation of permits64. Moreover, this regime is
time-inconsistent65. However, attempts to quantify the value of groundwater resource under
60Anderson et al. (1983) were the rst to informally analyze groundwater privatization. In particular, they
pointed out that privatizing the groundwater stock eliminates the stock externality, but not the pumping cost
externality. In this light, the relative merit of the privatization scheme rests with the relative importance of the
stock and pumping cost externalities; where the stock externality is a signicant source of overpumping, and
the pumping cost externality is unimportant, the privatization scheme could prove to be a practical alternative
to central control. Moreover, they suggested that a private property rights regime may provide rms with risk
benets not available under central control. The next section of this survey elaborates on the treatment of risk
externality in the context of groundwater extraction.
61 In particular, Provencher (1993) examined in a deterministic setting the applicability of the tradable permit
scheme for the case where the groundwater resource is already pumped too deep,that is, beyond the optimal
steady-state, and the task of the regulator is to return the water table to its optimal steady-state.
62Gisser (1983 ) refers to such permits as groundwater pumping rights,but clearly such a permit system is
simply a way to operationalize a depletion path guided by central control.
63Dudley (1988) examines this arrangement in the context of reservoir management, and refers to it as capacity
sharing.
64The ine¢ ciency of the private property rights regime let economists to generally overlook this regime as
a means to manage resources like groundwater. For instance, Dasgupta and Heal (1979), discuss the futility
of privatizing fugitive resources like groundwater and oil. Their argument concerned regimes granting rms
entitlements to particular units of the resource. As argued above however, in the private property rights regime
proposed in the groundwater literature, a rm is entitled to a particular number of units of the resource, via its
endowment of permits, but is not entitled to particular units of the resource.
65As argued by Provencher (1993), ... the most problematic aspect of the private property rights regime
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both central (optimal) control and the private property rights regime indicate that ground-
water privatization recovers most of the potential gain from management. In particular, in
Provenchers (1993) programming model of Madera County California this regime recovered
95% of the potential gain from management66; likewise, in a somewhat more complicated sto-
chastic dynamic programming model of the same region, Provencher and Burt (1994) found
that the private property rights regime recovers about 80% of the expected welfare gain from
groundwater management. Given that under a private property rights regime both the pump-
ing cost and the risk externalities persist, these ndings may be attributed to the fact that
this regime is more capable than others to exploit the private information held by rms. They
may also suggest that the risk and pumping stock externalities are not important factors con-
tributing to the ine¢ ciency of unconstrained groundwater extraction. In the next section of
this thesis we review research that investigates whether the elimination of the risk externality,
contributes to the elimination of the GSE in stochastic frameworks of groundwater extraction.
Signicantly, although the private property rights regime recovers a relatively large pro-
portion of the potential gain from groundwater management, this gain is relatively small, in
agreement with GSE . In particular, Dixon (1989) found that control raised the net benet of
is not its economic ine¢ ciency ... but rather its time-inconsistency. Time inconsistency is the conundrum
faced by regulators whose optimal policy depends on the initial state of nature. In general, there are two
versions of dynamic consistency: the weak and the strong version. Weak time-consistency requires that along
the equilibrium path, the continuation of a Nash equilibrium strategy remains a Nash equilibrium. Strong time-
consistency implies subgame perfection, requiring that this property holds at every subgame, not just those
along the equilibrium path. For example, the path strategy Nash equilibrium is dynamically consistent, but not
subgame perfect for K  2, where K is the number of periods in a path strategy game. Dynamic inconsistency
is frequently a feature of games with leader / follower structure. There is a sizable macro-economic literature on
this topic, while Newbery (1981) provides an analysis of dynamic inconsistency in a resource extraction context.
As far as the private property rights regime is concerned, the positive price of groundwater stock permits is
derived not from the regulators initial allocation of groundwater stock permits, but rather from the regulators
initial allocation of stock permits implied by the rst binding minimum. Typically the minimum water table that
maximizes welfare given the current state of the resource is not the same one that would maximize welfare given
the state of the groundwater resource in the future. This conundrum reects the time inconsistency of policy
instruments (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). In the context of the implementation of the private groundwater
property rights regime, a credible solution to the time inconsistency problem, suggested by Provencher and
Burt (1994), is to set the minimum water table at its steady-state level, as determined from the regulators
optimization problem, and to deny the regulator the discretionary power to change this minimum. In a strict
sense this approach is usually suboptimal, but it nonetheless goes a long way to ensuring the viability of the
private property rights regime.
66Although Provenchers (1993) theoretical model was formulated in a deterministic framework, he used a
stochastic dynamic programming model for his empirical analysis. The only source of uncertainty that he
introduced in his empirical model is the stochastic delivery of the Central Valley Project to one of the groundwater
basins he considered in his three-cell aquifer model.
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groundwater in the Kern County California by 0.3 percent, Provencher (1993) found that con-
trol raised the value of groundwater resource of Madera County California by 2-3 percent and
Provencher and Burt (1994) by 4-5 percent for the same basin67. In this regard, the simulated
value of groundwater stock of the Central Valley under the private property rights regime, is
the latest contribution to the recent literature nding low returns to groundwater management.
Still, the conclusion that there is no need to manage the Central Valleys groundwater
resource would be premature. The low returns to groundwater management in Kern and Madera
Counties reect the large surface water delivery to the county. In areas where surface water
deliveries are not so large, or where future surface water supplies dwindle as water is redirected to
urban uses, groundwater management could yield large welfare gains. Moreover, when rms are
risk averse the private property rights regime o¤ers potential benets from risk management not
available under the common property arrangement68. As already argued in this section of the
thesis, the theoretical models developed by Provencher (1993) and Provencher and Burt (1994)
do not acknowledge the stochastic nature of groundwater recharge, whereas their empirical
models are developed in a stochastic framework where rms are assumed to be risk neutral.
The next section reviews recent developments in the groundwater literature that not only
acknowledge the stochastic nature of groundwater recharge in their theoretical representations,
but they also take into account the hydrologic link between surface water and groundwater
resources.
2.6 Models of Tributary Aquifers and Stochastic Surface Sup-
plies.
In Gissers (1983) taxonomy aquifers are categorized in the following three major nat-
ural forms: (a) aquifers that are neither interconnected with surface water nor beneted by
substantial natural recharge [e.g. the Ogallala basin (which underlines part of Texas, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Colorado, Nebraska, and Kansas) and the Tucson basin in Arizona]; (b)
67Table 2.6.1 in section 2.6 of this chapter, summarizes the results of empirical investigations conducted from
the mid eighties until today.
68We further discuss this issue in section 2.6.2.
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aquifers that are not interconnected with surface water but beneted by substantial natural
recharge [e.g. the Kern County aquifer in California]; and (c) aquifers that are interconnected
with surface water and are either beneted by substantial natural recharge or not beneted
by considerable recharge [e.g. the aquifer of the Rio Grande, which is interconnected with the
Rio Grande]. A tributary aquifer is characterized by a groundwater stock that is hydrologically
connected to a body of surface water and as such falls under category (c) of Gissers taxonomy.
In a tributary aquifer, surface water may recharge the underground aquifer, or groundwater
may supplement surface ows depending upon hydrological conditions.
2.6.1 Tributary Aquifers with River E¤ects.
As mentioned in section 2.3.1, the rst and most extensive studies of conjunctive use of
surface water and groundwater is found in Burt (1964, 1966, 1967, 1970), where groundwater
stocks were modelled as partially renewed by a stochastic process. Burts analysis, however,
modelled surface water and groundwater as substitute goods, abstracting from the problems as-
sociated with the lagged hydrologic e¤ect present in a tributary aquifer. Subsequently, Nieswand
and Granstran (1971) attempted to incorporate the so called river e¤ectsinto a model of con-
junctive use water management. These are the e¤ects of connection between a groundwater
stock and a body of surface water. However, their focus was more on the relationship between
uncertain river ows and the availability of water than on the link between pumping and surface
water supply. Moreover, Young et al. (1986) considered the case of the farmers in Colorado
relying on the South Platte River for irrigation water, which were found to be adversely a¤ected
by pumping from a groundwater deposit associated with the river.
Burness and Martin (1988) were the rst to develop an analytical economic model which
focused primarily on the hydrologic link between surface and groundwater, by modelling the
instantaneous rate of aquifer recharge caused by groundwater pumping, through river e¤ects.
They modelled such river e¤ects as externalities which reinforced groundwater overpumping
present due to the usual common property e¤ects. Their conclusion was that optimal pol-
icy requires compensation to be paid for both river e¤ects and aquifer depletion net of river
e¤ects. This work points to an additional externality created by groundwater pumping that
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can be corrected with the appropriate management, and potentially increase the signicance
of groundwater management benets to the society. However, Burness and Martin did not
proceed to an empirical estimation of these benets.
2.6.2 Conjunctive Use of Groundwater with Stochastic Surface Water Sup-
plies.
Unfortunately, there exists no literature on models focusing primarily on the hydrologic
link between ground and surface water and at the same time acknowledging the stochastic
nature of surface water supplies. Instead, the literature on stochastic surface supplies adopted
Burts (1964) analysis, where surface water and groundwater are modelled as substitute goods
and aquifers are not interconnected with surface water, but are beneted by substantial natural
recharge; that is, aquifers that fall under category (b) in Gissers (1983) taxonomy. One of the
interesting issues that arises in this context, is whether a groundwater resource is more valuable
in a stochastic setting than in a deterministic69 one.
Feinerman and Knapp (1983) were the rst to investigate the case of stochastic surface
supplies which they assumed to be independently and identically distributed normal random
variables. They found that the probability distribution of the lift converged to a steady-state
distribution with constant variance and a mean equal to the deterministic steady-state. More-
over, expected benets from groundwater management in Kern County in California under
uncertainty, were found to be similar to expected benets under certainty. As a result the
authors did not pursue the uncertainty case any further. Tsur (1990) and Tsur and Graham-
Tomasi (1991) however, argued that economic intuition suggests that groundwater is underval-
ued in a deterministic setting, because such a setting fails to consider the role of the resource
as a bu¤er against surface water drought. This intuition was supported by simulations for the
Negev Desert in Israel reported in Tsur and Graham-Tomasi. The authors found that the bu¤er
value of groundwater ranged from 5% to 84% of the total value of the resource, depending on
extraction costs, the variability of surface water inows, and aquifer size.
69The typical approach of removing uncertainty from a model is to x random variable at their means.
68
Interestingly however, the positive sign on the bu¤er value is an empirical result, not a
theoretical one. That is, one cannot rely solely on microeconomic rst principles to prove
that groundwater is undervalued in a deterministic analysis; additional assumptions are neces-
sary. Under central (optimal) control the bu¤er value is positive if the rm-level unconditional
expected present value of net revenues from groundwater consumption, is greater than the
rm-level conditional (i.e. conditional on random surface water supplies being xed at their
means) expected present value of net revenues, for all feasible values of the groundwater stock.
By Jensens inequality70, this relationship holds if the value function is convex in surface water
supplies for all feasible values of groundwater stock. In Tsur and Graham-Tomasis (1991)
model, such is the case if (a) net revenues are concave in groundwater at time (t) and the
total volume of water consumed at time (t), and (b) the third derivative of the water revenue
function is not negative over the economically relevant range of consumed water volume. Con-
dition (b) is not sustained by rst principles alone. Recalling that the derived demand for
water is the inverse of the revenue function, this condition requires that the demand for water
is convex. Although this is certainly plausible, and perhaps empirically prevalent, its violation
does not violate the standard assumptions of the neoclassical paradigm. Generally, if we accept
that in the real world the bu¤er value of groundwater is usually positive, then deterministic
analyses usually underestimate the scarcity value of the resource, and the benets derived from
managing this resource.
Moreover, Provencher and Burt (1993, 1994) argued that managing groundwater by adopt-
ing the regime of private tradeable water permits71, may generate considerable welfare in a
stochastic framework by providing opportunities for risk management72. Figure (3.6.1) pro-
vides an illustrative example of how the groundwater stock a¤ects income risk. As drawn, this
70Jensen Inequality Theorem: Let  be a random variable from a probability space (
;B; P ) into a nite closed
interval on R and let q be a convex function on R. Then for any sub--algebra Bo of B;
q[EBo()]  EBoq() i
Particularly
q[E()]  Eq() ii
Corollary: (i) and (ii) hold for any random variable  into any closed subset of R provided that the conditional
expectations EBo() and EBo [q()] exist. (Source: Bergström, 1982, p. 73-6).
71See section 2.5.2 for the exact description of this regime.
72See section 2.2.1 for the exact denition of risk externality.
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gure reects the simplifying assumptions that surface water is delivered to rms at no cost,
and groundwater pumping is costless. Under these assumptions surface water and groundwater
are perfect substitutes; thus there is no economical reason to distinguish among them in the
production process. Hence, production income in period 2 (of a two-period model) may be
expressed as a function of only the rms total water consumption, denoted by (w2) : More-
over, production income is a drawn by assumption as a monotonically increasing and concave
function of water consumption.
Figure 3.6.1: The e¤ect of the total groundwater stock on income risk.
Source: Provencher and Burt (1994).
Given the situation described by this gure, each of the (M) identical rms consumes
(w2 = q2 + x2=M) units of water in the terminal period, where (q2) is each rms random
exogenous water allocation in period 2 and (x2) is the basin-wide stock of groundwater in
period 2. Hence, the magnitude of the total groundwater stock has a mean-shifting e¤ect on the
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distribution of the rms water consumption, shown in the gure by presenting two particular
density functions of water consumption (fw j ex2) and (fw j bx2), that have the same shape but
are positioned di¤erently. In particular, the former density function is characterized by a high
level of total carryover stock, (ex2), while the latter density function is characterized by a low
level of total carryover stock, (bx2)73: The density functions of production income are identied
by the notation (fh j x2) ; and are obtained graphically by using the income curve (h(w2))
to map the density function of water consumption into the probability space of production
income. The gure shows that, insofar as production income is concave in water consumption,
the distribution of a rms income from productive activities is more compact - that is, less risky
- at relatively high levels of total groundwater stock than at relatively low levels. As stated
by Provencher and Burt (1994), the intuition behind this result is straightforward: when the
stock of available groundwater is large, water is not scarce, and so productive activities are
insensitive to the vicissitudes of surface water supply.
Furthermore, Provencher and Burt (1994) argue that the negative correlation between pro-
duction income and income from groundwater stock permits (that is, water scarcity reduces
production income but increases the price of groundwater stock permits, thereby increasing
stock trade income) provides a means of risk management not available under central control.
Additional means of managing the riskiness of water consumption include among others, the
construction of surface reservoirs, the use articial recharge74 and the production of desalina-
tion water. That is, surface water inows are not necessarily purely exogenous; water managers
can exert some control over inows. By Jensens inequality, because the water revenue function
is concave in water consumption, surface water inows are more valuable when xed at their
mean value, than when drawn from the natural distribution of inows. This result suggests the
potential for welfare gains from smoothing surface water inows. Note, however, that this
rationale is diminished by the presence of groundwater, which is itself a source of water con-
sumption smoothing. In this context, the bu¤er value of groundwater is the welfare gain from
73All density functions in the gure are associated with density axes that are suppressed for the sake of clarity.
74The variability of net revenues can be further reduced by using excess inows in wet periods to recharge
the groundwater resource, thereby reducing groundwater pumping costs in dry periods. Reichard and Bredehoeft
(1984), Danskin and Gorelick (1985), Pyle (1988), Danskin (1990), Pyle and Iger (1990) have studied the
practice of diverting surface water to groundwater.
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postponing (perhaps indenitely) those inow-smoothing surface water projects which would
prove economical to undertake immediately in the absence of groundwater. In other words,
because groundwater is available, costly projects to smooth surface water ows - projects which
would otherwise pass a benet-cost test - are optimally postponed.
The question that remains to be answered, however, is whether the bu¤er value of groundwa-
ter is signicant enough to make the return to groundwater management practically signicant.
The answer to this question turns on the relative magnitude of the bu¤er values under central
(optimal) control and the common property arrangement. If the bu¤er value of the ground-
water resource is about the same under the common property arrangement as under central
control, the common practice in groundwater literature, of calculating the return to ground-
water management in a deterministic setting provides a good estimate of the truereturn to
management. Still, this is once again an empirical question. A relevant study75 is the one by
Knapp and Olson (1995).
Knapp and Olsons (1995) analytical solutions for optimal management and common prop-
erty regimes were characterized using lattice programming methods76. In particular, they
considered joint operation of a surface reservoir and groundwater aquifer, where reservoir in-
ows are stochastic and outows can be used for irrigation or for recharge to the aquifer77. By
contrasting e¢ cient groundwater use to common property use they nd that common property
withdrawals are larger than e¢ cient withdrawals for similar values of the state variables, re-
sulting in signicantly greater pumping depths in the steady state. Despite this however, they
75As indicated in section 2.5.2, Provencher (1991) and Provencher and Burt (1994) used stochastic dynamic
programming models in their empirical analyses, but their theoretical treatment of the optimization problem was
deterministic.
76For a state of the art analysis of lattice programming methods see Milgrom and Shannon (1994). Although
these methods have received relatively little attention in resource and environmental economics (variations of
these methods have been used in the literature on renewable resources by Sobel (1975) and Mendelsohn and
Sobel (1980)) they appear quite promising as they allow analysis where stock e¤ects on extraction costs imply
nonconcave objective functions. For renewable resources in general, the annual net benet function may be
nonconcave due to stock e¤ects on costs. Such nonconcavities create two di¢ culties: optimal policies may not
be unique-valued functions of the state variables, and the analysis of optimal policies cannot be based on the
concavity of the value function. Lattice programming methods developed by Topkis (1978), provide a direct and
convenient way to characterize the behaviour of optimal policies in such settings: if the objective function in
an optimization problem exhibits a specic form of complementarity, then optimal decisions vary monotonically
with the underlying states or parameters.
77 In their analysis groundwater is treated as a renewable resource (see section 2.2 of this chapter for a brief
discussion on the intuition of this treatment).
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found that the benets from groundwater management are relatively small. In particular, the
expected present value of net benets under common property operation was found to be equal
to 5.04 billion dollars in contrast to 5.17 billion dollars under e¢ ciency. In their framework,
this implied annualized benets from groundwater management in Kern County of roughly 7
dollars per acre of farmland per year. Based on these results, it seems that the GSR prevails
in stochastic frameworks as well. Interestingly however, the mean and standard deviation for
annual net benets in the limiting distribution were $209 and $25, respectively, under optimal
management, and $192 and $30, respectively, under common property. Hence, optimal man-
agement does reduce the variability of returns, so benets may be larger under risk aversion;
an indication that empirical work in this literature should aim towards constructing empirical
models with risk aversion78.
Table 2.6.1 summarizes the empirical evidence on the robustness of the GRE from mid
eighties onwards. The main conclusion that can be derived from this table is that the GRE
persists in economic frameworks characterized by time-varying economic relations, as well as
in stochastic frameworks. However, as already argued, optimal management does reduce the
variability of returns, an empirical result that suggests that benets may be larger in models
that depart from risk-neutrality and explicitly take account of risk aversion. Moreover, in
section 2.6.1 we argued that in tributary aquifers optimal management may produce signicant
benets by eliminating not only the cost, stock and risk externalities, but also by internalizing
the so called river e¤ects that can be signicant (although this argument has not yet been
tested empirically). Furthermore, in section 2.5.1 we argued that incorporation of uncertainty,
irreversibility and learning in a groundwater extraction game may increase the ine¢ ciency of
uncontrolled water pumping and further increase the benets from management. In addition, in
78Risk is pervasive in agriculture and as a result agricultural economists have frequently incorporated risk
preferences into their analysis. Farmers with dynamic decision problems typically confront intra-year risk because
prots are not deterministic in given decision-state combinations, and inter-year risk because state transition
processes are stochastic. However due to the inherent complexity of the problem of incorporating risk in the
framework of dynamic programming, most researchers applying this technique have assumed that farmers are
risk neutral. The handful of stochastic dynamic programming applications that have incorporated intra-year risk
aversion (Karp and Pope, 1984; Young and van Kooten, 1988) encounter two main theoretical objections. They
violate the independence axiom of expected utility theory and they assume risk neutrality toward inter-year risk
(Krautkraemer et al., 1992). How important are these theoretical problems in applied research remains to be
investigated. On the whole more theoretical and empirical research is needed to properly reect the inuence of
risk aversion on optimal dynamic programming solutions.
73
section 2.4.3 we argued that there are other components to the total economic value of water in
an aquifer, over and above the direct use value of the resource which is captured by the reviewed
models; thus the possibility of signicant management benets derived from preserving these
values. Finally, in section 2.4.2 we argue that it is economically intuitive to decrease the discount
rate used in empirical comparisons of optimal and no control of groundwater extraction, which
as established in section 2.3.3 increases management benets. All these are suggestions for
future research that can potentially resolve the GSE paradox. However, there already exists
empirical work that constitutes an exception to the persistence of the GRE . In section 2.4.1
and in the table below, we mention the empirical results derived by Brill and Burness (1994),
where a signicant increase in management benets is observed when demand for groundwater
is non-stationary. This empirical result reinforces the conclusion derived from table 2.3.1. of this
survey, which emphasizes the sensitivity of the GRE to the shape and properties of groundwater
demand function.
Table 2.6.1: Testing the Robustness of GSE (1986 - today).
Authors Model Welfare Gains1 Basin and Location Recharge
Kim et al. (1989) Adaptation to Depletion 1-3.7% (r=5-2%) High Plains, Texas Moderate
Dixon (1989) Stochastic DP 0.3% (r=5%) Kern, California Substantial
Provencher (1991) Stochastic DP 2-3% (r=5%) Madera, California Substantial
Brill & Burness (1994) Demand Growth (2% p.a.) 16.85% (r=1%) Ogallala, California Negligible
Provencher & Burt (1994) Stochastic DP 4% (r=5%) Kern, California Substantial
Knapp & Olson (1995) Stochastic OC 2.6% (r=5%) Kern, California Substantial
1 Welfare gains = net returns (OC)   net returns (NC). Does not consider costs of optimal basin management.
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2.7 Conclusion.
2.7.1 Summarizing Possible Rationalizations of GSE :
Indeed, the sensitivity of the GSE to the demand function is the central result of this
chapter. As established in section 2.3.2 the GSE e¤ectively states that if the slope of the
demand equation is small relative to the storage of the aquifer, then the di¤erence between
the socially optimal and the private exploitation of the aquifer, represented by the myopic
competitive-commonality equilibrium, is insignicant for all practical purposes. Even before
the identication of the GSE , a well-established view that Kelso (1967) has characterized as
the the water-is-di¤erent syndromemaintains that the derived demand for irrigation water
is price inelastic (the price elasticity of demand is dened as the percentage change in quantity
demanded resulting from 1% change in price, that is n =  

Q
P

P
Q

, where (P ) is price and
(Q) is quantity) and thus changes in prices will redistribute income to or from farmers but not
alter signicantly water usage in agriculture. Thus the accuracy of estimates of price elastici-
ties of demand for irrigation water is extremely important in predicting producer reactions to
future changes in relative water prices and inferring whether managing groundwater will have
a signicant positive e¤ect on total welfare.
However, a signicant problem exists in empirically testing this hypothesis. The absence of
observations over a wide range of prices has necessitated the use of programming approaches to
estimate the elasticities of the derived demand for water. Linear programming studies byMoore
and Hedges (1963), Gisser and Mercado (1972), Heady et al. (1973) and Hedges (1977), have
tended to support the contentions that the demand for irrigation water is inelastic. However,
Shumway (1973), also using linear programming found that the demand for irrigation water was
elastic in the price range of $9-16 per acre-foot in 1965 relative prices. On the whole, however
the indication from previous research into the impacts of water demand generally shows a
relatively inelastic demand relationship though admittedly the evidence is not conclusive.
Another related point worth making, is that groundwater demand for irrigation purposes is
not the only relevant one. Aquifers have historically been a clean source of water for domestic,
industrial and commercial purposes as well. Studies of the demand for water carried out in
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the past for di¤erent parts of the world and at di¤erent times, show that the price elasticity of
various classes of water demand as well as total water demand, is signicantly di¤erent from zero.
These studies have invariably attempted to regress demand for water against such variables as
price, income, wealth, climate, etc. A summary of the ndings of a number of these studies is
provided by Herrington (1987), where it is argued that price elasticity of demand for water lies
somewhere in the range of (0:0) to ( 0:3), again indicating inelastic demand schedules. Hence
one could conclude that the shape of real world demand curves for this resource, is probably
one of the main causes of the GSE :
Moreover, in section 2.2.4 of this chapter we argued that when the lateral groundwater
movement is slow, externality e¤ects are insignicant and private decisions of rms maximize
social welfare. However, slow lateral water movement is a characteristic of homogeneous aquifers
only and not a general aquifer characteristic. Furthermore, in section 2.5.1 we indicated that the
steady-state groundwater stock in an uncontrolled game theoretic environment is higher than
the steady-state groundwater stock in an uncontrolled competitive environment. This result
suggests that if real world groundwater extraction is strategic, then management benets will
be even smaller than benets from managing competitive, non-strategic extraction. Finally,
as argued in section 2.6.2, the bu¤er value of groundwater in a stochastic framework is not
always positive, a result one cannot guarantee the increase in management benets when the
stochastic nature of surface water supplies, that are used conjunctively with groundwater, is
acknowledged.
However, this is not to say that there exist no need for groundwater management. On the
contrary, in this chapter we have identied a number of circumstances that have or may poten-
tially render groundwater management signicantly welfare increasing. Firstly, Worthington
et al. (1985) have pointed out in an empirical work, that the di¤erence between the optimal
control and competitive regimes may not be trivial in conned aquifers if the relationship be-
tween the average extraction cost and the water table level is not linear and there are signicant
di¤erences in land productivity (see section 2.3.3). This result points to the need to develop
more empirical work to derive a good approximation of the shape of marginal cost of extraction
curve, and more theoretical work to resolve an asymmetric groundwater pumping di¤erential
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game where the di¤erences in land productivity are taken into account. Secondly, Brill and
Burness (1994) derive the same empirical result with non-stationary groundwater demand (see
section 2.4.1), which points to the importance of allowing time-varying economic parameters in
innite horizon optimal control models.
Thirdly, in section 2.4.2 we argue that driving interest rates down, in the light of suspected
irreversibilities and uncertainty about future water demand and supply, would raise groundwa-
ter management benets. Moreover, in section 2.5.1 we argue that incorporation of uncertainty,
irreversibility and learning in a groundwater extraction game may increase the ine¢ ciency of
uncontrolled water pumping and further increase management benets. Fourthly, in section
2.4.3 we argue that there might exist additional components of value in groundwater preserva-
tion, over and above direct use valuesthat are considered in the literature under investigation.
Taking account of indirect use, quasi-optionand existence valuesof groundwater, could
increase the benets from management if the sum of these values is signicant. Fifthly, in section
2.6.1 we argue that in tributary aquifers it is possible that additional negative externalities are
involved in groundwater extraction, over and above the three groundwater stock externalities
identied in section 2.2.1, such as presence of the so called river e¤ects. Correcting for these
externalities as well as the stock externalities, could potentially increase management benets
and reduce the relevance of the GSE : Finally, in section 2.6.2 we argue that already existing
stochastic di¤erential games and optimal control models in the groundwater literature, assume
risk neutrality and are not able to estimate possible management benets from reduction in the
variability of returns that could arise in a risk averse environment.
2.7.2 Motivation of Consecutive Research.
The GSE in essence states that in certain circumstances there may be a negligible nu-
merical di¤erence between competitive and socially optimal rates of water pumping from an
underground aquifer; i.e. the numerical magnitude of the various pumping cost and common
property externalities is insignicant. This result implies that marginal cost pricing of the re-
source is approximately e¢ cient and that the in situ scarcity value of the resource is negligible.
Clearly, if this result extends to a general rule then the role and scope of water management pol-
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icy are severely limited. That is, a corollary of the GSE is that the potential benets associated
with the regulation of the resource are relatively small, so that from an economic point of view
(i.e. using cost-benet analysis), regulation of the resource could not be advised. However, the
evolution of economic thought indicates that such simplied models as the one introduced by
Gisser and Sanchez (1980 a, b) often lead to strong theorems and clear-cut results; the danger
is that abstraction from reality may often bias results in directions inconsistent with real world
behaviour.
This result motivated consecutive research in this thesis. More specically, the research
in chapters 3 and 5, builds on two di¤erent economic methodologies to develop appropriate
theoretical and empirical models relevant for measuring the scarcity value of in situ ground-
water; these measures are used in the derivation of inferences on the potential of managing
this resource. As already argued, if social groundwater scarcity rents are signicant but not
incurred by current resource users, then groundwater extraction is dynamically ine¢ cient and
some form of management is needed (not necessarily price management). If the scarcity rents
of the resource are insignicant then marginal cost pricing of groundwater extraction is approx-
imately optimal, and groundwater management is not needed. Moreover, chapter 4 combines
and builds on two existing economic literatures in order to provide a methodology for deriving
an accurate measure of willingness to pay for improved groundwater quality, which arises from
the scarcity of this attribute of groundwater and its role in enchancing individualswell-being.
Once again, inferences on the appropriate management of the resource under consideration are
derived.
Consecutive models are deterministic because, as argued in section 1.3, empirical research
is based on data from a semi-arid region where natural recharge of the resource is insignicant.
In particular, the empirical application of the three models developed in this thesis concern
the Kiti aquifer, situated in a coastal region in the island of Cyprus. This aquifer su¤ers from
serious depletion and quality deterioration and faces the danger of complete exhaustion of its
water in the near future. Thus, the assumption of innite hydraulic conductivity (that implies
that the aquifer will never dry up irrespective of groundwater extraction rates) adopted by all
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models reviewed in this chapter79, should not and does not characterize our theoretical and
empirical investigations. Moreover, the Kiti aquifer is a small aquifer as far as storage
The material in chapter 3 is a direct extension of the reviewed literature. The key contribu-
tion of this chapter is the explicit recognition of the potential for innite production of water
through the existence of a backstop technology. In particular, we develope a model that de-
rives groundwater scarcity rents and management benets under the assumption of endogenous
adaptation to a backstop technology that allows innite production of water to the indenite
future. The availability of a backstop technology is a realistic aspect of groundwater manage-
ment that has been ignored by the relevant literature and can potentially contribute to the
elimination of the GSE . The derived solutions of this model under optimal and no-control of
groundwater extraction, provide the benchmarks for inferences on extraction behaviour implied
by the econometric estimates of scarcity rents derived in the two consecutive chapters of the
thesis. Chapter 4 combines the hedonic and travel cost methods, in order to develop a hedonic
model consistent with endogenous selectivity, for indirect estimation of the marginal willing-
ness to pay for scarce groundwater quality, from data on land prices and land characteristics.
Chapter 5 derives the shadow price of groundwater by employing a method prevalent in the
literature of productivity theory, but not yet used -to the best of our knowledge- for valuing
in situ natural resources. Chapter 6 contrasts and compares derived results, and concludes the
thesis by inferring the form of extraction behaviour relevant for the aquifer under consideration,
and by discussing the potential for its management.
79See section 2.3.2 of this survey.
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Chapter 3
Dynamic Sectoral Adaptation to
Increasing Resource Scarcity, when
Backstop Technology is Available:
Theory and Application to
Groundwater Allocation.
3.1 Introduction.
As can be inferred from the critical assessment of the Gisser-Sanchez literature presented
in chapter 2, consecutive modications and renements of the basic Gisser-Sanchez model
did not change the essence of the result. The main rationalization of GSE we o¤ered in the
previous chapter of the thesis, is the non-responsiveness of the demand for water, to price
changes imposed on current users after a regime switch from no-control to optimal control.
However, all renements of the basic Gisser-Sanchez model ignore one of the most realistic
aspects of groundwater management and treat the resource as an exhaustible ow. It is not
obvious however, why one should treat groundwater resources, or water resources in general,
as exhaustible. Water resources are e¤ectively available in unlimited quantities, but under a
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range of di¤erent supply conditions. Deposits of groundwater stored in aquifers may be cheaper
than water produced by desalination of seawater for example, but they are also exhaustible.
Estimates of the amounts available from the latter source are subject to great error, but suggest
that if society is prepared to pay the price, supplies will be available into the indenite future. In
this sense a backstop technology is available for groundwater - to use a phrase given prominence
by Nordhaus (1973).
This chapter assesses the GSE theoretically and empirically via simulations, in a dynamic
model with backstop technology availability. The empirical application of the model indicates
that in the absence of a backstop technology, the GSE is eliminated when the assumption
of innite hydraulic conductivity (adopted -sometimes implicitly- by almost all researchers in
the groundwater literature) is not imposed on the relevant dynamic models and when natural
recharge of the aquifer is sustained in the indenite future under an optimal control regime
of extraction. This is in sharp contrast to a competitive regime of groundwater extraction
with myopia, where current users of the resource incur only the marginal extraction cost (and
free-ride on the relevant scarcity rents), when this results in complete depletion of the aquifer
without sustaining aquifer recharge. Sustaining aquifer recharge to the indenite future after
depletion of the aquifer through managing groundwater extraction results in signicant welfare
gains and eliminates the GSE . Intuitively, our empirical results imply that when complete
depletion of the aquifer is probable, it is welfare increasing to manage extraction.
Given that we want to assume away innite hydraulic conductivity, the aquifer used for the
empirical application of the model developed in this chapter, is seriously depleted and faces the
threat of complete exhaustion in the near future. Hence the assumption of innite hydraulic
conductivity, which implies that the aquifer will never dry up irrespective of groundwater ex-
traction rates, is not relevant for the hydrological system under investigation. Aquifers that
face the threat of complete depletion are common in arid and semi-arid regions, which are
apparently the regions with serious water shortage and immediate need of optimal groundwa-
ter management. Moreover, the chosen aquifer has a smaller storage capacity than any other
aquifer used to empirically test the magnitude of the GSE that we are aware of. As already
argued in chapter 2, the GSE will persist as long as the slope of the demand function relative to
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aquifers storage is small. Hence the magnitude of the e¤ect could be reduced when simulating
optimal and uncontrolled extractions from a small aquifer.
Moreover, we are dealing with a coastal aquifer. As argued by Krulce et al. (1997), coastal
aquifers have a distinguishing feature which calls for a somewhat di¤erent model. This feature
amounts to the possibility of seawater desalination, which provides a natural backstopwater
source situated next to the aquifer. The proximity to the backstop technology allows departure
from issues of cost of transferring desalinated water to the location of its consumption. More-
over, because we are interested in aquifers located in semi-arid regions, we model groundwater
as a potentially exhaustible resource. That is, aquifers in semi-arid regions do not benet from
substantial natural recharge and as a result the groundwater growth rate is not stock depended
through leakages1. Thus in the context of our model, groundwater is mined until its e¢ ciency
price2 rises to the backstop price. When this equality is satised groundwater is replaced by
the backstop as the primary water source; thereafter the resources price remains constant at
the unit cost of the backstop technology.
Similar applications of the non-renewable resource model to groundwater management are
Moncur and Pollock (1998) and Bowen et al. (1991). A major weakness of these studies
however, is that they do not model the demand-side of the problem and cannot explain changes
in the willingness to pay for groundwater that might occur over time, and a¤ect the optimal
time of adopting the available backstop technology. In our model, demand for groundwater is
assumed to be changing over time through endogenous adaptations to resource depletion. As
will become apparent from the analysis of this chapter, these changes are potentially signicant
for the derivation of the correct scarcity value of groundwater. In addition this particular
representation of groundwater demand allows instantaneous estimation of the relative allocation
of water between di¤erent users, which can be an important information for reforming policy
institutions that concern the exploitation of the resource. The solution of the model uses
1Krulce et al., modelled groundwater as a renewable resource; that is, the natural growth rate (recharge) of
groundwater was assumed to be stock dependent, with a growth rate equal to the di¤erence between inow and
aquifer leakages, which (the aquifer leakages) were represented as a function of the groundwater stock in the
aquifer.
2E¢ cient pricing of a natural resource is graphically derived in section 1.1 of the introductory chapter of the
thesis. Also, see the analysis in section 3.3 of this chapter.
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the mathematical technique of multi-stage optimal control to derive the social benet from
groundwater use under an optimal management regime and compare it with the social benet
derived under the competitive-commonality situation. As already argued, the di¤erence between
the two solutions emerges because competitive groundwater extraction ignores one component
of the social cost of groundwater, namely the social benet of foregoing water usage currently
as a means of reducing future costs of acquiring groundwater. This equals the social user cost
of groundwater, which represents the in situ scarcity value of the resource.
In addition to providing a natural backstop technology, seawater may become a source of
environmental harm for coastal aquifers. Coastal fresh groundwater systems are in contact with
saline water, which if drawn into the aquifer, can diminish the waters potability as well as its
usefulness for other purposes (such as irrigation purposes). As argued in chapter 1, groundwater
scarcity has an important qualitative dimension that further limits the supply of usable water;
this exact dimension is explicitly modelled in the analysis of this chapter. Saltwater intrusion
can result as fresh groundwater is drawn down and saline water ows in to replace it, in an
attempt of natureto restore the hydrological balance of a freshwater ecosystem. Although the
dynamics of saltwater intrusion developed by hydrologists are in a relatively advanced stage3,
this phenomenon has not attracted the interest of economists. A notable exception is the
optimization model of exploitation of groundwater reserves with saltwater intrusion, developed
by Cummings (1971).
Summing up, this chapter aims to analyze the optimal strategy of consuming a resource
(groundwater) whose total availability is potentially innite through availability of a backstop
technology, its cost of extraction is an increasing function of the total already extracted, and
is bounded from above by the price of the backstop technology. This seems to describe with
tolerable realism the situation of water resources, where a number of di¤erent sources of supply
exist, the cheaper ones being exhaustible but the most expensive ones (typically desalination or
possibly large-scale recycling of past consumption) providing unlimited amounts of the input
in question. This chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we provide a graphical illus-
3See Reilly and Goodman (1985) for a survey on the quantitative hydrological analysis of saltwater-freshwater
relationships in groundwater systems.
83
tration of the advantages of achieving a disaggregated modelling of the demand for a natural
resource, which describes the demand-side of our model. In section 3.3, we provide a graphical
representation of the supply-side of our model that illustrates the role of scarcity rents in an
optimization model with backstop technology availability. In section 3.4, we formulate the mul-
tistage optimal control model of groundwater depletion, where endogenous adaptation to rising
resource scarcity denes the intertemporal pattern of economic sectors that use groundwater
and the endogenous time of introducing the backstop technology. The solution of the problem,
presented in section 3.5, involves sequentially solving a series of free endpoint problems, each
of which denes the date when an economic sectors demand for groundwater reaches zero.
The terminal endogenous switch is dened by the adoption of the backstop technology. The
adoption of the backstop technology characterizes the steady-state conditions of the problem
and the multi-stage solution allows e¢ cient choice of the quantity of water to be produced by
the backstop technology. Section 3.6 provides an illustrative empirical application of the model,
where the optimal control and competitive-commonality solutions of the system are numerically
derived and compared in order to establish whether the Gisser-Sanchez e¤ect is present. Section
3.7 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Comparison of Simple Aggregate Demand Versus Multiple-
Sectoral Demand: The Demand-Side of the Model.
Optimal allocation of groundwater is a multistage decision process. At each stage, e.g.
each year, a decision must be made regarding the level of groundwater use which will maximize
the present value of economic returns to the basin. The intial conditions for each stage may
be di¤erent due to changes in either the economic or hydrologic parameters of the basin under
consideration. However, in most of the dynamic mathematical models employed in the literature
reviewed in chapter 2 [ see for example, Burt, 1964; Bredehoeft and Young, 1970; Gisser and
Mercado, 1973; Gisser and Sanchez, 1980 (a, b); Noel, 1980; Feinerman and Knapp, Allen
and Gisser 1984; Nieswiadomy, 1985; Worthington et al., 1985; Zimmerman, 1990, Knapp
and Olson; 1995] groundwater is modelled as a stock to be depleted in a mining era before
moving to a stationary-state era. As already argued in section 2.4.1 of chapter 2, implicit in
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this literature are the assumptions of xed economic relations and/or exogenous rates of change
through time4. However, as indicated in the second part of table 2.3.1 of chapter 2, converging
lines of evidence from sensitivity analyses show that benets from groundwater management
are highly sensitive to the functional form and price elasticity of the relevant demand function
used in the optimal control model. Hence, paying attention to temporal changes in the benet
functions that govern depletion modelling, is potentially important.
More complex and realistic representations of increasing resource scarcity incorporate op-
portunities for adaptation to rising resource prices. That is, in the long-run perspective, shift
away from water intensive production activities, adoption of new techniques or backstop tech-
nologies, substitution of alternative inputs, and production of a di¤erent mix of products o¤er
rational responses to increasing scarcity. Kamien and Schwartz (1981), Rossana (1985) and
Tomiyama (1985), developed theoretical two-stage optimal control models that accounted for
sequential changes through time. Kim et al. (1989) generalized these models to (n) stages.
In particular, Kim et al. developed the technique of multistage optimal control in the context
of groundwater mining for agricultural production. Rather than directly stating aggregate de-
mand, their model states disaggregate categories of demand curves for di¤erent crops, with the
intertemporal relative allocation of the resource among categories of products being dened as
groundwater prices increase through time. Their approach provides the possibility of a more
detailed description of natural resource depletion, where allocation across products of resource
use can be portrayed in an intertemporal context. In the present chapter, we employ this tech-
nique to describe the chronological pattern of groundwater use by di¤erent economic sectors in
order to dene optimally the quantity of the resource that should be produced when the avail-
able backstop technology is adopted at some endogenously dened time. Including in a control
model the opportunity for this type of adaptation strengthens its ability to describe economic
processes associated with natural resource depletion. The additional detail, further can inform
public policy decisions concerning natural resource allocation among economic sectors, optimal
timing of adoption of an available backstop technology and denition of optimal quantity of
4As already mentioned in footnote 38 of chapter 2, two notable exceptions exist in the literature. Burness and
Brill (1992) considered endogenous irrigation technology choice, and Shah et al. (1995) integrated conservation
technology di¤usion within the exhaustible groundwater model. Their results indicated that without intervention
the gradual adoption process of the conservation technology will be slower than is socially optimal.
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the resource to be produced by this technology for each of the di¤erent users.
The essence of the above arguments that call for an endogenous formulation of the benet
function in an optimal control model, is the following. Projected results from optimal control
models become more tenuous the further one moves into the future. In particular, one of the
di¢ culties of using long-run optimal control is the need to provide the mathematical model
with estimates of willingness to pay (WTP) not only relevant for the present but also relevant
for some time in the future. However as time passes by, WTP for the resource in question
may change as the scarcity and hence the relevant price for the resource changes. (Price equals
marginal extraction cost in a competitive-commonality situation where rights are not exclusively
assigned, and marginal extraction costs plus scarcity rents if extraction is optimally controlled).
Two approaches exist towards estimation of the relevant demand functions. The rst is
the traditional approach, where a functional form is chosen and used in the estimation of
the demand function based on past and/or current observations. This demand function is
assumed to be relevant for the entire time span over which the problem is solved. However,
discontinuities may occur because the WTP of various demanders/users of the resource may
be bounded from above at di¤erent shadow prices. With groundwater shadow prices increasing
through time as the resources scarcity increases, some users of the resource may exit the
market and their WTP for the resource be driven down to zero. That is, there is a choke
price for the resource (which varies among di¤erent resource users) above which demand for
groundwater becomes zero. Thus, the estimated benet functions based on current observations,
may bear little relation to the actual benet function when future economic, hydraulic and
agronomic conditions are much di¤erent. The piecewise approach adopted in our analysis,
takes account of some foreseeable discontinuities in the derivatives of the demand functions.
Both of these approaches are extrapolations into the future, but the piecewise approach o¤ers
some advantages over the traditional approach because it uses more of the available information.
If the incorporated foreseeable changes do take place, results from the piecewise approach will
be more relevant in a long-run perspective.
More specically, the use of the piecewise demand approach enables us to establish optimal
intertemporal mining paths for di¤erent economic sectors, model the possibility of demand
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adaptation to resource depletion and derive accurate benets from groundwater management
at steady-state conditions. Below we briey discuss these strengths of the piecewise approach
if compared with the traditional approach based on aggregate water demand. Equations (3.1)
and (3.2) represent the demand for water by the agricultural and the domestic economic sector,
respectively,
WA = a1   b1P (3.1)
WD = a2   b2P (3.2)
where (WA) ; (WD) are groundwater quantities demanded by the agricultural and domestic
sectors respectively, (P ) is groundwater price. Optimality dictates that the price of groundwater
should equal the marginal benet derived from groundwater use. However, in the absence of
clear property rights price equals marginal extraction costs. Parameters (a1); (a2); (b1) and
(b2) are coe¢ cients of the ordinary (uncompensated) sector specic demand curves for water.
Figure 3.2.1: Aggregate Versus Disaggregate Demand Curves.
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Figure 3.2.1 presents these demand curves as AA0 and DD0, respectively. Horizontal sum-
mation of the two demand curves gives the kinked demand curve DBC, which represents the
multiple-sector piecewise aggregate water demand. Several strengths of the approach based on
multiple-sector aggregate demand become evident from this gure. In the descriptive mode,
two opportunities for a more detailed analysis exist. First, di¤erentiating by economic sector
permits estimation of the instantaneous relative allocation of groundwater between the agricul-
tural and the domestic sectors during the groundwater depletion era. In particular, the model
generates an endogenous switch time, the year at which groundwater is used only by the do-
mestic sector rather than the agricultural and domestic sectors, simultaneously. For example,
when the price of groundwater at some time (or the marginal cost of water extraction in the
absence of a groundwater market) increases to (P1) in gure 3.2.1, as a consequence of greater
pumping lifts, agricultural use of groundwater becomes zero and remains zero thereafter. The
shift exclusively to the domestic sector provides an example of a sectoral pattern that occurs
through time. The pattern is one of a shrinking number of existing economic sectors in a
regions economy as the price of groundwater pumping increases secularly with mining.
Second, prices that are higher than (P1) result in distinct extraction volumes depending on
which notion of aggregate demand is used; this proves to be crucial in choosing the exact volume
of water to be produced by the backstop technology at steady-state conditions. For example, if
the unit price of desalination is (P2), the multiple sector notion results in an accurate prediction
of (W2) rather than an underestimate of (W 02). Thus, water prices above (P1) generate di¤erent
estimates of social benets. These a¤ect both descriptive and normative analyses. In particular,
the kinked representation of aggregate demand provides a larger, and more accurate estimate of
the surplus from the economy-wide groundwater use relative to the traditional approach. This
additional information may prove crucial as groundwater mining becomes pervasive and policy
makers attempt to reform groundwater institutions or decide when it is optimal to adopt an
expensive backstop source of water. For example, if the unit price of desalination is (P3) then
the adoption of the available backstop technology is feasible only if the multi-sector notion of
the aggregate demand curve is used. Hence, accurate estimates of the value of social benets
derived from groundwater use for the economy as a whole, may help to balance equitably
and e¢ ciently any future reforms. When data is available, an approach based on a multiple-
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sector piecewise aggregate demand for groundwater o¤ers a superior alternative to the approach
commonly adopted in the literature based on undi¤erentiated aggregate demand.
3.3 Representation of Scarcity Rents in an OptimizationModel:
The Supply-Side of the Model.
Given that optimal pricing in groundwater market dictates that price equals marginal
benets from groundwater use, if the marginal extraction cost of water is lower than the corre-
sponding marginal benet, then this implies that water sales should involve a positive marginal
scarcity rent. Assuming that these conditions apply for the situation depicted in gure 3.2.1,
then for prices below (P1); the marginal net benet is positive for both sector-users. Could we
draw the diagram so that marginal net benet (and, hence, marginal scarcity rent) would be
zero? Marginal scarcity rent would be zero if water were not scarce. If the availability of water
as depicted by the groundwater supply curve, was greater than the amount represented by the
point where the aggregate marginal benet minus extraction costs intersects the horizontal axis
(indicating quantity of water demanded), water would not be scarce. Both sectors would get
all they wanted and their demands would not be competing with each other. Their marginal
net benets would both be equal to zero.
Natural resource scarcity rents can be motivated from either a utility maximization per-
spective (Heal, 1976, p. 373-74) as done in the previous paragraph, or in terms of prot
maximizing producers (Hotelling, 1931) as described in section 1.1 of the introductory chapter.
In our model we adopt Howes (1979) rationalization of the existence of scarcity rents for a
natural resource, i.e. these rents reect purely the scarcity of groundwater itself, given present
sources and the prospect that desalination, which is relatively more expensive, will have to be
used in the foreseeable future5. In gure 3.3.2, the dotted line depicts marginal extraction costs
at a moment of time for existing, conventional water sources, such as irrigation wells. If these
sources were not available, the alternative would be a backstopsource such as desalination,
5More specically, Howe (1979) states that anticipated higher costs for a resource imply a scarcity rent on
use of existing cheaper sources today.
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which we assume to be available in unlimited quantities though at the high (and constant)
cost (p). The e¢ ciency price line6 shows the e¢ cient price for water, incorporating extraction
costs as well as in situ value. Suppose that, contrary to the common situation, all rights to in
situ groundwater could be owned and sold independently of the overlying land. The question
would then be how much must a new groundwater user pay to gain access to groundwater now
used by landowners7. Consider a potential buyer contemplating a capacity addition to the level
(qGt). Under the conditions just outlined, the buyer can either purchase water rights covering
an existing source, with extraction cost (qGtc), or develop the backstop at cost (qGtp): Thus for
the incremental source at capacity (qGt), the buyers maximum willingness to pay for existing
rights is represented by the distance (cp).
Figure 3.3.1: Extraction Cost, Scarcity Value, and E¢ ciency Price of
Groundwater.
6Note that constant extraction costs generate rising scarcity values up to the time that desalination is intro-
duced, in contrast to the steadily declining values generated by linearly or exponentially increasing cost structures.
For further discussion on this issue see Moncur and Pollock (1988).
7Because of the indeterminacy of small number bargaining situations and market related imperfections, a
point estimate of these payments is not possible. However, this payment will be bounded at the high end by
what prospective buyers are willing to pay, and at the low end by what sellers are willing to accept.
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The owners willingness to accept compensation in exchange for rights to a well is also
a¤ected by the scarcity situation. If todays rate of use increases by one unit, the buyer will
incur sooner the higher costs of supra-marginal wells. The resulting increase in the present value
of future costs is the scarcity value attached to the marginal well. Adding marginal extraction
cost to marginal scarcity value yields the e¢ ciency price of extracted water referred to above.
Moreover, we assume that owners of the marginal source are fully aware that any prospective
buyer will have to pay more, and sooner, for even the next-least-costly well if they (owners)
refuse to sell. This awareness is the basis for determining the owners reservation price. At
(marginal) capacity (qGt), potential scarcity rent is the distance (c) and represents the sellers
minimum willingness to accept payment. In the solution of the optimal control model to be
developed in this chapter the adjoint variables (j(t)) represent the distance between marginal
extraction costs and e¢ ciency price at time (t) for each (j) stage of the system of di¤erential
equations. That is, (j(t)0s) represent groundwater scarcity rents.
At this point, it is worth noting and explaining the di¤erence between gure 1.1.1 presented
in the introductory chapter of the thesis, and gure 3.3.1 introduced in this chapter. Both gures
aim to describe the time path of scarcity rents, extraction costs and e¢ ciency price of in situ
groundwater, in the presence of an available backstop technology at a known price. In chapter
1, groundwater is treated as a xed resource stock to be mined until supplies are exhausted, or
marginal extraction cost becomes prohibitive. In this chapter however, groundwater is treated
as a partly renewable resource, which implies a stock e¤ect on the in situ value of the resource.
This stock e¤ect allows for the possibility of a positive in situ value of groundwater at the
endogenously dened time of adopting the backstop technology, which denes steady-state
conditions. That is, at steady-state a positive level of extraction is sustained at lower private
marginal extraction cost than the cost of the backstop technology, because of the exogenously
given rate of water inow in the aquifer (through recharge from rainfall and percolation of
used water back into the aquifer). As a result, at steady-state the social marginal cost of
water that becomes equal to the unit cost of the backstop technology, is composed of marginal
extraction cost and scarcity value of net inows. This equality denes the timing of the last
endogenous switch in the model developed in the following section of this chapter, which as
already indicated, is characterized by the adoption of the backstop technology.
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Ignoring in situ values overlooks a real element of total opportunity cost of groundwater.
After all, this is the essence of the literature reviewed in chapter 2, which aims to derive
an accurate value of the e¤ect of imposing these scarcity rents on groundwater users, and to
provide the economic intuition behind the magnitude of this e¤ect. As argued in section 1.1 of
the introductory chapter, in the presence of clear ownership, no externalities, and the existence
of viable markets, competitive market processes will establish the e¢ cient level of scarcity rent
of a resource and, thus, the e¢ cient time path of extraction and consumption. In the absence
of clear ownership rights and markets however, scarcity value frequently goes unrecognized.
Groundwater resources provide an important example of this phenomenon, given the growing
apparent depletion of water in aquifers. Ignoring scarcity rents in groundwater pricing means
that the price of groundwater (which equals the marginal cost of extraction in the absence of
a market for groundwater) is too low, thereby increasing excessive extraction. Thus e¢ cient
groundwater prices call for: (a) use of marginal extraction costs and (b) incorporation of the
scarcity value of in situ groundwater. Empirical determination of marginal extraction cost for
groundwater is - at least conceptually - straightforward, using cost data kept by the relevant
agency. Scarcity rent is another matter. If marginal extraction cost and price is known, one can
easily determine scarcity rent as a residual. But without a market-determined price, one needs
an indirect estimation of scarcity rent8. The model developed and solved in the consecutive
sections of this chapter enables us to derive the total optimal scarcity value of groundwater in
a particular basin. Moreover in Appendix B3 we derive the common property solution of the
model and in section 3.6 we empirically estimate the magnitude of the di¤erence in the net
present value of benets derived under optimal and competitive solutions of the model, in order
to investigate whether the GSE persists.
3.4 The Model.
We assume that farmers sell their production in competitive markets so that the price
of water is equal to the value of its marginal product. Moreover, the agricultural production
8See appendix B5, chapter 5 for a brief literature review of di¤erent approaches to specifying the time paths
of derived in situ (scarcity) value of various natural resources.
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function is assumed to be constant returns to scale and factors other than water and land are
optimized conditional on the rate of water extraction. Access to the aquifer is restricted by
land ownership and consequently the number of farmers is xed and nite over time. Moreover,
following Kim et al. (1989), model construction begins by stating disaggregate categories of
sector-specic demand curves. Analysis of the opportunity of adaptation to resource depletion
develops as a consequence of the disaggregate representation: with the e¢ ciency price of water
increasing through time, the intertemporal relative allocation of the resource among economic
sectors follows naturally. Equation (3.3) represents the inverse demand function for water for
the ith sector,
P =
ai
bi
  1
bi
(Wi); i = 1; 2; :::; n (3.3)
where, (P ) is the price (or marginal extraction cost in the absence of water markets and optimal
control) of water and (Wi) measures quantity of water demanded by sector i. The parameters
(ai) and (bi) are sector-specic time-invariant demand parameters, with (bi) assumed to be
greater than zero. As proposed by Kim at al. (1989), the sector-specic inverse demand curves
are ordered so that a1b1 <
a2
b2
< ::: < anbn . This ordering implies that as (P ) increases over
time due to increasing groundwater scarcity, water demand for each of the n economic sectors
reaches zero sequentially. In the absence of backstop technology and given that there exist
(n) economic sectors demanding water, (n  1) endogenous switching times should result from
this series of choke prices. Thus, aggregate water demand, in this representation, appears as a
piecewise linear function.
Groundwater extraction costs and desalination costs, together with hydrology, represent the
supply-side of the model. The marginal pumping cost function (MC) is,
MCG = c[h(t)] (3.4)
where (h) represents the head of the aquifer above sea level. At lower head levels, it is more
costly to extract water because more and/or deeper wells must be drilled and the water must be
pumped farther distances. As the aquifer nears exhaustion (h = 0) extraction cost rises rapidly.
Thus we model the average cost of extracting water from the aquifer as a positive, decreasing,
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convex function of the head9; i.e. c(h)  0, c0(h) < 0; c00(h)  0 and limh!0 c(h) =1:
A second important feature of this research is that we are dealing with a coastal aquifer. As
indicated in the introductory section of this chapter, a distinguishing feature of such aquifers is
the possibility of seawater desalination, which provides a natural backstopwater source. Thus
the aquifer is not the only possible source of water. Following Nordhaus (1973, 1979) and Heal
(1976), we consider a super-abundant resource to ow from a backstop technology with constant
unit cost (p): As indicated in section 3.1, we model groundwater supplies as exhaustible stocks
to be depleted over time, so that at a particular point in time the e¢ ciency price of groundwater
will reach the desalination price and eventually groundwater will be replaced by the backstop
as the primary water source. Thereafter the price of water will remain constant at the unit cost
of the backstop resource. The behaviour of economic sectors whose demand for water is driven
to zero before the e¢ ciency price of groundwater reaches the desalination price, is not a¤ected
by the existence of the backstop technology. The economic sectors that will be demanding
water from the aquifer at the time at which desalination starts, will continue to use water at
the desalination price. This denes behaviour at the steady-state10.
With this particular formulation for the backstop technology we abstract from both economies
of scale and technical change. As argued by Krulce et al. (1997), assuming constant returns
to scale is unlikely to be an important source of error for empirical work, because economies
of scale are quickly exhausted once desalination begins (Leitner, 1992) and the primary input
(saltwater) does not become more scarce as the desalinized quantity increases. Technological
change however, should ideally be incorporated in this model as it a¤ects the price of the back-
9More generally, the extraction cost could be a function of the rate of extraction as well, c(h; q): Our formu-
lation, however, assumes constant returns to scale in extraction technology.
10As a related matter, we briey comment on the issue of optimal sequencing of resource extraction with rising
unit extraction costs. Solow and Wan (1976) considered a simple two-period, two deposit model of an exhaustible
resource and showed that it is preferable to fully exploit the low cost deposit before extracting from the high cost
deposit in period one, while deferring some extraction program. Subsequently, Kemp and Long (1980) developed
a more general model wherein it may be preferable to exploit high and low cost resource deposits simultaneously
for the purpose of smoothing consumption over time. Commenting on the work by Kemp and Long, Lewis (1982)
derived su¢ cient conditions under which strict sequencing of extraction (from low cost to high cost) becomes
optimal, consistent with the model of Solow and Wan: extracted resources can be converted into productive
capital. A di¤erent problem arises in the case of physical mining constraints which prevent optimal sequencing
of resource extraction per Solow and Wan (1976). Moreover, Hartwick (1978) and Cairns (1986) examined
situations where sources of varying quality must be exploited at a single time. We adhere to the simpler model
of extraction costs rising with increased resource depletion.
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stop technology and as a result the time of adopting this technology. In this model we do
not allow for technological change, hence the cost of producing water from desalination at a
rate (qDi) is equal to (p  qDi): The present methodology, however, can be used to incorporate
expected technological change by specifying what the backstop price is expected to be at that
time in the future when it is expected to be used. Sensitivity analysis can then be applied
to explore how the extraction and e¢ ciency price paths respond to changes in the expected
backstop price.
The hydrological equation of motion given in equation (3.5), represents the change in the
level of the head of the aquifer through time and denes the constraint of the system,
_h(t) =
R+ (f   1  s)
nP
i=1
qGi(t)
A  S (3.5)
where ( _h) is the time derivative of h(t) and h(t)  h(t)e, where h(t)e is the natural hydrologic
equilibrium. The aquifers recharge rate is represented by (R) and f (0  f  1) is the return-
ow coe¢ cient of percolation back into the aquifer. As argued in the introductory section,
another special feature of coastal aquifers is that they are vulnerable to sea water intrusion;
that is, as the aquifer is emptied, saltwater intrudes in the aquifer in order to replace the
hydrological balance11, eventually making water unusable. The salinity coe¢ cient is represented
by s (0  s  1)12 which indicates the loss of e¤ective quantity of groundwater available in the
aquifer, due to poor quality. The size of the aquifer is measured by (A), and (S) is the storativity
coe¢ cient (the average saturation of water in the aquifer). The formulation in equation (3.5)
implicitly assumes that changes in the water level are transmitted instantaneously to all users.
As argued in section 2.2.4 of chapter 2, this assumption clearly exaggerates the degree of
11See appendix (A3) for a schematic hydrological description of the physical system of saltwater-freshwater
interaction.
12The modelling of saltwater intrusion is oversimplied in this chapter. A more accurate description of this
phenomenon should take into account not only the decrease in freshwater potential caused by groundwater
extraction, but also the dependence of seawater intrusion on freshwater stock; i.e. the greater the freshwater
stock the less the intrusion. Moreover, the quality of water appropriate for consumption in the residential
sector is higher than the relevant quality appropriate for consumption in the agricultural sector, and di¤erent
crops cultivated by the agricultural sector have di¤erent levels of salt tolerance. However our model makes the
simplifying assumption of a uniform salt tolerance for all relevant sectors and crops. Finally, there is a spatial
element to the movement of seawater in an aquifer, which is also ignored. A detail description and static economic
analysis of this spatial aspect of the phenomenon can be found in chapter 4.
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common property.
In equation (3.5), (R) is assumed constant and deterministic. A constant recharge rate
is a reasonable assumption for a conned basin, which is isolated from adjacent groundwater
reservoirs, except for very high levels of water table. When an aquifer becomes nearly full, it
develops leaks to the surface through springs and augments streams and rivers, making (R)
a decreasing function of (h) as storage capacity is approached. The aquifer nally reaches its
natural hydrologic equilibrium dened by (he). For this reason the di¤erential equation (3.5) has
been admitted in the literature as a good approximation of the dynamics of a conned aquifer
within the economically relevant range of groundwater reserves, given that when extracting
agents are mining the aquifer the water table will probably be below the critical value for which
the recharge begins to be a decreasing function of the water table.
The goal of the planning equilibrium is to maximize the present value of generated economic
surplus (net social benets) from intertemporal water use and the production of water from
desalination, subject to the hydrological constraint of the system. Economic surplus generated
from activity in an input market measures scarcity rents to producers plus consumers surplus in
the product market under general equilibrium, competitive conditions (Just and Hueth, 1979)13.
Social benets from water use are given by,
SB =
nX
i=1
Z qGi(t)+qDi(t)
0

ai
bi
  1
bi
Wi

dWi
or
SB =
nX
i=1

ai
bi
Wi   1
2bi
W 2i

(3.6)
where (Wi) represents the total quantity of water used by the ith economic sector, and is
equal to the sum of sector ith0s consumption of groundwater (qGi(t)) and water produced from
13The water demand curve used in both the empirical and theoretical analysis of this chapter is assumed to
be the general equilibrium input demand. See appendix B3 for a brief discussion of welfare measures in an input
market.
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desalination (qDi(t)). Total pumping costs (TC) are,
TC(t) =
nX
i=1
[c[h(t)]qGi(t) + pqDi(t)] (3.7)
Thus net social benets (NSB) at a given time are,
NSB =
nX
i=1

ai
bi
Wi   1
2bi
W 2i

 
nX
i=1
[c[h(t)]  qGi(t) + p  qDi(t)] (3.8)
In sections 3.5 and 3.6 we employ the technique of multi-stage optimal control, introduced by
Kim et al. (1989), in order to derive the optimal path of water use over consecutive time
periods, during which endogenous adaptation to water depletion and backstop technology is
allowed; this requires the imposition of a user cost that reects the value of leaving water in the
ground to reduce future costs of acquiring water, which represents scarcity rents of the resource.
3.5 Multi-Stage Optimal Control Formulation.
The ordering of groundwater sector-specic demands according to their price intercept
(a1b1 <
a2
b2
< ::: < anbn ) together with the existence of the backstop technology, results in a natural
partitioning of the problem into stages, with successive stages representing a smaller number of
economic sectors demanding water. This assures an intertemporal depletion path that moves
along the multiple-sector, piecewise linear aggregate demand curve. This dynamic adaptation
to groundwater depletion stops as soon as the e¢ ciency price of water reaches the price of
desalination (we assume that both groundwater reserves in the aquifer under consideration and
the price of desalination, are high enough so that the economy starts with using water from the
aquifer). At this price the economic sectors that derive a marginal benet from water usage at
least as high as the desalination price, will continue to demand a constant amount of water,
the one indicated by the parameters of their demand curves at the cost (price) of desalination.
Given a discount rate r > 0, the mathematical representation of this dynamic optimization
problem of the model developed in section 3.4 is,
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MaxP = J1 + J2 + :::+ Jk
=
Z T1
0
e rt
"
nX
i=1
Z qGi(t)+qDi(t)
0

ai
bi
  1
bi
Wi

dWi  
nX
i=1
(c[h(t)]qGi(t) + pqDi(t))
#
dt
+
Z T2
T1
e rt
"
nX
i=2
Z qGi(t)+qDi(t)
0

ai
bi
  1
bi
Wi

dWi  
nX
i=2
(c[h(t)]qGi(t) + pqDi(t))
#
dt
...
+
Z 1
Tk 1
e rt
"
nX
i=k
Z qGn(t)+qDn(t)
0

ai
bi
  1
bi
Wi

dWi  
nX
i=k
(c[h(t)]qGi(t) + pqDi(t))
#
dt
(3.9)
Equation (3.9) can also be written in summary form as,
Max
kX
j=1
Pj =
kX
j=1
(Z Tj
Tj 1
e rt [SBi(t)  TCi(t)] dt
)
T (t = 0) = To
T (t = k) =1
j = 1; 2; :::; k and k   1  n  1 (3.10)
The above maximization is solved subject to the following constraints as dened by each stages
hydrological equation of motion,
_h(t) =
R+ (f   1  s)
nP
i=1
qGi(t)
A  S ; 0  t  T1;
_h(t) =
R+ (f   1  s)
nP
i=2
qGi(t)
A  S ; T1  t  T2;
...
_h(t) =
R+ (f   1  s)
nP
i=k
qGn(t)
A  S ; Tk 1  t  1: (3.11)
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Constraint (3.11) can be summarized as,
_hj(t) =
R+ (f   1  s)
nP
i=j
qGi(t)
A  S ; Tj 1  t  Tj (3.12)
The initial conditions of the maximization problem are,
h(t = 0) = ho (3.13)
qDi(t = 0) = 0; i = 1; 2; :::; n: (3.14)
The time of adoption of the backstop technology is (k   1), e is the exponential function,
Tj(j = 1; 2; :::; k   1) is the jth switch time, Jj represents social benets for the jth depletion
stage (j = 1; 2; :::; k). Note that the maximum number of endogenous switches possible as this
problem runs to innity, is (n 1). Assuming that the e¢ ciency price of water is lower than the
price of water produced from desalination, initial condition (3.14) indicates that desalination
is not used at time period t = 0. The stages are dened by sequential shifting away from the
economic sector that produces the lowest marginal benet from its water consumption, until
the time period in which the e¢ ciency price of water reaches the price of water produced from
desalination. At this particular period switching stops and the economic sectors that derive a
marginal benet from water use at least as high as the price of desalination (p), will continue
demanding water and be provided with water from both water sources (i.e. the aquifer and the
backstop technology) at a uniform price equal to p: From this point onwards qDi(t) > 0:
The current value Hamiltonian functions, which represent the above j-stage optimal control
problem are given in equation (3.15),
Hj [qGi(t); qDi(t); h(t); j(t); t] =
nX
i=j
Z qGi(t)+qDi(t)
0

ai
bi
  1
bi
Wi

dWi
 
nX
i=j
[c[h(t)]  qGi(t) + p  qDi(t)] + j(t)
26664
R+ (f   1  s)
nP
i=j
qGi(t)
A  S
37775
j = 1; 2; :::; n (3.15)
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where qGi(t); qDi(t) are the control variables guiding inter-sector water allocation over time,
hj(t) are the state variables representing the hydrological motion of water over time for the j
stages, and j(t) are the adjoint variables for the j stages. The scarcity rents are represented
by j(t); which are the conventional user costs (i.e. the benet of foregoing groundwater usage
currently as a means of reducing future costs of acquiring water).
Necessary conditions for optimality14, which hold for all t are derived by using the Pontrya-
gin principle,
_hj(t) =
R+ (f   1  s)
nP
i=j
qGi(t)
A  S j = 1; :::; k (3.16)
_j(t) = r  j(t)  @H6j
@hj(t)
= r  j(t) + c0[h(t)]
nX
i=j
qGi(t) j = 1; :::; k (3.17)
@H6j
@qGi(t)
=
ai
bi
  1
bi
(qGi(t) + qDi(t))  c[h(t)]  j(t)

s+ 1  f
AS

 0;
for i = 1; :::; n; j = 1; :::; k; k  n
= 0 if qGi(t) > 0
qDi(t) = 0 for j = 1; 2; :::; k (3.18)
14The necessary conditions stated in equations (3.16-3.25) are also su¢ cient for the maximization of P of
equation (3.10) at each stage j, if the following conditions are satised:
(1) The net social benets function in equation (3.8), is di¤erentiable and jointly concave in qGi, qDi and h:
(2) One of the following is true:
(i) Equations (3.12) are linear in (qGi; h);
(ii) Equations (3.12) are concave in (qGi; h) and (t)  0 for t 2 (0; T ); or
(iii) Equations (3.12) are convex in (qGi; h) and (t)  0 for t 2 (0; T ):
When the above conditions are not satised, e.g. when the annual net benet function is nonconcave due to stock
e¤ects on costs, two di¢ culties are created: optimal policies may not be unique-valued functions of the state
variables, and the analysis of optimal policies cannot be based on the concavity of the value function. As argued
in section 2.5.2 of chapter 2, lattice programming methods provide a direct and convenient way to characterize
the behavior of optimal policies in such settings. In essence, Topkis (1978) shows that if the objective function in
an optimization problem exhibits a form of specic complementarity, then optimal decisions vary monotonically
with the underlying states or parameters.
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@H6j
@qDi(t)
=
ai
bi
  1
bi
(qGi(t) + qDi(t))  p  0;
for all i = 1; :::; n; j = 1; :::; k; k  n
= 0 if qDi(t) > 0 (3.19)
lim
t!1(t) = 0 (3.20)
lim
t!1 p(t) = p (3.21)
j(Tj ) = j(Tj+) (3.22)
j(Tj 1) =  

@Jj
@h(Tj 1)

(3.23)
where J represents the optimal value function at the jth   1 switching time. Each of the
j stages represents a control problem and has an adjoint variable j(t) associated with it,
which represents the scarcity value of groundwater at each solution stage. Equations of (3.16)
are the stagesequations of motion. The adjoint equations are represented by (3.17). These
equations demonstrate that groundwater pumping costs

c0[h(t)]
Pn
i=j qGi(t)

create the value
associated with user cost. The equations of (3.18) assure that water use for a particular sector
equates marginal benet to marginal pumping cost plus marginal user cost (scarcity value), and
guide water allocation among the economic sectors to equate their marginal value products.
They are necessary for allocative e¢ ciency of groundwater over time and across sectors. The
incorporation of marginal user cost in the equations ensures representation of the scarcity value
of groundwater (i.e. the opportunity cost of current pumping).
Once desalination is introduced, equation (3.19) guides inter-sectoral allocation of water by
equating their marginal value products. At this time the opportunity cost of current pumping
becomes zero. Equation (3.20) and (3.21) are the conventional transversality conditions, which
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must hold in the limit as time approaches innity. The remaining two equations have been
introduced by Kim et al. for the solution of a multi-stage optimal control problem. Equations
of (3.22) state that the adjoint variable, which represents user cost, must be continuous at each
switch time. Equations of (3.23) give an additional set of transversality conditions for the (k 1)
stages prior to the nal stage of desalination. These transversality conditions, simply represent
a marginal condition that equates the benet of marginal accretions to the groundwater stock
between stages by setting equal the user cost of one stage and the derivative of the optimal
value function of the next stage with respect to (h), both evaluated at the switching time.
3.5.1 Solution of the Multi-Stage System: the Mining Era.
To solve the system of equations (3.16)-(3.23) given the initial conditions in equation (3.13)
and (3.14), it is useful to think in terms of the optimal price path in each stage of the system.
The inverse demand curve for water for ith agent is given by,
D 1j (qGi(t) + qDi(t)) 
ai
bi
  1
bi
(qGij(t) + qDij(t)) = pij(t)
for i = 1; 2:::n and j = 1; 2; :::; k (3.24)
We assume that both the cost of desalination and groundwater reserves are high enough so
that water is always extracted from the aquifer. Then condition (3.18) holds with equality. As
mentioned in section 3.4, this condition guides water allocation among sectors for each stage of
the system to equate their marginal value product. Hence the price of water for the di¤erent
sectors is equal at each stage (i.e., p1jt = p2jt = ::: = pnjt = pjt for j = 1; :::; k). This gives,
j(t)

s+ 1  f
A  S

= pj(t)  c[hj(t)] (3.25)
Thus the in situ shadow price of water is equal to the royalty (i.e., price less unit extraction
cost). Rearranging equation (3.17) yields,
r  j(t) = _j(t)  c0[h(t)]
nX
i=j
qGi(t) (3.26)
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Equation (3.26) is a general optimal condition that must hold for all t; for all j, whether or not
desalination is being used and can be interpreted as an arbitrage condition. The left-hand side
is the foregone marginal benet of extracting water in terms of pounds realized after one period.
The right-hand side is the marginal benet of conservation, that is the interest on the resource
royalty. The rst term on the right is the foregone increase in value that would have been
realized by conserving the marginal unit. The second term is the increase in future extraction
cost due to extracting the marginal unit now instead of later. Thus equation (3.26) says that at
the margin, the benet of extracting water must equal the e¢ ciency cost of extracting water.
Substituting equation (3.24) into (3.19) gives,
pj(t)  p  0
< if qDij(t) = 0 (3.27)
which says that if price is below the cost of desalination at any of the j stages, desalination is
not used. The initial condition of the system given in equation (3.14), indicates that we assume
that at rst desalination is not used [qDi(t = 0) = 0]; hence pj(t) < p: From condition (3.25)
and its time derivative we get,
j(t) =
A  S
(s+ 1  f) [pj(t)  c[hj(t)]] (3.28)
_j(t) =
A  S
(s+ 1  f)
h
_pj(t) 

c0[hj(t)]  _hj(t)
i
(3.29)
Combining equations (3.16), (3.17), (3.28) and (3.29) gives,
_pj(t) =
r [pj(t)  c[hj(t)]]
A  S +
c0[h(t)] R
A  S (3.30)
The solution to the optimal control problem for each of the (j) stages of the mining era (during
which pj(t) < p) is governed by the system of di¤erential equations composed of equation (3.30)
and equation (3.31) given below. Equation (3.31) is the same as equation (3.10) and gives the
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hydrological equations of motion for each of the j stages,
_hj(t) =
R+ (f   1  s)
nP
i=j
qGit
A  S (3.31)
where qGij(t) = ai   bipj(t). Equation (3.30) and (3.31) dene the optimal trajectory of water
price and the optimal trajectory of aquifer head, respectively. The switching times (Tj) are
dened by the following two conditions,
qGij(t) = 0 (3.32)
pj(t) =
ai
bi
(3.33)
Thus, to derive optimal switching times we need a di¤erential equation showing the time path of
groundwater extraction by each economic sector. Given that equation (3.18) holds with equality
when desalination is not used, we take the time derivative of this equation for qDij(t) = 0: This
gives,
_jt =

AS
s+ 1  f

  1
bi
_qGij(t) 

c0[hj(t)] _hj(t)

(3.34)
Combining equations (3.16), (3.17), (3.18) with qDij(t) = 0; and equation (3.34), gives a di¤er-
ential equation for the quantity of groundwater demanded by each sector,
_qGij(t) = r [qGi(t) + bic[hj(t)]  ai]  c
0[h(t)]biR
A  S (3.35)
The system of di¤erential equations that needs to be solved for the derivation of endogenous
switches is given by equation (3.35) and equation (3.31) above. The jth switch time is derived
by setting qGij(t) = 0: A numerical solution of the system of di¤erential equations and derivation
of optimal switching times are provided in section 3.6.
3.5.2 Steady-State Conditions: the Desalination Era.
As already argued once desalination begins, pj(t) = p and _pj(t) = 0: Moreover, the head of
the aquifer is maintained at h; that is hj(t) = h and _hj(t) = 0. These conditions imply that
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the system reaches a steady-state, at which desalination continues to be used, price is xed at
p, and the aquifer head is maintained at h: Substituting p into equation (3.25) we get,
j(t) = (p  c[h(t)])

A  S
s+ 1  f

(3.36)
The time derivative of (3.36) gives,
_j(t) = 0 (3.37)
Combining equations (3.16), (3.17), (3.36) and (3.37) we get,
p  c[hj(t)] =  c0[hj(t)] R
r(A  S) (3.38)
which gives the optimal level of the head of the aquifer, which is maintained in the steady-state.
Because c0[h(t)] < 0; R > 0; r > 0 and AS > 0, equation (3.38) says that c[hj(t)] < p
whenever desalination is being used; the cost of extracting water from the aquifer is less than
the cost of desalinated water. This contradicts the intuitively reasonable proposition to use the
aquifer as long as the cost of extraction is lower than the cost of desalination. However, the
true cost of extracting water from the aquifer is not only the cost of current extraction but
also the cost of future extraction. As water is drawn from the aquifer, the cost of extracting
future water is increased, which may increase overall costs. The cost of extracting future water
must be balanced with the lost benets of leaving water in the ground. The optimal amount of
water to leave in the aquifer is h: It is also worth noting that desalination may never come into
play. This would occur if demand were completely satised by water from the aquifer without
ever drawing the aquifer down to h. However, in the numerical solution of model provided in
section 3.6 aquifer depletion is high enough so that desalination is eventually used.
3.5.3 Summary of Solution Stages.
Solving the optimal control problem requires nding the initial shadow price for in situ
groundwater (0); that will cause the e¢ ciency price path to rise to the desalination price at
105
exactly the same time that the aquifer head reaches (h). The solution of the model entails the
following solution stages:
Solution Stage 1: Initial Conditions of the System - No Desalination.
Initially the e¢ ciency price of water is below the cost of desalination, which is constant at price
(p): Moreover, the e¢ ciency price of water is below the marginal benet of water use for each of
the ith sectors in the economy. Each sector i optimally chooses the quantity of groundwater it
consumes, given the costs of acquiring groundwater and the hydro-technical constrains imposed
by the equation of motion of the head of the aquifer. At this stage no water is produced by
desalination, (i.e. qDi(t = 0) = 0) and total demand of water in the economy is satised by
groundwater supplies.
Solution Stage 2: Endogenous Adaptation Era - No Desalination.
The e¢ ciency price of groundwater is still below the price of desalination, hence the backstop
technology does not enter the picture yet. During this period the model exhibits an intertem-
poral depletion path that moves along the multiple-sector, piecewise linear aggregate demand
curve. As depletion of groundwater continues, the e¢ ciency price of water increases, and as a
result we observe sequential shifting away from economic sectors with lower marginal benet
from groundwater usage. Put otherwise, the economic sectors that are characterized by elastic
water demand curves, are soon faced with a situation where the shadow price of water is higher
than their marginal benet from water use and as a result their willingness to pay for ground-
water becomes zero. That is, during this era we observe sequential exits of economic sectors
from the groundwater market. Our model allows identication of the sector specic optimal
exit times.
Solution Stage 3: Edogenous Adaptation of Backstop Technology - Desalination Begins.
The e¢ ciency price of water reaches the cost of desalination and desalination begins. At this
point, the head of the aquifer is exactly h (i.e. the economy reaches a steady-state where water
inows are exactly equal to water outows and as a result equation (3.5) balances at h). This
causes price changes to cease. Price is set at exactly the cost of desalination (p), _pij = 0, and
groundwater is extracted from the aquifer at exactly the rate of net inow to the aquifer (as
given by equation (3.5), the hydro-technical equation of motion of the system). Thus _h(t) = 0,
and the aquifers water head is maintained at h: The balance of quantity demanded is supplied
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by desalination such that qDk(t) = ak  pbk qGk(t). Moreover, disaggregated representation of
groundwater demand adopted by our model, allows identication of the intersectoral allocation
of both desalinated and extracted water.
3.6 Application of the Model.
The focus of this study is the Kiti coastal region, located in the southern part of the semi-
arid island of Cyprus15. The aquifer in this region is neither beneted by substantial natural
recharge, not interconnected with surface water. Moreover, in Kiti the notion of common
property characterizes ownership of groundwater reserves. As argued in section 1.3 of the
introductory chapter of the thesis, the doctrine of absolute ownership governs groundwater
property law in the island. Although the doctrine conditions ownership of groundwater on
ownership of land overlying the aquifer (thereby limiting access), in all other respects owners
of land, own groundwater as a common property resource subject to the rule of capture. This
creates a pumping cost externality among groundwater users, thereby causing a traditional
market failure.
The empirical application of the dynamic model uses economic and hydrologic parameters
for the Kiti region supplied by the Water Development Department of Cyprus16. Table (3.6.1)
summarizes these parameters.
15The interested reader can nd a geographical map indicating the location of the Kiti region, in sections D
of the appendix of the questionnaire used in the Survey of Production (1999). The relevant questionnaire is
attached at the end of the thesis.
16Given the absence of observations over a wide range of prices, researchers at the Water Development De-
partment of Cyprus have used linear programming for the estimation of the derived sector specic demands for
groundwater.
107
Table 3.6.1: Economic and Hydrologic Parameters Pertaining to the Kiti Area.
Symbol Description Parameter Value
ba Absolute value of the slope of agricultural water demand 6,118,500 m3=$
bd Absolute value of the slope of domestic water demand 1,270,000 m
3=$
aa The intercept of agricultural water demand 9,436,500 m3
ad The intercept of domestic water demand 4,048,000 m
3
a Price elasticity of agricultural water demand for relevant range 0.48
d Price elasticity of domestic water demand for relevant range 0.18
k1 Cost of pumping one cubic meter of water per meter of lift 0.02 £ /m3
k2 The intercept of the pumping cost equation 0.3672 £ /m3
f Return ow coe¢ cient 0.05 pure number
A Area of the aquifer 12,000,000 m2
S Storativity coe¢ cient 0.7 pure number
s Salinity Coe¢ cient 0.3 pure number
R Rechrage rate 4,000,000 m3 p.a.
ho Initial elevation of water table above sea level 3.45 masl
p Unit price of desalination 0.5 £ /m3
 In 1999 £ 1 Cyprus is worth £ 1.14 UK.
 Meters above sea level.
In order to nd the steady-state hydraulic head, switching times during the mining era, as
well as the terminal endogenous switching time dened by the adoption of the desalination, we
have attempted a numerical solution of the problem formulated in sections 3.3 and 3.4. Our
empirical application involves groundwater demand by the two existing sectors of the economy
of Kiti: the domestic sector and the agricultural sector. As explained in section 3.4, sequential
exits from the groundwater market are dened by the relative magnitude of the parameter
ratio

ai
bi

of sector specic demand curves. In the present application these equal 1:5422$=m3
for the agricultural sector and 3:1874$=m3 for the domestic sector. These are the prices per
m3 of water at which the quantity demanded by the agricultural and domestic sectors become
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zero, respectively; hence the agricultural sector should exit the market rst. This result is in
agreement with the empirical regularity identied by e.g. Gibbons17(1986), which indicates
that the marginal net benets from agricultural uses are lower than the marginal net benets
of water use by the domestic sector.
The explicit marginal cost function used in the solution of the system is,
c[h(t)] = k1  [SL  h(t)] = k2   k1  h(t)
The di¤erence (SL h)measures pumping lift, the distance from the water table to the irrigation
surface. This is the pumping cost function traditionally adopted in the groundwater literature
(see for example, Gisser and Sanchez (1980 a, b) and Kim et al. (1989)), which represents a
specic form of a general cost function. The derivatives of this cost function have the desirable
properties; i.e. a positive partial derivative with respect to (qG) and a negative cross-partial
derivative between (qG) and pumping lift.
Using the data in table 3.6.1, we calculate optimal extraction rates and price paths for
various initial shadow prices. The solution method involves rst using the steady-state head
equation (3.38) to calculate the nal head, and solving for the end time (tk 1), the time that
desalination is introduced, such that the solution to the system of di¤erential equations (3.30)
and (3.31) with boundary conditions h(tk 1) = h and p(tk 1) = p; results in h(t0) = h0:
Simultaneously we solve the system of di¤erential equations that allows derivation of endogenous
switches, given by equations (3.35) and (3.31). Substituting the relevant parameters from table
3.6.1 in equation (3.38) gives the optimal level of the head of the aquifer, which is maintained in
the steady-state at h = 2:88 (masl)meters above sea level. Our programming results18 indicate
that with interest rate equal to 5% per annum and desalination price (p) at $0:5m3; the initial
per cubic meter scarcity value of groundwater in the aquifer is $0:20176m319 and desalination
is introduced instantaneously20, before any of the two sectors leave the market. At steady-state,
17Gibbons provides a detailed survey and synthesis of existing studies on the economic value of water in various
uses.
18The programming package used for the solution of the model isMathematica 4.0 (1999), by Stephen Wolfram.
19This corresponds to an average in situ value of the resource equal to $0:487105 per square meter of land, or
equivalently $478:105 per 0:1 hectare of land.
20Desalination is to be introduced in the region under consideration in May 2000. The desalination plant under
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the quantity of water demanded by the domestic and agricultural sectors are 3:413mm3 and
6:378mm3; respectively21. Of the total quantity of water demanded, 3:200mm3 will be extracted
from the aquifer and the remaining 6:591mm3 will be provided from desalination. Of the total
quantity of water produced, 2:298mm3 and 4:293mm3 will be consumed by the domestic and
agricultural sectors respectively. Moreover, 1:116mm3 will be extracted by the domestic sector
and 2:084mm3 by the agricultural sector. Hence although the empirical application of the model
does not identify any endogenous sectoral exits from the groundwater market, the disaggregated
representation of the groundwater demand curve allows estimation of the intersectoral allocation
of water from both relevant sources. Steady-state conditions are summarized in the table
below22:
Table 3.6.2: Steady-State Conditions Under Optimal Control (With Desalination)
Price of Water (Desalination Price) £ 0.50 Per Cubic Meter of Groundwater
Unit Extraction Cost £ 0.3100 Per Cubic Meter of Groundwater
Optimal Head (h) 2.8800 Meters Above Sea Level
Initial Marginal Scarcity Value (0) £ 0.2017 Per Cubic Meter of Groundwater
Initial Scarcity Value (0) £ 487.1050 Per (0.1) Hectare of Land
Last Endogenous Switch Time (tk 1) 1999 Year of Desalination Adoption
Quantity Demanded by Domestic 3.4130 Millions Cubic Meters of Water
Quantity Demanded by Agriculture 6.3780 Millions Cubic Meters of Water
Quantity Extracted from the Aquifer 3.2000 Millions Cubic Meters of Water
Quantity Produced by Desalination 6.5910 Millions Cubic Meter of Water
construction aims to cover only domestic water demand. However, there exists major opposition with reference
to the location of the desalination plan, because the salt resulting from the desalination causes environmental
harm if discharged in not deep enough areas of the sea. This is another aspect of the problem, and possibly an
interesting future extension of the model.
21 (mm3) stands for millions of cubic meters.
22 In their supply-side study of oil prices, Roumasset et al. (1983) conducted a sensitivity analysis showing
that the assumption of an unlimited backstop technology does not introduce a substantial inaccuracy in the
estimation of e¢ ciency prices if the backstop price is set su¢ ciently high and if total resources available at and
below the backstop price are abundant. In particular, their test of this condition was that the e¢ ciency prices
in the present and projection period of interest (e.g., 50-100 years) were not sensitive to changes in the backstop
price of the ultimate resource. However, in situations like the one we have considered in the current empirical
application, where total resources available below the backstop price are scarce, e¢ ciency prices are very sensitive
to changes in the backstop price.
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The components of annual welfare derived from these steady-state conditions are shown in table
3.6.3. These add up to $170:36m (millions) of total annual welfare discounted indenitely at
5% rate of interest.
Table 3.6.3: Welfare Under Optimal Control - With Desalination
Consumer Surplus of the Agricultural Sector £ 3.324 m
Consumer Surplus of the Domestic Sector £ 4.586 m
Producer Surplus from Water Extracted from Aquifer £ 0.608 m
Total Annual Welfare £ 8.518 m
Total Annual Welfare discounted at 5% indenitely £ 170.360 m
Let us now calculate welfare under competitive (myopic) conditions of groundwater extrac-
tion23. Taking a discrete time approximation to our model yields the following table:
Table 3.6.4: Calculation of Welfare Under Myopic Extraction
Year ho MC P QA QD QA+QD hc WA WD
masl $=m3 $=m3 mm3 mm3 mm3 masl $m $m
1 3.45 .2982 .2982 7.612 3.669 11.281 2.247 4.735 5.299
2 2.247 .3223 .3223 7.465 3.638 11.103 1.071 4.554 5.211
3 1.071 .3458 .4180 6.879 3.517 10.396 0.000 3.867 4.870
The rst column of the table above gives the year of groundwater extraction, the second column
gives the opening head of the aquifer (measured in meters above sea level), and the third
column gives the unit cost of groundwater extraction given the opening head for each specic
year (measured in pounds per cubic meter). Column four gives the price of groundwater under
myopic extraction, which is usually equal to the unit extraction cost (measured in pounds per
cubic meter of water). Columns ve and six give the quantities of groundwater demanded
by the agricultural and domestic sectors (measured in millions of cubic meters), respectively.
23See appendix B3 for the analytical derivation of extraction and water level time trajectories, as well as
endogenous switch times, under common property conditions.
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Column seven gives the total quantity of groundwater demanded by both sectors of the economy
(measured in millions of cubic meters). Finally columns eight and nine indicate sector-specic
consumer surpluses which give the annual welfare derived from agricultural and domestic use of
groundwater respectively (measured in millions of pounds). Note that in the last year the total
quantity demanded has been set so as to exactly exhaust the aquifer. This produces a small
producer surplus in year 3 (because price is above pumping cost) equal to $0:751m (or equal to
$0:681m if discounted at 5% rate of interest). However, we have ignored this in the calculation
of overall welfare since this is just an artifact of the discrete approximation. As shown in table
3.6.4, under myopic groundwater extraction the aquifer is exhausted in three years. Adding up
welfares and discounting at 5% yields a net present value (NPV) welfare equal to $27:259m:
The above calculation assumes that when the aquifer is completely exhausted, natural
recharge disappears and as a result there are zero benets after exhaustion of the aquifer.
However, given the availability of a backstop technology in our model, after the aquifer is
exhausted the price jumps to $0:5=m3 and desalination will be introduced. Hence, in the pres-
ence of desalination the mining phase of myopic groundwater extraction will be identical to the
one described in table 3.6.4 and the steady-state phase will be similar to the one described in
table 3.6.3, except that there will be no producer surplus from the aquifer, that is all water
will be provided from desalination. Hence, annual welfare in the desalination phase will be
$7:91m, capitalized at 5% that is worth $158:2m, and discounted back to year 1, that is worth
$136:66m: Adding this to the NPV from the mining phase as described in table 3.6.4, gives a
total NPV for this case of $163:919m: Comparing this gure with total welfare under optimal
control with desalination (given in table 3.6.3 at $170:36m), provides a welfare improvement
of 3:8%: From this result we can conclude that in the presence of a backstop technology the
GSE persists, even when the assumption of innite hydraulic conductivity is not imposed on the
relevant dynamic models. This is an intuitive result, as the availability of a backstop technology
e¤ectively reduces the scarcity of the resource and consequently the welfare improvement to be
achieved if current users incur not only the unit extraction cost, but also the scarcity rents of
the resource they consume.
The obvious question that arises at this point is how robust is the Gisser-Sanchez e¤ect in
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the absence of backstop availability, when compelete depletion of the relevant aquifer is due in
the near future (that is, assuming away innite hydraulic conductivity). To calculate welfare
under the optimal control regime in the absence of a backstop technology, we take a discrete
time approximation to our model, which yields the following table:
Table 3.6.5: Calculation of Welfare Under Opitmal Control.
No Desalination ! Exhaustion of the Aquifer in Year 4.
Year ho MC P QA QD hc CSA CSD PSA PSD
masl $=m3 $=m3 mm3 mm3 masl $m $m $m $m
1 3.450 0.2982 .5000 6.378 3.413 2.469 3.324 4.586 1.287 0.689
2 2.469 0.3178 .5228 6.237 3.384 1.513 3.179 1.125 1.279 0.694
3 1.513 0.3369 .5456 6.098 3.355 0.582 3.039 1.077 1.273 0.700
4 0.582 0.3555 1.1634 2.318 2.570 0.000 0.439 0.031 0.493 0.707
As in table 3.6.4, the rst column of the table above indicates the year of extraction, the second
column gives the opening head (measured in meters above sea level), and the third column
gives the unit cost of groundwater extraction given the opening head for each specic year
(measured in pounds per cubic meter). Column four gives the optimal price of groundwater -
which is equal to the sum of the unit extraction cost and the unit scarcity value of the resource-
(measured in pounds per cubic meter of water). Columns ve and six give the quantities
of groundwater demanded by the agricultural and domestic sectors, respectively (measured
in millions of cubic meters). Columns eight to eleven indicate sector-specic consumer and
producer surpluses, which give the annual welfare derived from agricultural and domestic use
of groundwater, respectively (measured in millions of pounds). Note that in the last year the
total quantity demanded has been set so as to exactly exhaust the aquifer. Hence, under the
regime of optimal control the aquifer is exhausted in four years24. Adding up consumer and
producer welfares for both sectors of the economy, and discounting at 5% yields a net present
24To limit water demand to 3:2mm3 (ignoring recharge) which is what is available from the aquifer at steady-
state conditions (see table 3.6.2), we need a price of $1:392=m3 at which consumption from agriculture and
domestic sectors would be 0:9198mm3 and 2:2802mm3, respectively. For this to be an optimum we need to nd
a head that satises equation (3.38). It is straightforward to see that there is no positive value of the head of
the aquifer that satises this equation. Hence, optimal control also involves exhausting the aquifer.
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value (NPV) welfare equal to $22:83m:
However, the welfare benets of keeping the natural recharge of the aquifer available, are
substantial25. As indicated in table 3.6.1, the natural recharge of the aquifer under consider-
ation is equal to 4:0mm3 and the steady-state quantity demanded of groundwater extracted
from the aquifer under optimal control is equal to 3:2mm3 (see table 3.6.1): To limit demand to
this level a price of $1:392=m3 is needed, at which consumption from agriculture and domestic
sectors would be 0:9198mm3 and 2:2802mm3, respectively. The annual consumer surplus from
agriculture having its 0:9198mm3 is $9:069m. The annual consumer surplus from the domes-
tic sector having its 2:2802mm3 is $2:047m: However, there is considerable producer surplus
because pumping costs when the aquifer is empty are $0:3672 per m3 while the selling price
is $1:392 per m3: Applying this surplus to 3:2mm3 is worth $3:279m annually. Thus total
annual benets are $5:395m, and capitalizing at 5% makes that worth $107:9m: Assuming
this regime did not start until year 4 after the aquifer is (almost) exhausted, gives a NPV of
$88:77m. Adding this amount to $22:83m, which is the total welfare received the rst four
years of optimal groundwater extraction before the exhaustion of the aquifer, gives an overall
NPV for optimal control with no desalination but continuous recharge of $111:60m: Compar-
ing this welfare gain with the one derived under myopic conditions of groundwater extraction
($27:259m) gives a huge welfare improvement of 409:4% and the Gisser-Sanchez e¤ect certainly
disappears. Table 3.6.6 summarises welfare derived under di¤erent regimes with and without
backstop availability.
25Some hydrologists consider that a myopically managed aquifer subject to saline intrusion runs the risk of
irreversible loss of recharge, which can be avoided at little or no cost with careful (optimal) management. This
is a hydrological possibility for aquifers that consist of ne materials (e.g. silty sands), while it is less relevant
for aquifers that consist of coarse materials (e.g. gravels). Coastal aquifers such as the one we are modelling in
this chapter consist of ne materials. As indicated above, this makes the hydrological possibility of irreversible
loss of recharge under myopic extraction that can be avoided at little or no cost with optimal management, very
probable. For this reason in this chapter I am schematically modelling the simplied case in which irreversibility
precludes the use of aquifer recharge, although admitting that reality may be more complex and site specic.
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Table 3.6.6: Examining the robustness of the GSE.
Regime Backstop Welfare Welfare Improvement GSE
Optimal Control Available £ 170.36m
Myopic Available £ 162.621m 3.8% Persists
Optimal Control Not Available £ 110.51m
Myopic Not Available £ 25.961m 409.4% Disappears
Our results suggest that in the presence of a backstop technology the GSE persists. This
is an intuitive result because it suggests that when the scarcity of the resource is reduced due
to the presence of a backstop technology, welfare gains from controlling resource extraction are
not signicant for any practical purposes. However, our results suggest that in the absence of
a backstop technology and continuous natural recharge the GSE disappears; that is, a huge
welfare improvement is derived from controlling extraction as compared to myopic exploitation
of the aquifer. This result constitutes a partial resolution of the Gisser Sanchez e¤ect and
applies to situations where extraction is likely to exhaust the water in the aquifer and social
benets from managing the aquifer and sustaining natural recharge to the indenite future, are
found to be signicantly greater than benets derived under myopic extraction which involves
complete exhaustion of the aquifer. However, all relevant empirical applications that identify
the existence of the GSE are characterized by model parameters that converge to a steady-state
of positive groundwater extraction and aquifer head, under both competitive and optimally
controlled solutions. As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, this is an artifact of the
commonly adopted assumption of innite hydraulic conductivity, which implies that the aquifer
will never dry up, irrespective of groundwater extraction rates. However, in situations where
extraction is likely to exhaust the water in the aquifer under consideration, this assumption
should not be adopted. In the present model this assumption was not adopted, and as a result
social benets from managing the aquifer and sustaining natural recharge of the aquifer, are
found to be signicant for all practical purposes. It is worth noting however, that this result
holds only if sustaining natural recharge of the aquifer is possible under optimal control even if
the aquifer is completely exhausted26.
26This throws some doubt on the wisdom of using linear demand and pumping cost functions, since behaviour
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3.7 Conclusion.
Although motivated by the case of coastal aquifers, the model is an extension of the model of
an exhaustible resource subject to a backstop technology (Heal, 1976), generalized to include
the possibility of demand adaptation to increasing resource scarcity. Our empirical results
indicate that when a bakstop technology is available the GSE persists, while in the absence of
backstop availability it is possible that the GSE disappears. This provides a partial resolution
of the Gisser-Sanchez paradox that dominates the relevant literature since 1980. The essence
of our argument is that net groundwater management benets are very signicant in situations
where no management of the resource leads to complete exhaustion of the water in the aquifer
under consideration, while optimal management of the resource achieves to sustain positive
rates of groundwater extraction through sustaining natural recharge in the indenite future
(although it also involves complete depletion of the aquifer).
While the notion of a backstop technology as a basis for resource management remains con-
troversial, we submit that the existence per se of a backstop is not the critical issue. Virtually
limitless and renewable resource substitutes do exists (e.g. seawater, solar power, etc.). The
critical issue is at which unit costs can they be made e¤ective substitutes for nonrenewables.
Moreover, the concern of most relevance to policy is what happens in the interim on the way
to the steady-state. In the nal analysis it is the trajectory to the steady-state, rather than
long-run sustainability, that captures concerns for the future. Our model, not only solves for
the optimal time of adopting this technology which denes the steady-state conditions, but
also models the optimal path of resource use towards this steady-state, by allowing endogenous
demand adaptation to increasing resource scarcity. Other applications of the approach devel-
oped in this chapter, could disaggregate resource demand by technological e¢ ciency of resource
use and describe the chronological pattern of adopting more e¢ cient irrigation technologies.
Moreover, the optimal time of use of other sources of water, such as surface water from a dam
or a reservoir, or articial recharge, could be introduced in the model as additional backstops
to groundwater depletion.
close to zero is crucial. At the same time it indicates interesting lines of future research.
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The model developed in this chapter does not take into account dynamic strategic interac-
tions between extracting units within or among economic sectors, which is a realistic description
of groundwater exploitation in situations with a small number of relevant extracting agents.
As argued in section 2.4 of chapter 2, these external e¤ects are independent of the pumping
cost externality and if present and signicant, they may a¤ect the value the resource scarcity
rents (Negri, 1989; Dixon, 1989; Provencher and Burt, 1993). The intrinsic logic of this model
however, can easily accommodate game theoretic formulations, by reformulating the optimal
control model into a di¤erential game and employing closed-loop (feedback) solution techniques
for the derivation of relevant trajectories.
A limitation of our model is that it uses the agentsbenets to characterize socially optimal
exploitation, which is problematic when irreversible events or irreparable damage to nature
are involved. Given that we are dealing with an aquifer that faces complete depletion in the
near future, it would be more appropriate for the water management authority to incorporate
the water table level into its objective function and postulate some kind of intervention to
avoid extinctionor the occurrence of irreversible events27, even if the backstop price is so high
that renders its endogenous adoption non-optimal under a management regime. This could be
another subject for further research.
27See section 2.4.2 of chapter 2, where we discuss the work of Tsur and Zemel (1995), where optimal exploita-
tion of groundwater when extraction a¤ects the probability of irreversible event occurring is investigated.
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Appendix A3.
Description of the Physical System of Saltwater-Freshwater Interaction.
The development of groundwater resources in mainland coastal areas is a delicate issue,
and careful management is required if water quality degradation due to the encroachment of
seawater is to be avoided. The general class of groundwater systems that our model attempts to
describe, consists of a saturated porous medium containing a miscible uid of variable density
and salt concentration. In a porous media in a coastal area, a zone of mixing, known as the
zone of di¤usion or dispersion, forms between the two uids, as shown in the hypothetical cross-
section in gure A.3.1. At this zone of mixing, some of the saltwater mixes with the freshwater
and moves seaward causing the saltwater to ow toward the area of mixing.
Figure A3.1: Hypothetical cross-section showing the zone of di¤usion and ow
patterns in homogeneous coastal aquifer (modied from Cooper et al., 1964).
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Appendix B3.
Welfare Measures in an Input Market.
Mishan (1968) demonstrated the well-known partial equilibrium result that the area behind
a competitive supply curve conditioned on xed-input prices (producers surplus) measures
returns or quasi rents on xed-production factors. Likewise, it can also be shown that the area
behind a derived demand for inputs (conditioned on xity of other input and output prices)
measures returns or quasi rents on xed-production factors of the production process using
the input. That is, a producers surplus as consumer of any of his inputs is the same as his
surplus as producer and supplier of his output in the xed-price situation. In contrast to this
extremely partial approach, a number of other authors (Johnson, 1960 ; Krauss and Winch,
1971) have attempted to approach welfare surplus from a general equilibrium standpoint where
all other prices in the economy are allowed to vary. These works have culminated in the paper by
Anderson (1974) which shows that welfare changes can be determined by comparing the change
in income arising from production (the area behind the general equilibrium supply function)
with the income e¤ect of price changes in consumption.
Then, Just and Hueth (1979) argued that the area behind a general equilibrium demand
curve in an input market does not measure benets to buyers in that market alone, but rather
measures the sum of rents to producers selling in all higher markets (assuming no intervening
market has perfectly elastic demand) plus nal consumers surplus. These results hold given
the usual conditions required for validity of consumers surplus measures in the nal goods
market and producers surplus in the initial resource market. If the nal consumers surplus
is the Marshallian surplus calculated from an ordinary nal goods demand, then the results
of Willig (1976)28 can be used to determine the closeness of approximation to the proper
28Although the Marshallian consumer surplus, which is dened as the area behind the inverse uncompensated
demand curve, has some intuitive appeal as a welfare indicator, it does not measure any of the theoretical
denitions of welfare change. It is neither an index of utility change, expect under special conditions, nor a
measure of gain or loss that can be employed in a potential compensation test. The Marshallian surplus does
lie between compensating variation (the welfare change associated with a price decrease given by the reduction
in income needed to hold the individual on the original indi¤erence curve, which measures the area to the left
of the Hicks-compensated demand curve that passes through the initial position) and equivalent variation (the
additional expenditure (income) necessary for the individual to reach the original utility level, given the initial
set of prices, which measures the area to the left of the Hicks-compensated demand curve that passes through
the nal position). This opens the question of whether it can be a useful approximation to either of these
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Hicksian concept. If the demand curve used in calculating the change in consumer surplus and
generating intermediate market demands is the proper compensated demand, then the change
in consumer surplus is the proper Hicksian welfare measure. Moreover, if some other nal
goods price changes as a result of altering price in the market under consideration, then only
the Hicksian version of the demand curve has the proper path independence of the line integral
used to evaluate the change in the expenditure function29. However, as argued by Robert Willig
in most applications the error of approximation will be very small. in fact the error will often
be overshadowed by the errors involved in estimating the demand curve(1976, p. 589).
In the natural resource literature researchers have attempted to directly estimate compen-
sating variation (CV) and equivalent variation (EV) welfare measures, using the concept of
willingness to pay and willingness to sell, respectively. In contrast to Willigs proposition,
heuristic arguments and empirical evidence have supported the belief that willingness to sell
exceeds willingness to pay. Bockstael and McConnell (1980) draw attention to some di¢ culties
in applying Willigs results in empirical work, and point out that economists should be careful
about estimating the value of removing or providing access rights to natural resources. There
is no strong evidence to show that unambiguous measures of welfare changes can be calculated
when a resource is eliminated, as in the empirical application of the optimal control model of
this chapter. This is unfortunate, because some of the most controversial questions faced by
economists deal with the consequences of eliminating/depleting natural resources. Calculating
the value of removing access to/or depleting a resource implies the equivalent of a price increase
which reduces quantity to zero, and hence makes it di¢ cult to use Willigs error bounds for
compensating and equivalent variation. Moreover, for some functional forms (linear, double-
other measures. Willig (1976) has o¤ered rigorous derivations of expressions relating the Marshallian surplus,
compensating variation and equivalent variation. These expressions provide a way of calculating the magnitude
of the di¤erences among the three measures for given prices, quantities, and income. Willigs bounds for the
approximation errors are based on the fact that the di¤erences between the three measures arise from an income
e¤ect on the quantity demanded; and the size of that e¤ect depends on the change in real income brought about
by the price change and on the income elasticity of demand for the good.
29When simultaneous changes in all prices take place, the Marshallian consumer surplus is dened as a line
integral. This integral will be independent of the path of integration (that is, the order in which prices and/or
incomes are assumed to change) only if the income elasticities of demand for all goods are equal. The income
elasticities of all goods can be equal to each other only if they are all equal to one, in other words, if preferences
are homothetic. Finally, if the prices of only a subset of all goods change, a unique Marshallian surplus exists if
the marginal utility of income is constant with respect to only those prices that are changed (Just, Hueth, and
Schmitz; 1982).
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log), we cannot calculate the errors of approximating willingness to buy or sell by the area
under the demand curve.
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Appendix C3.
Common Property Solution of the Model.
In chapter 2 we argued that Gisser and Sanchez (1980 a, b) derived a result, which
prophetically summarized the up to date empirical estimates of the di¤erence in the net present
value of benets derived under socially optimal and competitive rates of water pumping. This
result essentially states that in certain circumstances, the numerical magnitude of the various
pumping cost and common property externalities is insignicant. In this appendix we derive
analytically the competitive extraction and water table level equilibrium paths, as well as
competitive switch times for sectoral exits from the groundwater market and for endogenous
adoption of the desalination technology. The competitive-commonality solution of the model
we develop, allows estimation of the magnitude of common property externalities, if compared
with the optimal control solution of the model. The numerical solution of the model under
both regimes allows identication of the presence or absence of the GSE .
The common property equilibrium characterizing groundwater depletion di¤ers from the
planning equilibrium in the ve intertemporal traits of the model: rate of groundwater min-
ing, groundwater allocation between sectors, switch times representing a sectors demand for
groundwater becoming equal to zero, the time of adoption of the backstop technology and the
quantity of water produced by the backstop technology at steady-state conditions. To derive
the common property equilibrium, we ignore groundwaters scarcity value and adopt the myopic
condition of marginal benet of groundwater use equals current marginal cost of groundwater
pumping. As analyzed in chapter 2, the myopia of ignoring user cost stems from behavioral
incentives that originate in common ownership of groundwater.
As suggested by Kim et al. (1989), the characterization of the common property equilib-
rium of our model, follows from manipulating equations (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5). To derive this
equilibrium we explicitly dene the marginal cost equation (see section 3.6),
MCG = c[h(t)] = k1(SL  h) = k2   k1  h(t) for qDi = 0 (3.39)
MCG = p = for qDi > 0 (3.40)
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h(t = 0) = ho (3.41)
qDi(t = 0) = 0 (3.42)
Equations (3.39) and (3.40) give the relevant marginal cost of extraction during the mining
era and after the introduction of desalination, respectively. Equation (3.41) gives the initial
condition for the head of the aquifer and equation (3.42) reveals the assumption that both the
cost of desalination and groundwater reserves are high enough so that desalination is not used
at the initial stage of the system. Given zero production of water from desalination, equating
price (marginal benet of groundwater extraction) in equation (3.24), with the current marginal
cost of groundwater pumping and substituting this expression into the inverse demand equation
(equation 3.3) gives,
qGi(t) = ai   k2bi + k1bih(t) i = 1; :::; n: (3.43)
The equality in the equation (3.43) remains through time, thereby ignoring the value of
groundwater left in the aquifer from reducing future pumping costs, i.e. ignoring the scarcity
value of the resource. Moreover, equation (3.43) equates marginal benets of water use across
economic sectors and as a result it satises static inter-sectoral allocative e¢ ciency, although it
does not satisfy dynamic e¢ ciency. Inserting equation (3.43) in the hydrological constraint of
the system gives,
_h(t) =
26664
k1(f   1  s)
nP
i=j
bi
AS
37775  h(t)
+
26664
R+ (f   1  s)
nP
i=j
ai   k2(f   1  s)
nP
i=j
bi
AS
37775
for j = 1 (3.44)
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The solution to (3.43) is,
h(t) =  
2664R+ (f   1  s)
nP
i=1
ai   k2(f   1  s)
nP
i=1
bi
k1(f   1  s)
nP
i=1
bi
3775
+
8>><>>:h0 +
2664R+ (f   1  s)
nP
i=1
ai   k2(f   1  s)
nP
i=1
bi
k1(f   1  s)
nP
i=1
bi
3775
9>>=>>;
 exp
2664

k1(f   1  s)
nP
i=1
bi

t
AS
3775 (3.45)
Inserting h(t) in equation (3.43) gives,
qGi(t) =
2664ai   bi

R+ (f   1  s)
nP
i=1
ai

(f   1  s)
nP
i=1
bi
3775
+
2664bi

R  [k1(SL  h(t = j   1))] (f   1  s)
nP
i=1
bi + (f   1  s)
nP
i=1
ai

(f   1  s)
nP
i=1
bi
3775
 exp
2664

k1(f   1  s)
nP
i=1
bi

t
AS
3775
i = 1; :::; n: (3.46)
Equations (3.45) and (3.46) characterize depletion in the rst stage of the system, with n sectors
using water in their production activities.
Endogenous switch times are derived by using the numerical ordering of sectors by intercept,
as dened in the main text of this chapter. Setting qGi(t) = 0 and solving equation (3.46) for
(t), gives the rst endogenous exit for the common property solution. With the rst switch
time established, the solution of the system of equations (3.45) and (3.46) represents common
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property equilibrium paths, for the rst (j) stage. Characterizing the intertemporal paths for
subsequent stages again develops into a routine, sequential procedure. In stage 2, the value of
equation (3.45) at the rst endogenous switch establishes the initial condition for h(t)j=2: Using
stage 2s initial condition the procedure followed for the derivation of equations (3.43-3.46) is
repeated in order to dene the time path of water allocation among the (n   1) sectors, until
equation (3.40) becomes binding. At this point the backstop technology is adopted, and the
system reaches a steady-state at which desalination continues to be used and marginal benet
of water is xed at the unit cost of the backstop technology (p) (hence _pj(t) = 0): In section
3.6, the numerical solution of the common property equilibrium characterized in this appendix
is derived and compared with the optimal control solution of the problem.
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Chapter 4
Hedonic Price Analysis and
Selectivity: Theory and Application
to Groundwater as a Productive
Input.
4.1 Introduction.
In chapters 1 and 2, we have argued that the di¢ culty in establishing clear ownership rights
in groundwater exploitation makes it improbable for markets for this resource to function well.
In the absence of well-functioning markets there is no price or quantity data from which the
benet (willingness to pay) from having access to good quality groundwater, can be reliably
estimated. Although, the marginal willingness-to-pay curves for nonmarketed, public goods
cannot be estimated from direct observations of market transactions, they do exist. How
then, can they be derived? Revealed preference approaches to environmental valuation aim
to obtaining demand and benets information for nonmarketed, public goods. They depend
on the existence of observable behaviour within a market which is connected in some clearly
dened way with the environmental non-marketed resource to be valued. Information derived
from this observed behaviour are used to estimate willingness to pay for the resource. Two
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such methods, prevalent in the environmental literature, are the hedonic and the travel cost
methods.
The hedonic method rests on the assumptions that (a) the price of some marketed good (e.g.
land, house, car, wage rate, etc.) is a function of its di¤erent characteristics, (b) an implicit price
exists for each of the characteristics, and (c) this price can be identied statistically. If one of the
characteristics is a di¤ering but measurable environmental or resource attribute (e.g. varying
groundwater supplies or qualities), the hedonic technique enables derivation of the implicit
marginal willingness to pay (price) for an incremental unit of that characteristic. Likewise,
the principle being used in the travel cost technique, is that of inferring the value of a set of
non-marketed attributes from expenditure in another market. However, this technique can be
applied in somewhat di¤erent cases; i.e. it can be applied if (a) individuals are observed to incur
costs in order to consume commodities related to the environmental or resource characteristics
of interest, and (b) the consumed commodities are non-marketed. Intuitively, the extra time
and money an individual is willing to spend to access a site with more desirable environmental
or resource characteristics, yields useful information for valuation of those characteristics.
The hedonic price technique was developed by Griliches (1971) and others, initially for the
purpose of estimating the value of quality change in consumer goods. The formal structure of
hedonic models was rst analyzed by Rosen (1974) who has used the hedonic price concept to
analyze the supply and demand of the characteristics that di¤erentiated products in competitive
markets. Freeman (1974) was the rst to provide the profession with an early discussion of the
application of the concept to measuring the demand for environmental quality characteristics,
while the rst empirical study of housing prices and an environmental amenity was by Ridker
and Henning (1967). The earliest examples of hedonic methods applied to irrigation water val-
uation were Milliman (1959) and Hartman and Anderson (1962). Their work anticipated most
of the major developments of the hedonic method in the 1970s, but predated the coining of
the term hedonic. Moreover, the relationship among land prices and surface and groundwater
access (both in quantity and quality terms) has been studied in a hedonic framework by Mi-
ranowski and Hammes (1984), Gardner and Barrows (1985), Ervin and Mill (1985) and King
127
and Sinden (1988)1. A more recent example applied to irrigation water value is Toell, Libbin
and Miller (1990), who compared sales of irrigated and non-irrigated lands in order to measure
the value of groundwater in the southern High Plains in the United States. The travel cost
technique seems to have been rst proposed by Hotelling (1931), and subsequently developed
by Clawson (1959) and Clawson and Knetsch (1966). Such models have also been employed to
measure the welfare e¤ects to changes in water quality of recreational sites (e.g. Binkley, 1978;
Freeman, 1979; Caulkins et al., 1986; Smith and Desvousges, 1986; Bockstael et al., 1987 ).
This chapter considers the case where the quality characteristics of an input inuence its
usage and argues that this can cause sample selection problems giving rise to misleading para-
meter estimates corresponding to the hedonic shadow prices of the quality characteristics of the
input. The input under consideration is land. The sample selection problem here is analogous
to the one considered in the travel cost models, where the endogeneity of the decision to visit a
recreational site is shown to result in estimated demand that exaggerates the consumer surplus
associated with the trip2 (Miller and Hay, 1981; Vaughau and Russell, 1982; Hellerstein and
Mendelsohn, 1992; Hausman et al., 1992 ). The sample selection problem investigated here
arises from the fact that the decision to pay for a particular input (i.e. a parcel of land) is not
exogenous to the level of the price paid. This is because certain quality characteristics can be
responsible for the parcel being included in or excluded from the sample. For example, in a
hedonic analysis of residential housing, tra¢ c noise can be found to have a positive valuation
because houses in main roads have a high probability of being converted to business properties.
We demonstrate this argument in a model where land is demanded for use as an input
either in agricultural production or in touristic development. In the context of this model the
hedonic valuation of the quality characteristics of the land parcel is investigated together with
1Moreover, Caswell and Zilberman (1986) considered alternative exogenous irrigation technologies in a static
setting and argued that the introduction of modern land quality-augmenting irrigation technologies tends to
increase the value of the lower quality land on which the new technologies are adopted, but it may reduce the
value of prime lands, reducing the hedonic prices of land quality and water depth.
2Recent attention to limited dependent variable models in the econometrics literature has led to a wholesale
departure from ordinary least squares estimation of travel cost models. When the data available to the researcher
are collected on-site, the sample will be conditioned on recreational participation at that site and is said to be
truncated. More interesting stories are possible when data include observations on non-participants as well.
Such data are especially important if one wishes to use the results of the model to predict responses to policy
changes where these changes might cause individuals to enter or leave the market for a recreational good.
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this selection decision, in order to avoid the sample selection bias of the type described above.
Proximity to the sea in particular, decreases the probability of land usage for farming due
to salinization of groundwater supplies and increases the probability of tourism usage due to
attractiveness to tourists. Land parcels closed to the seaside however, may be used in agriculture
in spite of the poor quality of their groundwater supplies, because the marginal cost - marginal
benet calculation undertaken by prospective buyers, based on benets achieved by agricultural
or touristic development of each particular parcel of land, does not allow use of the parcel in
touristic development. The relevant net marginal benet is a function of the characteristics of
the parcel (including the quality of groundwater supplies accessible to each particular parcel)
but is not observable. The aim of this chapter is to investigate empirically how this selectivity
problem a¤ects the willingness to pay for improvements in groundwater quality; the form of
quality degradation under consideration is seawater intrusion.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 describes the decision environment
in which the selectivity problem of interest arises. Section 4.3 develops a model of producer
demand for package factors of production and discusses the behavioural e¤ects of characteristics
reecting quality. Section 4.4 reports the results obtained from the empirical analysis and
section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Decision environment.
As argued in the introduction of this thesis, it is important to keep in mind that ground-
water scarcity has an important qualitative dimension that further limits the supply of usable
water. In chapter 3 we investigated the dynamics of one particular cause of quality deterioration
of groundwater resources, namely seawater intrusion. This refers to coastal fresh groundwater
systems that are in contact with saline water which, if drawn into the freshwater aquifer sys-
tems, can diminish the waters usefulness for various purposes. Figure 4.2.1 presents a simplied
description of the movement of intruding seawater into an aquifer. Consider a coastal irrigation
district. A reference boundary (R) is dened, where (R) may be the coastal perimeter of the
irrigation district, the seaward limit of agricultural activity, or an arbitrarily dened line. The
object of (R) is to provide a point of reference from which to measure the length of intrusion.
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For an arbitrarily given depth (d) measured at (R), (Ls) is the length measure of saltwater
intrusion. Note that the interface and the point of measuring the length of intrusion (Ls), is
not between saltwater and freshwater. In as much as saltwater and freshwater are miscible
uids, a transition zone will exist between the two uids. The maximum level of salt concen-
tration for irrigation water is usually around 3000 TDS3 mg=l (milligrams per litre). Hence
as far as the agricultural sector is concerned interest lies in the interface between water with
total salinity greater than 3000 and water with total salinity less than 3000, i.e. the interface
between brackish waterand fresh-water, as shown in gure 4.2.14.
Figure 4.2.1: Representation of Seawater Intrusion.
3Although the e¤ects of particular ions on crop productivity vary, the usual approach is to lump all salinity
into a macro measure called total dissolved solids (TDS).
4This gure is a stylized version of the gure in Appendix A3, where the zone of di¤usion corresponds to the
area of the aquifer lled with brackish water.
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To understand the movement of saltwater intrusion imagine a district that is divided into (n)
zones. The dimensions of each zone depend on the impact of saltwater intrusion on pumping
activity. For example, starting at (R), an inland movement of the saltwater interface to a
distance
 
L1s

results in the loss of pumping activity in a given area. This arc would be zone
1. The impact of further movements of the interface is usually treated discretely, with each
succeeding zone dened in terms of the impact of intrusion on pumping potential. Thus the
location of a parcel of land with respect to its proximity to the sea, is dening for the quality
of groundwater supplies accessible to owners of the parcel under consideration: the further
away from the sea the parcel is, the lower the impact of seawater intrusion on its groundwater
supplies. It is also worth noting that in terms of freshwater stock, instability in the interface
between salt water and freshwater causes a widening of the transition (di¤usion) zone. Thus as
the aquifer is mined, saltwater not only replaces freshwater, but relatively larger quantities of
freshwater become brackish. Instability of the interface is directly related to the rate of mining
of the aquifer given a level of freshwater stock.
As it is obvious from gure 4.2.1, if the phenomenon of saltwater intrusion occurs in a par-
ticular aquifer, proximity of a parcel of land to the sea is a proxy for the existence and extent
of saltwater intrusion in a parcels groundwater supplies. As groundwater supplies are contam-
inated, if other sources for irrigation water are not readily available, new wells must be drilled,
coastal injection wells installed, and/or brackish groundwater treated with costly osmosis or
catalysis methods. All these imply additional costs for the farm owner (agricultural producer).
Moreover, if salinated water is applied for irrigation, dissolved soils become concentrated in
irrigated soils (as part of the applied water evaporates through plants) and adversely a¤ect
crop productivity. Crops vary in their sensitivity to salinity. Generally speaking however, the
least sensitive crops are also the least valuable, so areas irrigated with highly saline waters tend
to emphasize low-valued types of crops. Thus proximity to the sea decreases the benets from
agricultural use of a parcel of land (if other clean, but equally priced sources of water are not
readily available). As a result, proximity to the sea decreases the probability of land usage for
farming. That is, owners of land close to the sea substitute away from fresh groundwater as
an input in their production because fresh groundwater becomes more expensive to access due
to saltwater intrusion. Hence sea proximity does not only a¤ect the value of agricultural land,
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but it also a¤ects the decision to use a parcel of land as an input in agricultural production.
If this endogeneity problem is ignored, hedonic results for agricultural land market will ignore
the full e¤ect of groundwater salinization on the price of agricultural land; thus giving wrong
estimates of shadow prices of relevant environmental and resource characteristics. To correct
for this problem we adopt a simple Heckman (1976, 1979) type process.
However, property value measures, have the capability of capturing the marginal value of
all possible e¤ects of environmental changes in a single number. In our model, proximity to the
sea also increases the probability of land usage for tourism development due to attractiveness to
tourism5. That is, owners of land who chose to use their land for agricultural production, value
sea proximity because of the prospect of switching to the most lucrative tourism industry in the
near future. Omitting this e¤ect, will ignore the increase in the shadow price of land which is a
prospective candidate for use in tourist development. Thus, on the whole proximity to the sea
gives rise to two opposite e¤ects on the price of land already used as an input in agricultural
production: (a) the probability of land usage for farming decreases and (b) the probability of
land usage for tourism development increases. To separate these two e¤ects in our empirical
analysis, we use two continuous index variables specifying the proximity of each parcel of land
to the coast and the town center of the region under consideration, respectively. Given that
the town of the region is located on the coast and touristic development is traditionally more
intense closer to the town centre, this variable aims to serve as a proxy for the e¤ect of sea
proximity on the attractiveness of an agricultural parcel for tourism development.
To summarize the decision process put forward in this section, there is an endogenous
selection on the use of land based on the quality of the lands groundwater supplies and other
characteristics, and an additional positive e¤ect on the shadow value of land after deciding to use
it in agricultural production, emerging once again from the e¤ect of sea proximity on prospective
future tourism development of the land. The decision tree relevant for understanding the above
argument is graphically presented in gure 4.2.2., where we provide a stylized exposition of the
decision process we want to study both theoretically and empirically in this chapter6. We also
5 It is worth noting that the tourism industry in the region under consideration, does not use groundwater as
an input in its production. Instead surface water is used.
6For the construction of this gure, we adopt two of the assumptions that will be employed in the theoretical
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note that the rst decision step shown in the gure, that is whether to purchase land or not, is
ignored in this chapter due to absence of relevant data that would allow empirical investigation
of the matter.
Figure 4.2.2: Endogenous Selection of a Packaged Input.
model of this chapter, to be presented in the following section. Firstly, we assume that the cost function is
weakly separable in land, so that prices of other goods can be excluded from the decision to buy a parcel of land
(see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, p. 122-137, for an excellent discussion on the meaning and usefulness of the
separability assumptionand two-stage budgeting). Secondly, we assume that each individual purchases only
one land bundle. We explain the need for this assumption in the following section.
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4.3 Selectivity and Input Demand.
We assume that rm-specic production sets over packaged inputs7 of agricultural produc-
tion are described by the separable cost function,
C(p; Y`) = G` [c1 (p11; :::; p1K) ; :::; cI (pI1; :::; pIK) ; Y`] (4.1)
where Y` are the units of output produced by the `th producer (rm) from the use of all the
packaged inputs of production, ci (:) is a sub-function reecting the unit cost of the ith package
and pik is the price of the kth input in this package. In this context, producer ` = 1; ::; L
obtains the k = 1; :::;K input indirectly, through purchasing the package i = 1; ::; I. Applying
Shephards lemma8 to (4.1) we obtain the demand for the kth input in the ith package by the
`th producer,
qik` =
@C (p; Y`)
@pik
=
@G` [:]
@ci (:)
@ci (:)
@pik
(4.2)
where @G` [:] =@ci (:) represents the demand for the ith package and @ci (:) =@pik the conditional
demand for the individual kth factor of production in this package, i.e. demand for kth input
subject to the expenditure of the ith package being decided. Here we focus on the case where
producers purchase only one input package at a time9, i.e. the outcome of the above optimiza-
tion problem is a corner solution. We therefore drop the ith subscript for convenience and
incorporate the selection aspect in the analysis by writing expenditure on the selected package
by the `th producer as,
y`  kq`kpk = k

@G` [:]
@c (:)
@c (:)
@pk

pk
=
@G` [:]
@c (:)
k
@c (:)
@pk
pk =
@G` [:]
@c (:)
c (:) (4.3)
7A packaged input is an input which has several attributes that are recognized by purchasers, but the attributes
cannot be unbundled when purchasing it.
8Shephards lemma states that the partial derivatives of the cost function with respect to prices (if they exist)
are the Hicksian demand functions.
9This assumption is convenient for modelling quality heterogeneity through a hedonic price function, that
appears below. More specically, if more than one land package were purchased, it would be necessary that the
bundles be identical or that the hedonic price function be linear in all characteristics. This is because there can
be only one marginal implicit price recorded for each individual for each characteristic.
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where @G` [:] =@c (:) = 1 if the package is selected by the `th rm and @G` [:] =@c (:) = 0 otherwise.
We model the package selection decision using a simple Heckman (1976, 1979) type process,
I` = g (x`) + v` (4.4)
where x` = x1`; x2`; :::xM` is a vector of variables a¤ecting the package choice, including quality
characteristics and other rm-specic production characteristics like farming skills etc.; v` is an
error term. Each rm values a particular parcel according to its characteristics. In particular
each rm makes a marginal benet - marginal cost calculation based on the benet achieved by
making the purchase and using the land for production in the agricultural sector, and by not
making the purchase and using the money for something else (i.e. purchase land for touristic
development). As I` increases (due to quality improvements, increases in rm e¢ ciency etc.)
so does the probability of selecting this package for agricultural production. Since marginal net
benet is obviously not observable, we model the di¤erence between benet and cost with the
unobservable variable I` . However, we are able to observe whether a parcel of land is purchased
and used in agriculture, or not. Hence, we can infer the sign of I` , but not its magnitude, from
such information. Using the dummy variable D` = 1 when the ith package is selected by the
`th rm and D` = 0 otherwise, we can write,
D` = 1 if I

` > 0
and D` = 0 if I

`  0 (4.5)
Turning to the modelling of quality heterogeneity of agricultural land parcels used by
di¤erent producers10, recall that ci (:) in (4.1) is the unit cost of the ith package and denes
the quality augmented price of the kth input in the package selected by the `th producer as
pk` = k`pk; where k`  1. Then quality heterogeneity is introduced in the analysis by writing
10Palmquist (1989) has developed the analytical hedonic model for agricultural land. Miranowski and Hammes
(1984) and Palmquist and Danielson (1989) present estimates of hedonic price functions and marginal implicit
prices for agricultural land.
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the unit cost of the package under consideration as,
c (p1`; :::; p

K`) = c(1`p1; :::; K`pK) (4.6)
At base period prices (pk = 1; for all k), equation (4.6) obtains the form c (:) = c(1`; :::; K`):
Then expenditure on the package by the `th producer incorporating the selection decision can
be written as,
lny` = lnc(1`; :::; K`) + u` if D` = 1 (4.7)
With (D`) and (x`) observed for a random sample, but (y`) observed only when D` = 1; the
expenditure variable in this equation is incidentally truncated11 from below, on a non-positive
net benet from buying land for agricultural purposes (i.e. I` > 0). Assuming that v` and
u` have a bivariate normal distribution with zero means and correlation , then we can insert
these in Theorem 2 in Appendix A4 to obtain,
E [u]D`=1 = 
` (:)
1  ` (:) (4.8)
where E [:]denotes expectations, ` (:) and ` (:) are the values of the standard normal proba-
bility density (pdf) function and the standard normal cumulative function (cdf); truncated at
[ g (x`)]12; respectively;  = cov(v`; u`) reects simultaneity in the participation and hedonic
equations13. Therefore, for D` = 1 we may write (4.7) as,
lny` = lnc(1`; :::; K`) + M` + ` (4.9)
where M` is the Mills ratio ` (:) =[1   ` (:)] and ` a random error term. This equation can
be estimated by OLS methods by replacing the unknown M` values with those computed at
11See appendix A4 for a brief description of the e¤ects of incidental truncation on normal distribution.
12Given that a = 0 and  = 1; the degree of truncation is equal to:
 =

0  g(x%)


=  g(x%)
13Covariance between (`) and (u`) in this econometric model is given by ( = u) ; where  and u are
the standard deviations of (`) and (u`), respectively.
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[ bg (x`)]; the predictions obtained from the selection equation (4.4).
4.4 Empirical analysis.
The empirical analysis focuses on demand for land parcels by individual production units.
The data is drawn from a Survey of Production (1999) in Kiti, a coastal region located in
the island of Cyprus. In the area under investigation the phenomenon of seawater intrusion is
pervasive. Data on usage (agriculture or tourism14) and price (y`, ` = 1; :::; L) from actual sales
are collected for 282 land parcels. The relevant transactions took place over the time period
of 1994-1998 (including) and prices are corrected to 1998 constant prices. Also collected for
these parcels are many characteristics (k`; k = 1; :::;K) reecting the quality of land, such
as the groundwater and soil quality, fragmentation, distance from the sea, distance from the
town centre and other environmental and location characteristics. Moreover, using data on the
distance (measured in kilometers) of a parcel of land from the coast and the town center, we
constructed two separate indexes indicating proximity of each parcel in the sample to the coast
and town center, respectively. These indexes equal one if the parcel is located on the seaside or
on the reference point chosen for the town center, and equal zero if the parcel is located at the
furthest distance point relevant for the sample of data under consideration. See appendix B4 for
a more detailed description of the procedure followed for the construction of the questionnaire,
collection of the data, and construction of the data-set used in the empirical analysis of this
chapter. Moreover, see thesis attachment for the actual questionnaire used in the collection of
this data, detail description of collected information and constructed variables, as well as their
descriptive statistics.
Assuming that lnc(1`; :::; K`) has the Translog form, we write expenditure on the package
by the `th producer at base period prices (4.9) as,
lny` = ao +kaklnk` +
1
2kjkjlnj`lnk` + 
cM` + ` (4.10)
14The residential sector is not considered in this chapter.
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where cM` = ` (:) =[1  ` (:)] predicted from the following probit equation15,
D` = o +ssxs` + v` (4.11)
where D` = 1 when the ith package is used for farming and D` = 0 otherwise (i.e. used in
tourist development), and xs` includes the k` quality characteristics plus years of experience
in farming (reecting farm-specic production skills).
The package used for estimation is the Time Series Processor (TSP) 4.4, by Bronwyn H.
Hall. Table 4.1 reports the results from the probit specication of equation (4.11). Table 4.2
reports the parameters obtained from applying (4.10) to the individual agricultural land parcel
data described above. The probit model uses analytic rst and second derivatives to obtain
maximum likelihood estimates via the Newton-Raphson algorithm16. Zeros are used as starting
values. The reported log likelihood is the log likelihood function as the program iterated to a
solution17. Note that the value of the likelihood increases with each guess. In this context there
is no precise analog to the R2 used to indicate the goodness of t of linear regression models,
thus we use the Kullback-Leibler R2; which is a generalized measure of explanatory power for
a wide class of nonlinear models18.
In the probit model, the derivative of the probability with respect to the independent vari-
ables varies with the level of these variables. As a result, it is not generally useful to report the
coe¢ cients from a probit, unless only the sign and signicance of the coe¢ cients are of interest.
Both explanatory variables included in the estimated probit model of this application, have
15The normal distribution has been used in regression models explaining binary (0/1) dependent variables,
giving rise to the probit model,
Pr ob(y = 1) =
g(xl)Z
 1
(t)dt = (g(xl))
16The basis for Newtons method is a linear Taylor series approximation. The method converges very rapidly
in many problems. If the criterion function is globally concave, it is probably the best algorithm available. This
method is very well suited to maximum likelihood estimation.
17One feature of the probit is that the likelihood functions are globally concave. Therefore, an optimization
package does not have to worry about discriminating between local maxima and global maxima when it tries to
nd parameter values that maximize the log-likelihood function; they will be the same.
18The Kullback-Leibler R2 is computed as the ratio of one minus the log likelihood of the tted model, to the
log likelihood of the model with intercept only.
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signicant coe¢ cients at 95% signicance level and their signs conform to expectation. That
is, more years of experience in farming (referring to the owner of the parcel) increase the prob-
ability of a parcel being used in agriculture. Proximity of the parcel to the coast, which serves
as a proxy for increased salinization of farms groundwater supplies, decreases this probability.
One useful expedient is to calculate the value of the derivatives at the mean values of all the
independent variables in the sample. The motivation is to display the derivative for a typical
element of the sample. These derivatives are reported in the second half of table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Parameter Estimates from Probit Estimation.
Variable Parameter t-ratio
Intercept -0.40220 -0.63748
Years of Experience in Farming 0.03942 1.7772
Proximity to Coast -0.64487 -2.48901
Diagnostic Testing
Number of Observations 282
Log likelihood -29.7400
Kullback-Leibler R2 0.31179
Value of Derivatives at the Mean Values of all Independent Variables
Use of Package Dl = 1 (agricultural) Dl = 0 (tourism)
Intercept -0.02262 0.02262
Years of Experience in Farming 0.00222 -0.00222
Proximity to Coast -0.03627 0.03627
In table 4.2, the results obtained from the unrestricted version of (4.10) are under the heading
with selectivity correctionand the results obtained subject to the restriction  = 0 are under
the heading without selectivity correction. The estimated equation is the hedonic function,
which depicts the relationship between the price of the various parcels of land as a function of
their characteristics. This hedonic function represents the equilibrium for the hedonic market,
which is given by the double envelope of the bid curves of agricultural producers and the
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o¤er curves of landowners for the di¤erent land characteristics. The dependent variable of the
estimated hedonic expenditure function is the natural logarithm of per (0:1) hectare price of
land, measured in Cyprus Pounds (£ )19.
19 In 1999 £ 1 Cyprus is worth £ 1.14 UK.
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Table 4.2: Parameter Estimates of Demand for Land
No selectivity correction Selectivity correction
Variable Parameter t-ratio Parameter t-ratio
Intercept 9.11550 32.2472 8.23301 20.5839
Area (0.1 hectares) Per Parcel -0.068666 -2.95819 -0.063782 -2.80292
Existence of House on Parcel (dummy) 0.49507 1.30937 0.50443 1.36423
Existence of Well on Parcel (dummy) 0.16357 1.10975 0.13066 0.90397
Expenditure (£ ) on Fertilizers Per Parcel p.a. -0.00046881 -2.01384 -0.00047785 -2.09888
Expenses (£ ) on Investments in Parcel p.a. -0.000013402 0.89142 0.000016155 1.09674
Index of Proximity of Parcel to Town Center 0.0022397 6.86747 0.0023008 7.20007
Water Extraction (m3) Per Parcel p.a. 0.000000312 1.04986 0.00000039 1.33806
Existence of Groundwater Toxicity (dummy) -0.25685 -1.6409 -0.22692 -1.47939
Index of Proximity of Parcel to the Coast 0.14194 4.31643 -0.06633 -1.63431
Mills ratio - - 3.00440 3.05280
 Total Expenses on construction works and other investments, excluding investments in machinery.
Diagnostic Testing for Model with Selectivity Correction
Number of observations 193
Mean of dependent variable 7.76669
Standard deviation of dep. var. 1.18107
Variance of residuals 0.75769
R-squared 0.48794
Adjusted R-squared 0.45682
Durbin-Watson 1.75224 [L = 1.55, U = 1.99]
Ramseys RESET2 0.87576 [F-critical = 1.25]
F (zero slopes) 15.6797 [F-critical = 1.25]
LM het. test 0.16835 [2-critical = 53.7]
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In equilibrium the marginal implicit price of a productive characteristic of land can be
derived by di¤erentiating the hedonic expenditure function with respect to that characteristic.
This gives the increase in expenditure that is required to obtain a parcel of land with one more
unit of that characteristic, other things being equal. If the price of the model was a linear
function of its characteristics, then this would imply constant implicit prices for the di¤erent
farmers. But if the price is a nonlinear function of its characteristics, then the implicit price of
a characteristic depends on the quantity of the characteristic being purchased. Linearity will
occur only if farmers can arbitrageattributes by untying and repackaging bundles of attributes
(Rosen, 1974, p.37-38). As indicated in table 4.2, the area has a strongly signicant e¤ect on
the value of the agricultural land, which is positive but diminishing. This result indicates the
existence of xed costs per transaction, which is what presumably prevents landowners from
repackaging their plots into smaller sizes, thereby increasing their overall prot.
It may alternatively be argued that the failure of the hypothesis of costless repackaging
of land is a reection of mispecication of the estimated model. To test the validity of this
argument we attempt a Box and Cox (1962) transformation on the model and we then turn to
the results of the various diagnostic tests reported in the second half of table 4.220. Using the
Box-Cox transformation21 we nd that the log-linear model is most likely to have generated the
observed data22. The Durbin-Watson test for the model with selectivity correction indicates
that the null hypothesis of no rst-order autocorrelation cannot be rejected, although the esti-
mated statistic falls in the zone of indecision. Moreover, the regression specication error test
(RESET) introduced by Ramsey, suggests correct specication of the estimated model. The
reported F-test strongly suggests rejection of the null hypothesis of zero slope coe¢ cients for the
explanatory variables, indicating the overall signicance of the included land characteristics in
explaining its price. Finally, the LM-tests for heteroscedasticity suggests acceptance of the null
hypothesis of no heteroscedastic residuals. The results from the above hypothesis tests suggest
20All reported hypothesis tests are carried out at 95% condence level.
21Halvorsen and Pollakowski (1981) suggested the use of the quadratic Box-Cox functional form, which is
a exible functional form that embodies many of the popular functional forms as special cases. Parameter
restrictions on the quadratic Box-Cox may be tested to determine whether any of the simpler forms should be
preferred in a particular application.
22This suggests that 0s in the Translog expenditure function (equation 4.10) are taken to be equal to the
exponents of the regressors included in the estimated model.
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that, costly repackaging rather than statistical mispecication is the relevant hypothesis for
explaining the non-linearity of the estimated model.
Commending on the results reported in the rst half of table 4.2, all variables in the regres-
sion model with selectivity correction have e¤ects conforming to expectation. A more detail
description of the estimated variables and their descriptive statistics can be found in the thesis
attachment. Moreover it is worth noting that the results presented in table 4.2 are the outcome
of a number of preliminary empirical estimations of the hedonic function. The nal version
of the empirical estimation was selected based on statistical considerations. We started our
preliminary estimation of the hedonic price function by including two variables indicating (a)
the percentage of the total area of each parcel of land that is irrigated and (b) the percentage
of the total area of each parcel of land that is not irrigated. These two variables were included
in order to investigate if the suitability of land for cultivation of irrigated agricultural products
(which are higher valued crops compared to crops produced by arid-agriculture) a¤ects the per
(0:1) hectare price23 of land. These variables turned out to be statistically insignicant at 95%
condence level. Moreover, we used dummies indicating the ownership structure of each parcel,
that is the area of land of each parcel (measured in (0:1) hectares) that is owned, rented and
government granted. These dummy variables also turned out to be statistically insignicant at
95% condence level. Given these results, in the nal version of the estimated hedonic equation
we only included the area of land (measured in (0:1) hectares) covered by each parcel as well
as its square, the latter capturing non-linear e¤ects of the total area of a parcel on its price.
In addition to the above, a number of other variables were incorporated in the preliminary
versions of the estimated hedonic function, but were excluded from the nal version of the
estimation due to their statistical insignicance. These include the grand total of production
expenses measured in CY£ per parcel per annum (see attached questionnaire for a detail de-
scription of the composition of this variable), production expenses on water purchased measured
in CY£ per parcel per annum, as well as receipts from sales of crops per parcel per annum.
Moreover, three variables indicating the number of man-hours worked per week per parcel by
23The units of price per (0:1) hectares of land are Cyprus pounds. As already mentioned in chapter 3, in 1999
£ 1 Cyprus appears to be worth £ 1.14 UK (British pound).
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permanent, casual and administrative workers, were included in the preliminary estimations
of the hedonic function. From our point of view, these variables could indicate the produc-
tive capacity of a particular parcel. Unfortunately, these variables did not have a statistically
signicant e¤ect on the per (0.1) hectare price of land and where nally excluded from the
nal model. Furthermore, a number of dummy variables were constructed to take account of
whether each particular parcel was connected to a water scheme, a dam or a reservoir, and
whether it belongs to an irrigation division24. Once more, these dummy variables did not con-
tribute signicantly to the explanation of the variation in the dependent variable of the hedonic
price function, possibly indicating the scarcity of other water sources in the area (e.g. water in
dam and reservoirs) as well as groundwater. Moreover, the dummy variable indicating whether
the quality of a parcels soil belongs to classes I, II, II, IV or V (see appendix of the attached
questionnaire, section A, for the detail description of these ves classes of soil quality) turned
out to be statistically insignicant as well. Likewise, average rainfall (measured in millimeters
per annum) relevant for the region of location of each parcel of land, turned out to be a sta-
tistically insignicant variable in our sample, perhaps due to the lack of signicant variation of
average annual rainfall among parcels of land in the data-set, given the smallness of the area
under investigation.
Finally it is worth explaining why groundwater salinity was proxied by the index constructed
to indicate coast proximity rather than directly using dummy variables indicating the quality
of groundwater supplies beneath a parcels land (i.e. generally suitable for irrigation, restricted
for certain crops, generally unsuitable for irrigation, suitable for residential use, generally un-
suitable for residential use25), or even hydrogeological information on salinity levels of a parcels
groundwater supplies (i.e. existence of upconing of saline groundwater26, existence of saltwater
intrusion27). Firstly, all these variable were included in the preliminary estimation of our model
24 Irrigation divisions have the responsibility for operation and maintenance of small non-government irrigation
schemes. Irrigation divisions are established on the basis of the Irrigation Division Law. Irrigation divisions
function well, with a high level of participation by users in making decisions for requesting new or extended
schemes, and with responsibility for operation and maintenance.
25See appendix of attached questionnaire, section B, for the detail description of these variables.
26Where the regional saltwater-freshwater system is in equilibrium, a pumping well screened in the freshwater
zone can cause a disturbance of this equilibrium. Under certain conditions, the well induces a greater upconing
of saline water and the well discharge becomes saline to a degree governed by the discharge rate, the duration of
pumping and local hydrological conditions. This is hydrological phenomenon is called upconing.
27See appendix of attached questionnaire, section B, for the detail description of these variables.
144
as dummy variables and turned out to be statistically non-signicant due to high multicollinear-
ity among them. Moreover, the index variable we constructed indicating proximity to the coast
is a continuous variable and as such is richer in information than any crude dummy variable
that tries to proxy the e¤ect of salt-water intrusion. In addition, this index variable accurately
captures the spatial nature of this hydrogeological phenomenon. Finally this continuous index
variable is readily comparable to the index variable indicating proximity to the coast, which
proxies the suitability of each parcel of land for touristic development. The comparability of
these two indexes allows intuitive comparisons on derived willingness to pay for groundwater
quality given present and prospective uses of land, which is the essence of the argument devel-
oped in this chapter. At this point we also mention that a run of the relevant regressions in per
hectare form did not produce more intuitive results for our empirical analysis, possibly because
the dummy variables included in the estimation model (e.g. existence of a house on a parcel,
existence of a well on the parcel, groundwater toxicity of a parcels groundwater supplies) as
well as other explanatory variables of interest (proximity to coast and the town center) are by
construction in per parcel form.
From this point onwards we restrict our discussion to variables with signicant coe¢ cients at
95% condence level. Unlike the dummy variables representing soil quality which turned out to
be statistically insignicant, expenditure on fertilizers which can serve as a proxy for the quality
of soil of the parcel, has a signicant negative e¤ect on per (0:1) hectare price of land, apparently
indicating the e¤ect of poor soil quality on the selling price of land. One possible rationalization
of the statistical signicance of this variable as opposed to the statistical insignicance of the
dummies of soil quality, is that expenditure on fertilizers indicates the suitability of the soil
of a parcel for the crops already cultivated in the specic parcel, and not soil suitability for
cultivation in general. That is, soil suitability for cultivation as given by the soil dummies,
considers all possible cultivations some of which may be irrelevant for the owner of the land in
the region under consideration; hence their statistical insignicance in explaining willingness to
pay for a parcel located in this region.
Proximity to the town centre has a strongly signicant positive e¤ect. As argued in section
4.2, this variable proxies the e¤ect of sea proximity on the attractiveness of an agricultural par-
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cel for future tourism development. Moreover proximity to the town reduces the transportation
costs for rms, since the town center is the location where trading of agricultural products takes
place. Hence the positive e¤ect on the value of land. The variable of interest here, proximity
to the coast28, does not appear to be signicant in the model where a correction for sample
selection (farming versus tourism) is made by including the Mills ratio in the explanatory vari-
ables. Without this correction, however, proximity to the coast appears to have a signicant
positive e¤ect on the value of agricultural land, apparently indicating that ignoring selectivity
correction ignores the fact that the costs of salinization can be o¤set by an increasing proba-
bility of switching to the more lucrative tourism industry. Although the estimated coe¢ cient
indicating the marginal shadow value of groundwater toxicity is not statistically signicant at
95% condence level, is worth noting that it has approximately the same e¤ect in both models
(with and without correction for selectivity bias). This result suggests that the cost of increased
groundwater toxicity to agriculture cannot be o¤set by an increasing probability of switching to
tourism because this characteristic is not relevant for tourism development, whereas proximity
to the sea is.
As argued above, the marginal implicit price of a productive characteristic of land can be
derived by di¤erentiating the hedonic expenditure function with respect to that characteristic.
This marginal implicit price of coast proximity, that serves as a proxy for increased salinization
28The correlation coe¢ cient between the variables proximity to the coast and proximity to the town centre is
0:068, which is low. The gure below explains why this is the case.
In the gure, dashed lines indicate distance from the town centre and black lines indicate distance from the coast.
Take for example parcel number 3. This parcel is on the coast, but far away from the town centre.
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of groundwater supplies, can be taken as a measure of the producers equilibrium marginal
willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid the marginal increase in the salinization of fresh groundwater
supplies beneath his land. This leads us naturally to the question of whether producersinverse
demand functions for factor inputs can be identied from observations of marginal implicit
prices and quantities29. The answer depends on the circumstances of the case. In the model
estimated in this chapter the hedonic price function is nonlinear and as a result, di¤erent
producers selecting di¤erent bundles of characteristics will have di¤erent marginal implicit
prices for groundwater quality. There is one situation where the inverse demand function can
be immediately identied - that is, if all producers have identical incomes (factor endowments)
and prot functions. Then the marginal implicit price function is itself the inverse demand
function for factor inputs. Since the marginal implicit price curve is the locus of equilibrium
points on producesinverse demand curves, with identical incomes and production functions,
all producers have the same inverse demand curve for factor inputs. Since all the equilibrium
points fall on the same inverse demand curve, they fully identify it.
In the more realistic case where di¤erences in incomes, production functions, or other vari-
ables result in producers having di¤erent inverse factor demand functions, Rosen (1974) argued
that implicit price and quantity data from a single market could be used to estimate the inverse
demand function, provided that the standard identication problem of econometrics30 could be
solved. It is now clear in the literature that this analysis is incorrect. The problem is that the
data from a single market are insu¢ cient to identify how the same producers would respond to
di¤erent implicit prices and income. There are at least two ways in which estimates of inverse
29 If the inverse demand function could be identied, it could be used to estimate the welfare change of a
producer associated with change in groundwater quality, assuming that other things are held equal. Specically,
if the quantities of other characteristics and amenities do not change, the welfare change can be found by
intergrating the inverse demand function over the relevant range of the change in the characteristic. However,
a change in the quantity of one characteristic can result in changes in the quantities of other characteristics the
producer chooses and in changes in the hedonic price function itself. Moreover, in the case where the improvement
in the environmental characteristic leads to changes in output prices, there will be further changes in producers
surplus and compensated consumers surplus. These must be taken into account in deriving a welfare measure.
30Unlike the standard market model in which an individual faces an exogenously determined price and chooses a
quantity, and unlike a quantity-rationed market in which an individual faces an exogenously determined quantity
and reveals a marginal willingness to pay, the individual chooses both a point on the hedonic price schedule and
its associated quantity. The choice of that point simultaneously determines the marginal willingness to pay and
the quantity of the characteristic. This makes it very di¢ cult to separate out the e¤ects of demand-shifters from
the price-quantity relationship itself.
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demand functions for fresh groundwater can be obtained from hedonic analysis. The rst is to
increase the quantity of information obtained from marginal implicit prices by estimating he-
donic price functions for several separate markets, and then pooling the cross-sectional data on
the assumption that the underlying structure of demand is the same in all markets (Freeman,
1974; Palmquist, 1984). The second approach is to impose additional structure on the problem
by invoking a priori assumptions about the form of the underlying cost function.
We restrict our conclusions to information derived from the marginal implicit price for
groundwater quality (i.e. less salinity), that is considered to be the producers equilibrium
marginal willingness to pay (WTP) per (0:1) hectare of land in order to avoid marginally higher
salinization of its groundwater supplies (measured as increased sea proximity). In interpreting
the empirical results reported in table 4.1, recall that in the environmental valuation literature
the marginal implicit price of a productive characteristic of land can be derived by di¤erenting
the hedonic expenditure function with respect to that characteristic. This marginal implicit
price is the marginal WTP for that productive characteristic. Given that the model we estimate
in this chapter has a log-linear functional form, the marginal WTP per (0.1) hectare of land in
order to avoid marginally higher salinization of its groundwater supplies (measured as increased
sea proximity), is equal to the exponent of the estimated coe¢ cient of the indexed variable
indicating proximity of a parcel of land to the coast, in the estimated hedonic regression. In the
regression model with selectivity correction this marginal WTP for avoiding coast proximity
is equal to £ 1.07 (Cyprus Pounds) per (0.1) hectare of land (i.e. it is equal to exponential of
0.06633, which is the value of the estimated coe¢ cient of sea proximity in the hedonic model with
selectivity correction). It is also interesting to note that the model without selectivity correction
indicates that the agricultural producer has a marginal WTP of £ 1.15 per (0.1) hectare of land
to gain a marginal increase in groundwater salinization (i.e. this gure is derived by taking
the exponential of 0.14194, which is the value of the estimated coe¢ cient of sea proximity in
the hedonic regression without selectivity correction). Of course, the latter result is counter
intuitive and is explained by the fact that the model without selectivity correction estimates
the marginal WTP for sea proximity which increases the value of land for prospective touristic
uses.
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The estimated coe¢ cient of sea proximity in the hedonic regression with selectivity correc-
tion is not statistically signicant at 95% condence level, in explaining the variation in the
dependent variable of the regression which is the natural logarithm of per (0.1) hectare price of
land, measured in Cyprus pounds. This conclusion is derived by performing a t-test on the rel-
evant coe¢ cient. At 95% condence level and 182 degrees of freedom, the null hypothesis that
the relevant coe¢ cient is zero is rejected only if the calculated t-statistic [calculated t-statistic
= estimated coefficient   0standard error of coefficient ] is larger than 1.96. Since the calculated t-statistic reported in ta-
ble 4.2 is equal to 1.634, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. As already mentioned above,
the marginal implicit price of a productive characteristic of land can be derived by di¤erenting
the hedonic expenditure function with respect to that characteristic. This marginal implicit
price is the marginal WTP for that productive characteristic, which in our model is derived
by taking the exponent of the statistically insignicant coe¢ cient of sea proximity. Hence,
the coe¢ cient from which we derive the marginal WTP per (0.1) hectare of land in order to
avoid marginally higher salinization of groundwater supplies does not a¤ect signicantly (i.e.
does not explain signicantly the variation in) the per (0.1) hectare price of land, which is the
dependent variable of the hedonic regression. On the other hand, the estimated coe¢ cient of
sea proximity in the hedonic regression without selectivity correction is statistically signicant
at 95% condence level. This result is again derived by performing a t-test on the relevant
estimated coe¢ cient. This result indicates that the coe¢ cient from which we derived the mar-
ginal WTP for marginally increased sea proximity given prospective touristic uses of the land,
is statistically signicant in explaining the variation in the per (0.1) hectare price of land.
The statistical insignicance of the coe¢ cient from which we derive the marginal WTP per
(0.1) hectare of land in order to avoid marginally higher salinization of groundwater supplies
can be rationalized in a number of ways. Theoretical reasons that could undermine the validity
of this result point to the presence of non-convexities in repackaging of land and xed costs of
switching from one use of land to another. The presence of such non-convexities is indicated
by the non-linearity of the estimated hedonic price function and constitutes a standard reason
for the failure of rst best general equilibrium solution. Hence the marginal WTP for avoiding
groundwater quality deterioration is derived from a distorted general equilibrium water demand,
instead of the rst-best general equilibrium input demand. On the other hand, the insigni-
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cance of WTP for groundwater quality per (0.1) hectares of land could imply that agricultural
producers that use groundwater as an input in their production are myopic and not willing to
pay a signicant amount of money for preserving groundwater quality in the aquifer because
they do not consider future use of groundwater in their production activities. As argued in
previous chapters of this thesis, this result is an artifact of the absence of clearly allocated
property rights for water in the aquifer, which implies that groundwater quality conserved to-
day by one producer, might be extracted tomorrow by another producer. Hence the need for
optimal management of this aquifer emerges, so that current users of the resource pay the so-
cial cost of their groundwater extraction which in principle includes the cost of deterioration of
groundwater quality, caused by overpumping of extracting agents.
The estimated marginal WTP for avoiding groundwater salinization is not directly compa-
rable to the scarcity value of the resource derived from the optimization model of chapter 3, or
the one to be estimated by the use of the stochastic distance function in chapter 5. However,
the marginal WTP for improvements in groundwater quality as far as less salinity is concerned,
also arises from a scarcity situation: the scarcity of salt-free groundwater. This scarcity situa-
tion refers to the qualitative dimension of groundwater scarcity, which as argued in chapter 1,
is as important as the quantity dimension of this particular resource problem (studied in chap-
ter 3 and 5 of this thesis). In a broader sense, values assigned to environmental and resource
service ows are determined by their roles in enchancing individualswell-being31 and arise
from their scarcity or limited availability. If the services of the environment could be purchased
in a perfectly functioning market, estimating the marginal willingness-to-pay curves would be
a fairly straightforward econometric problem. But environmental and resource service ows
typically have characteristics such as nonexcludability and nonrivalry, which make it di¢ cult
31Economic values can only be dened in terms of some underlying criterion that identies what is to be
considered good. In neoclassical welfare economics good is dened in terms of the well-being of individuals. An
individuals well-being can be represented by an ordinal utility function. An allocation of resources, good and
services in an economy is Pareto optimal if there is no feasible reallocation hat can increase any one persons utility
without decreasing someone elses utility. Of course, there is an innite number of Pareto optimum allocations
for an economy, each with a di¤erent distribution of utilities across individuals. In order to rank the allocations it
is necessary to have a social welfare function that aggregates the utilities of the individuals, perhaps by assigning
social welfare weights. If such a social welfare function exists, pareto optimality is a necessary but not su¢ cient
condition for maximizing that function. Hence, pareto optimality is the solution to a constrained maximization
problem in which some of the constraints are the exogenously determined environmental and resource service
ows. The shadow prices on these constraints are the economic values of these service ows.
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or impossible for markets for these services to function well. Often individuals are not free to
vary independently the level of the services that they consume. The public good character of
environmental services then leads to market failure. And without a market, there are no price
and quantity data from which the demand relationships can be estimated. This chapter aimed
to provide a method of deriving an accurate measure of the marginal willingness to pay for an
environmental and/or resource quality when selectivity issues are involved.
4.5 Conclusion.
The argument put forward in this chapter is that hedonic valuations can be misleading
when the quality characteristics intended for valuation have sample selection implications. We
consider this argument in the case of land close to the seaside that can be used either as an
input in agricultural production or for touristic development. In this case, proximity to the
sea can reduce the quality of land as an input in agricultural production, due to salinization of
groundwater supplies, but increases the probability of switching the land usage from agriculture
to the lucrative tourism market. Deterioration of the groundwater supplies can then appear to
have a positive e¤ect on the price of agricultural land. The empirical analysis of this chapter
conrms this argument. Furthermore, it shows that in a model where the selection and hedonic
valuation aspects of agricultural land are modelled simultaneously, low quality groundwater
supplies do not have a positive e¤ect on the price of agricultural land.
The overall conclusion of this chapter is that researchers and policy makers in environmental
valuation must be careful when employing hedonic techniques to derive willingness to pay for
environmental an/or resource quality; it is possible for these techniques to give rise to misleading
conclusions about the e¤ect of an environmental attribute on producers (or consumers) welfare
if potential biases from inappropriate sample selection criteria are ignored. Moreover, the argu-
ments raised in the chapter have implications for hedonic price analysis applied to other goods
whose quality characteristics can a¤ect sample selection. For example, the approach followed
in this paper may be used to correct for tra¢ c noise appearing to have a potentially positive
valuation e¤ect on residential housing because houses in main roads have a high probability of
being converted to business properties.
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The analysis described in this chapter results in a measure of the implicit price of and
the marginal willingness to pay in order to avoid the loss of fresh (salt-free) groundwater,
which is found to be insignicantly small. However, a limitation of property value models in
general, is that they are based on observing behaviour responses to di¤erences in amenity levels
across properties and as a result they only capture marginal willingness to pay for perceived
di¤erences in amenities and their consequences. For example, if there are subtle, long-term
e¤ects associated with reduced environmental quality at some property sites but people are
unaware of their casual link to the property site, their marginal willingness to pay to avoid
these e¤ects will not be reected in property price di¤erences32.
Moreover, in the model described in this chapter, it makes intuitive sense to speak of the
individual producers as using the environmental or resource service of fresh groundwater. Thus
the values estimated are direct or indirect use values. However, it is also possible for individuals
to value environmental and resource services independently of any use they might make of those
services. Freeman (1993) has shown that if the assumption of weak complementarity holds,
then market demand information can reveal everything there is to know about the value of the
resource; that is, value measures derived from market data reect total value. If conditions of
weak complementarity do not hold, then the existence component of the total economic value of
fresh groundwater is not reected in indirectly derived market demands33. This challenge does
not rule out the application of this chapter provided that results are properly interpreted as
representing use values alone. However, the indirect valuation method described in this chapter
can shed no light on the possible magnitude of the existence value of the resource in question.
Where existence values are potentially signicant, most researchers argue that the only method
to estimate total values for environmental amenities is contingent valuation34.
32See Freeman (1993, p. 33-36 ) for a discussion of the noneconomic foundations of resource valuation and the
importance of the need for a second understanding of the underlying biological and physical processes by which
environmental and resource service ows are generated.
33Though it is convenient to pretend that existence values can be totally separated from the use values of market
goods this is probably not completely true (Larson, 1991). That people could care about the preservation of an
aquifer and yet not alter their behavior in any way seems unlikely. In more complex models that include time
allocation, surely amenities that a¤ect welfare would inuence time devoted to information gathering. Still such
preference-revealing behavior is likely to be di¢ cult to trace and use in valuation.
34Contingent valuation is a method of non-market valuation which asks individuals their values (in money
terms) for specied changes in quantities or qualities of goods or services. See Bishop and Heberlein (1990) for
a survey of this method.
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Appendix A4.
Incidental Truncation of Normal Distribution.
The topic of sample selection (or incidental truncation) has been the subject of an enor-
mous literature, both theoretical and applied. Four fairly extensive, though far from exhaustive
surveys of this topic are Dhrymes (1984), Maddala (1983, 1984), and Amemiya (1984)35. More
recent studies on this issue are Heckman (1990), Manski (1989, 1990), and Newey et al. (1990).
The e¤ect of truncation occurs when sample data are drawn from a subset of a larger population
of interest. The sample selection problem is a form of truncation. A truncated distribution is
the part of an untruncated distribution that is above or below some specied value.
If (x) is a continuous random variable normally distributed with mean () and standard
deviation (),
Prob(x > a) = 1  (a  

) = 1  ()
where  =
 a 


and (:) is the standard normal cumulative density function (cdf). The
truncated normal distribution is, then,
f(x j x > a) = f(x)
1  ()
=
(22) 1=2e (x )2=(22)
1  ()
=
(1=)((x  )=)
1  ()
where (:) is the standard normal probability density function (pdf). It is also worth noting
that if the truncation is from below, as it is the case in the model developed in the main text of
chapter 4, the mean of the truncated variable is greater than the mean of the original one. (If
truncation is from above, the mean of the truncated variable is smaller than the mean of the
35The last is part of a symposium on censored and truncated regression models.
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original one). Truncation reduces the variance compared to the variance in the untruncated
distribution.
For the moments of the truncated normal distribution, we have the following theorem36:
Theorem 1 : Moments of the Truncated Normal Distribution: if x  N [; 2] and (a)
is a constant
E[x j truncation] = + ()
V ar[x j truncation] = 2(1  ())
where  = (a  )= and
() =
()
1  () if truncation is x > a
() =
 ()
()
if truncation is x < a
() = ()(()  )
An important result is that 0 < () < 1, for all values of , and d()=d =  (). The
function () is called the inverse Mills ratio or the hazard function for the distribution. A
useful way to view truncation is in terms of the probability that (x) is less than (a), which
indicates the degree of truncation. This is an increasing function of (a). As this probability
rises, a greater proportion of the distribution is being discarded, and the mean rises accordingly.
In the theoretical and empirical model developed in chapter 4, we use the incidentally
truncated bivariate normal distibution. Suppose that () and (z), have a bivariate distribution
with correlation ():We are interested in the distribution () given that (z) exceeds a particular
value. Intuition suggests that if () and (z) are positively correlated , the truncation of (z)
36Details may be found in Johnson and Kotz (1970, p.81).
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should push the distribution of () to the right. The truncated joint density of () and (z) is
given by,
f(; z j z > a) = f(; z)
Pr ob(z > a)
The moments of the incidentally truncated bivariate normal distribution are given in Theorem
237.
Theorem 2 : Moments of the Incidentally Truncated Bivariate Normal Distribu-
tion: If () and (z) have a bivariate normal distribution with means () and (z), standard
deviations () and (z), and correlation (), then
E[ j z > a] =  + (z)
V ar[ j z > a] = 2(1  2(z))
where
z =
a  z
z
(z) =
(z)
1  (z)
(z) = (z)((z)  z)
If the truncation is z < a, we make the replacement
(z) =
 (z)
(z)
The truncated mean is pushed in the direction of the correlation if the truncation is from below
and in the opposite direction if it is from above.
As already indicated the model developed in the main text of this chapter, motivates a
regression model that corresponds to the results in Theorem 2. The problem of truncation
37Much more general forms of the result that apply to multivariate distributions are given in Johnson and
Kotz (1974). See also Maddala (1983, 266-267).
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surfaces when we account for the fact that the expenditure equation (section 4.3, equation
4.7) describes expenditure on land purchases, but an actual gure is observed only if land is
purchased and used for agricultural production (instead for tourism development). Occurrence
of agricultural use of land, allows us to infer that the benet from using the parcel for agri-
cultural production exceeds the reservation shadow value (in terms of net prots or other net
benets derived from agricultural use of land) necessary to make the purchaser participate in
the agricultural sector of the region under consideration. Thus, the expenditure variable in the
hedonic equation is incidentally truncated.
As argued in Greene (1997), recent research has cast some skepticism on the selection model
based on the normal distribution38. Among the ndings are that the parameter estimates are
surprisingly sensitive to the distributional assumption that underlies the model. Of course,
this in itself does not invalidate the normality assumption, but it does call its generality into
question. On the other hand, there exists compelling evidence that sample selection, in the
abstract, raises serious problems, distributional questions aside. The most recent literature,
for example Duncan (1986), Manski (1989, 1990), and Heckman (1990), has suggested some
promising approaches based on robust and nonparametric estimators. These obviously have
the virtue of greater generality. Unfortunately, the cost is that these approaches generally are
quite limited in the breadth of the models they can accommodate. That is, one might gain the
robustness of a nonparametric estimator at the cost of being unable to make use of the rich set
of accompanying variables usually present in the panels to which selectivity models are often
applied. For example, the nonparametric bounds of Manski (1990) is dened for two regressors.
Other methods (e.g. Duncan, 1986) allow more elaborate specication. The upshot is that the
issue remains unsettled. For better or worse, the empirical literature on the subject continues
to be dominated by Heckmans original model built around the joint normal distribution, which
is the model adopted in the theoretical and empirical analysis of chapter 4.
38See Goldberger (1983) for an early survey of this literature.
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Appendix B4.
Survey of Production (1999).
The data used in the empirical analysis of chapter 4 is drawn from a Survey of Produc-
tion (1999) in Kiti, a coastal region located in the island of Cyprus. For the interested reader
the questionnaire used in the survey is attached at the end of this thesis, together with the
description of the collected information and constructed variables, as well as their descriptive
statistics. The construction of the questionnaire is based on our preference for data on actual
market transactions39. For rental land parcels there is a regular monthly market transac-
tion from which fairly accurate data on rents could be gathered. However, the majority of
land parcels is owner-used. The relevant transactions took place over the period of 1994-1998
(including) and prices are corrected to 1998 constant prices.
Data on usage (agriculture or tourism) and price is collected for 282 parcels of land. Also
collected for these parcels are many of their characteristics such as: area of holding, land use and
tenure, area planted, production of temporary and permanent crops, production expenses, ad-
ministrative costs, hydrogeological characteristics, personal characteristics of buyers and sellers,
employment of holders and family members, labour costs, value of construction works and other
investments, indirect taxes and other expenses. The constructed data-set is readily available
from the author.
39There is agreement in the hedonic literature that the most preferred source of data is systematically collected
information on actual sales prices of individual dwellings or land parcels along with relevant characteristics. The
presumed superiority of individual transaction data over non-market estimates provided by experts, is based on
the assumption that the housing market is in an equilibrium in which all opportunities for possible gains from
further trade at the revealed set of prices have been exhausted. This is a heroic assumption. The divergence from
full equilibrium of the land market however, will only introduce random errors into the estimates of marginal
willingness to pay (see Freeman, 1993, p. 382-83 ).
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Chapter 5
On the Use of a Stochastic Distance
Function to Retrieving Natural
Resource Shadow Prices: Theory
and Application to Groundwater as
a Productive Input.
5.1 Introduction.
The aim of this chapter is to derive the in situ shadow price of unextracted groundwater in
an aquifer, through modelling and empirically analyzing the technology of vertically integrated
agricultural rms that both extract and use groundwater as an input in their production. As
mentioned repeatedly in this thesis, this shadow price, also referred to as the resources scarcity
rent or royalty, represents the marginal valuation of the individual agricultural producer for
the resource left in situ, and is not directly observable. In addition, the e¤ect of cumulative
extraction on the marginal cost of extraction, which is one of the major theoretical factors
determining the time path of natural resource prices is also not directly observable. In the model
developed in this chapter, the non-observability of the in situ shadow price of groundwater is
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caused by the fact that market transactions in vertically integrated agricultural rms occur
only after groundwater has been extracted and used in the production of agricultural products;
that is there is no market for groundwater.
This chapter uses duality theory in order to derive information on the in situ shadow price
of the resource and the e¤ects of cumulative extraction on the marginal cost of extraction.
Firstly, we solve the restrictedversion of the dual cost minimization problem of the vertically
integrated agricultural rm. The solution of this problem presented in section 5.2 gives lemma
1, that establishes the relationship between the current (unobserved) in situ shadow price of
groundwater in the unrestricted solution of the problem, with the derivatives of the observable
and estimable restricted cost function. This exact same method has been employed in theoretical
and applied work, for the derivation of the time path of in situ shadow prices of unextracted ore,
to be used as a production input in the vertically integrated Canadian metal mining industry
(Halvorsen and Smith, 1984, 1991).
Secondly, we propose another method that allows derivation of the unobservable shadow
price of in situ resources through the use of an input distance function. In empirical appli-
cations, distance functions have a number of virtues that make their use attractive when the
environment under which rms operate is regulated and/or when rms are ine¢ cient due to
lack of incentives faced by their operators. In particular, the rst virtue of distance functions is
that they do not necessarily require price data to compute the parameters; only quantity data is
needed. Secondly, distance functions do not impose any behavioural hypothesis (such as prot
maximization or cost minimization). That is, they allow production units to operate below
the production frontier (i.e. to be ine¢ cient) and they also allow derivation of rm-specic
ine¢ ciencies. Thirdly, the duality result between the distance functions and the more conven-
tional cost, prot and revenue functions provide exibility for empirical applications (Färe and
Primont, 1995). In section 5.3 of this chapter we derive lemma 2, which establishes the rela-
tionship between the derivatives of the estimable input distance function with the unobserved
shadow price of in situ groundwater. The derivation of this lemma is possible by the use of the
pre-mentioned duality between Shephards input distance function and the cost function.
The key extension of this chapter on the existing literature is that it establishes that when
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cost, prot or revenue function representations are precluded1, the restricted distance function
provides an excellent analytical tool for estimating unobservable shadow prices of in situ natural
resources produced and used as inputs in production processes of vertically integrated rms.
Section 5.3.1 briey reviews relevant concepts concerning distance functions and related e¢ -
ciency measures. Section 5.3.2 solves the restricted production problem of vertically integrated
agricultural rms that both extract and process groundwater, by using the distance function
approach, and derives lemma 2. In section 5.3.3 we briey review alternative methods of esti-
mating distance function frontiers and argue for the superiority of the stochastic frontier model,
adopted in the empirical analysis to follow. The stochastic frontier model exhibits two major
advantages over alternative estimation methods: (a) it acknowledges that observed costs may
deviate from an e¢ cient cost frontier due to events that are both within and outside a rms
control, and (b) it allows rm-specic derivation of shadow prices, whereas other methods allow
derivation of shadow prices for e¢ cient rms only.
The empirical application of the restricted distance function methodology to deriving the
current in situ groundwater shadow price is presented in section 5.3.3. It involves estimating
a restricted input distance function stochastic frontier and employing lemma 2 to derive an
estimate of the individual produces valuation of the marginal unit of groundwater in the aquifer.
We also provide a brief discussion on estimated rm-specic technical ine¢ ciencies. That is,
our empirical analysis suggests that cost minimizing behaviour is not achieved (or not pursued)
by relevant rms and as a result, estimation of resource scarcity rents through estimation of
a restricted cost function as suggested by Halvorsen and Smith (1984, 1991), will give biased
estimates. The identication of these ine¢ ciencies provides strong support for the use of the
distance function approach, because as already mentioned this approach does not impose any
behavioural hypothesis. The procedure is illustrated with data for groundwater use by the
agricultural sector in the Kiti region of the island of Cyprus. One advantage of this data-
set is that it enables us to test for ine¢ ciency using truly microeconomic data. Although
most previous empirical analyses in the literature have been conducted on data that have been
aggregated to some degree, evidence on technical ine¢ ciency may be lost in the aggregation
1That is, prot maximization or cost minimization are violated, resulting in distortions in the shadow prices
of resources that are both produced and used as inputs in the production processes of vertically integrated rms.
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process. If this conjecture is correct, then we should expect to nd clearer evidence of ine¢ ciency
using microeconomic data.
5.2 The Use of the Restricted Cost Function to Deriving Ground-
water Scarcity Rents.
In this section, we model the behaviour of the individual agricultural rm2, in order to
derive its marginal valuation for unextracted groundwater. Following the methodology pro-
posed by Halvorsen and Smith (1984, 1991) we derive the restricted cost function of vertically
integrated agricultural rms, dual to the production function for nal agricultural output, in
order to achieve analytical derivation of an estimable shadow price of in situ groundwater.
Agricultural rms are vertically integrated, because they engage both in the extraction and
use of groundwater resources as an input in their production process. The rm is assumed to
maximize the wealth obtainable from its stock of the natural resource given input and out-
put prices, the technological conditions governing extraction and production, and the resource
transition equation. We assume that groundwater recharge is signicantly lower and slower
than withdrawals, so the groundwater stock is treated as an exhaustible resource. The fol-
lowing di¤erential equation describes the environmental constraint of the rms maximization
problem,
_H(t) =
R  (1 + s  f) W (t)
AS
(5.1)
where (H) is the aquifer head, representing the yearly e¤ects of cumulative groundwater ex-
traction on the total stock of groundwater available to agricultural rms owning land above the
relevant aquifer3. The stock of the resource is reduced by extraction (W ) at each (t) ; implying
that the change of the aquifers hydraulic head ( _H) depends on [W (t)]: Moreover, (R); (s) and
(f) are constant hydrological parameters representing deterministic groundwater recharge, the
2The model can allow for more than one producers, which exhibit either price taking or strategically interacting
behaviour. Strategic interaction can be modelled through the equation of motion of the model, representing the
e¤ect of cumulative extraction on the level of aquifer head ( _H): See equation (5.1).
3As in previous chapters of the thesis, we assume that access to groundwater is restricted to rms owning
land above the aquifer.
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salinity coe¢ cient and the return ow of percolation back to the aquifer, respectively. The area
and storativity of the aquifer are represented by (A) and (S), respectively4.
Assuming that the quantities of inputs used in groundwater extraction are separable from
those used in agricultural production, output of the vertically integrated agricultural industry
is produced according to the following production function5,
Q = Q (Xp; T;W (Xw;H; T )) (5.2)
where (Q) is the quantity of nal output, (Xp) is a vector of agricultural inputs other than
groundwater, (T ) is time which indexes the e¤ects of technological change, and [W (:)] is the
output of the extraction sub-production function; that is, the quantity of groundwater extracted.
The extraction sub-production depends on inputs used in the extraction process (Xw), the head
of the aquifer (H) and technological change (T ). With a positive market rate of interest (r) ;
the relevant wealth maximization problem for the vertically integrated agricultural rm is given
by equation (5.3) below. Note that the prot maximization problem is consistent with the
intertemporal control problem, since the Hamiltonian essentially summarizes an innite series
of static optimization problems.
max
Xp;W
Z 1
0
e rt [PQQ  PpXp   Cw (W;Pw;H; T )] dt
subject to,
_H(t) =
R  (1 + s  f)W (t)
AS
H(0) = Ho (5.3)
where (PQ) is the price of output, (Pp) is the vector of agricultural input prices, (Pw) is the
vector of groundwater extraction input prices, and (Cw) is the minimal total cost function dual
4See chapter 3, section 3.4, for precise denitions of these hydrological parameters.
5From this point onwards, time (t) is suppressed in the mathematical exposition of this chapter.
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to the groundwater extraction sub-production function given by,
Cw (W;Pw;H; T ) = min
xw
fPwXw :W =W (Xw;H; T )g (5.4)
If a competitive market existed for clean (salt-free) in situ groundwater, its market
price in period (t) would be equal to the marginal opportunity cost to the rm of one unit of
groundwater stock left in the aquifer. We denote this price by (t): Thus the current value
Hamiltonian for the maximization problem of equation (5.3) is,
H = PQQ  PpXp   Cw (W;Pw;H; T ) + 

R  (1 + s  f)W
AS

(5.5)
where (Xp) and (W ) are control variables, and () is the costate variable, representing user
cost of groundwater. The rst-order conditions for an interior solution include,
@H
@Xp
= 0) PQ @Q
@Xp
= Pp (5.6)
@H
@W
= 0) PQ @Q
@W
=
@Cw
@W
  

f   s  1
AS

(5.7)
_  r =  @H
@H
) _  r = @C
w
@H
(5.8)
Equations (5.6) and (5.7) are the static optimality conditions for agricultural input and the
natural resource input, respectively. For agricultural inputs, the value of the marginal product
is equated to the price of the input, whereas for the natural resource, the value of the marginal
product is greater than the marginal extraction cost by an amount equal to the unobserved
shadow price of fresh groundwater in situ. Moreover, equations (5.8) is the dynamic optimality
condition for the natural resource.
Equations (5.6), (5.7) and (5.8) cannot help in the empirical derivation of the producers
valuation of in situ groundwater given the non-existence of data on () and
 
@Cw
@W

: However,
duality theory suggests that the above maximization problem corresponds to a cost minimiza-
tion problem. Below we solve the unrestricted cost minimization problem of the vertically
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integrated agricultural rm, given by,
min
Xp;Xw
PpX
p + W (Xw;H; T )
s:t: Q(Xp;W; T )  Q (5.9)
The Lagrangian for the unrestricted cost minimization problem is,
LU = PpX
p + PwX
w + W (Xw;H; T ) + U [Q Q (Xp; T;W (Xw;H; T ))] (5.10)
where () is again the (unobserved) shadow price of groundwater in the aquifer. The rst-order
conditions for agricultural inputs are,
@LU
@Xp
= Pp   U @Q
@Xp
= 0 (5.11)
@LU
@Xw
= Pw  

 + U @Q
@W

@W
@Xw
= 0 (5.12)
Once again the solution of the unrestricted dual cost minimization problem of the rm uses
the unobserved shadow price of in situ groundwater. Below we attempt to solve the above cost
minimization problem in a way that will allow estimation of (). The rst-order conditions
derived from the solution of the above unrestricted cost minimization problem will be used in
this attempt.
Solving the restricted cost minimization version of our problem, involves considering the aux-
iliary problem of minimizing the total cost of agricultural inputs (excluding groundwater inputs
that are exhaustible) in each period given the stock of groundwater (H), and the quantities of
(Q) and (W ) in each period. (Q) and (W ) are the solutions to the rms wealth-maximizing
problem,
min PpX
p + PwX
w
s:t: Q(XP ;W; T )  Q
W (Xw;H; T )  W  (5.13)
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As argued by Halvorsen and Smith (1991), each individual rm will not explicitly solve
the restricted cost minimization problem considered here, but instead will solve simultaneously
for the wealth-maximizing quantities of output and rate of groundwater extraction, together
with the quantities of agricultural inputs that minimize total costs. However, the optimal quan-
tities of agricultural inputs given by the solution to the restricted cost minimization problem will
be identical to the quantities implied by the more general wealth maximization problem (see,
Lau (1976)). The Lagrangian of the constrained cost minimization problem of the agricultural
rm is given by,
LR = PpX
p + PwX
w + R [Q Q (Xp;W; T )] +  [W  W (Xw;H; T )] (5.14)
The rst-order conditions for the cost-minimizing quantities of agricultural and groundwater
inputs are, respectively,
@LR
@Xp
= Pp   R @Q
@Xp
= 0 (5.15)
@LR
@Xw
= Pw    @W
@Xw
= 0 (5.16)
The solution of this cost minimization problem yields the following cost function for non-
resource agricultural inputs,
CR = CR (Q;Pp; Pw;W;H; T ) (5.17)
where CR is the minimal total expenditure on agricultural inputs other than groundwater stock,
given Q;PP ;W;H; T: Applying the envelope theorem6 gives,
@CR
@W
=
@LR
@W
=  R @Q
@W
+  (5.18)
@CR
@H
=
@LR
@H
=   @W
@H
(5.19)
6The Envelope Theorem establishes a connection between the derivatives of the value function and the deriv-
atives of the Lagrangian function, with respect to the parameter of interest. More specically, it states that we
can nd the e¤ect of a change in the exogenous variable on the optimized value of the objective function, simply
by taking the partial derivative of the Lagrange function with respect to the exogenous variable at the optimal
solution to the problem.
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The interpretation of the right-hand sides of equations (5.18) and (5.19) employs the
solution of the cost minimization problem with (W ) unrestricted derived in equations (5.9-
5.12). The solution values for (Xp) and (W ) for the unrestricted minimization problem, will
be identical to those derived for the restricted problem with (W ) set to its wealth maximizing
level. From (5.10) and (5.14),
R = U (5.20)
and from (5.12), (5.16) and (5.20),
 =  + R @Q
@W
(5.21)
Substituting (5.21) in (5.18) we derive the following relationship that allows empirical estimation
of the individual agricultural producers marginal valuation of in situ groundwater,
@CR
@W
=   (5.22)
Lemma 1 (Hotellings Lemma): The current value of the in situ resource price for the individual
producer of a vertically integrated natural resource producing rm, is equal to the negative of
the marginal nal cost of production of the resource.
Lemma 1 and   0; imply that the nal cost of gross production is non-positive. The
intuition is that additional output, all else held constant, reduces the marginal cost of producing
a given level of groundwater. This result (i.e. that the partial derivative of a restricted cost
function with respect to a quantity variable is equal to the negative of its shadow price) was
rst noted by Hotelling (1932) and amounts to the Hotellings lemma7. Lemma 1 also implies
that the current value of in situ resource price can be observed by di¤erentiating the estimated
restricted nal cost function with respect to gross production of groundwater. Moreover, it is
worth noting that deriving the implicit shadow price of water from derivatives of the restricted
cost function can be done for any values of () and (Q), not just those associated with wealth
maximizing paths. Halvorsen and Smith (1984, 1991) derive this result in their work as well8.
7Alternatively, the Hotellings Lemma states that di¤erentiating the prot function with respect to the prices
gives the output-supply and input-demand functions for the rm.
8Moreover, taking the rst-order conditions of equations (5.10) and (5.14) with respect to (H) ; and combining
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The restricted cost function method employed in the analysis of this section, is often used
in the literature for the analysis of the production technology of rms whose behaviour suggests
systematic deviations from cost minimization. These are rms that fail to minimize costs due
to lack of incentives faced by their operators, or function in regulated environments and as a
result face additional (observable) constraints other than those implied by prot maximization
(that implies maximizing possible output which can be produced from given quantities of a set
of inputs) or alternatively cost minimization (that implies minimizing the level of cost at which
it is possible to produce some level of output, given input prices). In this chapter we suggest
that the dual input distance function to the restricted cost function, has a number of virtues
that render it better equipped to analyze economic behaviour of vertically integrated rms for
which cost minimization is a questionable hypothesis. As argued in the introductory section of
this chapter, agricultural rms are traditionally heavily regulated and as a result they might
be facing a number of additional constraints other than cost minimization, which are often not
easily identiable. Moreover, the agricultural sector, even if not heavily regulated, is tradition-
ally found to exhibit systematic ine¢ cient behaviour. Distance function measures are ideal for
analyzing economic behaviour when cost-minimization is not the maintained hypothesis, be-
cause they (a) do not necessarily require any price data which might be distorted in regulated
the results with equations (5.20) and (5.21) gives,
@CR
@H
=
@CU
@H
Hence, the change and the level of user cost (shadow value) of water in the aquifer, can be determined for each
time period, from the derivatives of the minimum restricted cost function as,
_  r = @C
R
@H
(A1)
 =  @C
R
@W
(A2)
A restricted cost function can be postulated (e.g. Translog, Leontief , Cobb-Douglas, Generalized Cobb-Douglas)
and the shadow value () can be estimated. Estimation of the relevant restricted cost function, provides consistent
parameter estimates, irrespective of whether or not the time path of the in situ price of the natural resource
conforms to the dynamic optimality condition of equation (A1). However, under the null hypothesis that this
dynamic condition is satised, more e¢ cient estimates can be obtained by adding to the system of equations an
additional equation incorporating the restrictions on the parameters implied by dynamic optimality. Estimation
of the restricted cost function with and without the corresponding parameter restrictions imposed by the discrete
version of (A1), permits a standard likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis of satisfaction of the dynamic
optimality condition. This has been proposed as a test of the Hotelling principle. A brief review of the literature
on testing the implications of the Hotelling principle on natural resource scarcity, and suggestions for possible
advancements to this literature, is presented in appendix B5.
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industries (only quantity data is needed), (b) do not impose any behavioural assumptions which
might not be directly observable in regulated rms, (c) allow ine¢ cient behaviour and provide
a way of estimating the degree of production ine¢ ciency, and (d) allow exibility in empirical
applications through the duality result between conventional cost, prot and revenue functions.
5.3 The Use of the Input Distance Function to Deriving Ground-
water Scarcity Rents.
5.3.1 E¢ ciency Measurement Concepts.
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the use of distance functions in
production theory. The pioneering theoretical work on distance functions in production theory
dates back to Shephard (1953, 1970) and the recent extensions can be found in Färe, Grosskopf
and Lovell (1994) and Färe and Primont (1995). However, it is only in the last few years
that empirical applications of distance functions have become more widespread. Studies using
distance functions to compute shadow prices of either inputs or outputs in regulated industries
or services include, just to mention a few, Grosskopf and Hayes (1993), Färe et al. (1993),
Hetemäki (1994 a, b).
Figure 5.3.1: Technical and Allocative E¢ ciencies.
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One could argue that an input orientation may be more appropriate in agriculture because
the managers are likely to have more discretionary control over inputs rather than outputs.
For this reason, we focus on input oriented distance functions. We begin with Farrells (1957)
original ideas, which were illustrated in input/input space and hence had an input-reducing
focus9. Farrell illustrated his ideas using a simple example involving rms which use two inputs
(x1 and x2) to produce a single output (y); under the assumption of constant returns to scale.
The constant returns to scale assumptions allows one to represent the technology using a unit
isoquant10. Knowledge of the unit isoquant of the fully e¢ cient rm, represented by (SS0) in
gure 5.3.1, permits measurement of technical e¢ ciency.
If a given rm uses quantities of inputs, dened by the point (P ), to produce a unit output,
the technical ine¢ ciency of that rm could be represented by the distance (QP ), which is the
amount by which all inputs could be proportionally reduced without a reduction in output. This
is usually expressed in percentage terms by the ratio (QP=0P ), which represents the percentage
by which all inputs could be reduced. The technical e¢ ciency (TE) of a rm is most commonly
measured by the ratio,
TE1 = 0Q=0P
which is equal to one minus (QP=0P ). It will take a value between zero and one, and hence
provides an indicator of the degree of technical ine¢ ciency of the rm. A value of one indicates
the rm is fully technically e¢ cient. For example, the point (Q) is technically e¢ cient because
it lies on the e¢ cient isoquant11. In quantifying the level of the ine¢ ciency this research
focuses on the notion of technical ine¢ ciency, distinguishing it from the concept of allocative
9The Farrell input- and output-oriented technical e¢ ciency measures can be shown to be equal to the input
and output distance functions discussed in Shephard (1970). Further discussion on this can be found in Lovell
(1993, p.10).
10Farrell also discussed the extension of his method so as to accommodate more than two inputs, multiple
outputs, and non-constant returns to scale.
11Moreover, if the input price ratio, represented by the line AA0 in gure 5.3.1, is also known, allocative
e¢ ciency may also be calculated. The allocative e¢ ciency (AE) of the rm operating at (P ) is dened to be the
ratio,
AEI = 0R=0Q
since the distance (RQ) represents the reduction in production costs that would occur if production were to occur
at the allocatively (and technically) e¢ cient point (Q0), instead of at the technically e¢ cient, but allocatively
ine¢ cient, point (Q) : One could illustrate this by drawing two isocost lines through (Q) and (Q0). Irrespective
of the slope of these two parallel lines (which is determined by the input price ratio) the ratio (RQ=0Q) would
represent the percentage reduction in costs associated with movement from (Q) to (Q0) : The total economic
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ine¢ ciency. As argued above, technical ine¢ ciency implies that a rm is using an excessive
amount of inputs to produce the xed output levels. Allocative ine¢ ciency instead implies that
a rm, which might be fully e¢ cient from a technical point of view, is using an economically
suboptimal input mix when market prices are considered. The importance of this distinction
is based on the fact that the notion of technical ine¢ ciency can be clearly related to the lack
of incentives faced by the operators of the rm, while allocative ine¢ ciency could instead be
caused by exterior environmental constraints under which managers operate.
Figure 5.3.2: Piecewise Linear Convex Isoquant.
e¢ ciency (EE) is dened to be the ratio,
EEI = 0R=0P
where the distance (RP ) can also be interpreted in terms of a cost reduction. Note that the product of technical
and allocative e¢ ciency provides overall economic e¢ ciency,
TE AE = (0Q=0P ) (0R=0Q) = (0R=0P ) = EE
Also note that all three measures are bounded by zero and one.
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This e¢ ciency measure assumes that the production function of the fully e¢ cient rm is
known. In practice this is not the case, and the e¢ cient isoquant must be estimated from the
sample data. Farrell suggested the use of either (a) a non-parametric piecewise-linear convex
isoquant constructed such that no observed point should lie to the left or below it (see gure
5.3.2), or (b) a parametric function, such as the Cobb-Douglas form, tted to the data, again
such that no observed point should lie to the left or below it12. A brief review of the merits and
shortcomings of alternative estimation procedures is presented in section 5.3.3 of this chapter.
More general representations of the above concepts can be given as follows. Consider a
(k  1) input vector x = (x1; x2; :::; xk)0  0 used in the production of a (m  1) output
vector y = (y1; y2; :::; ym)0  0. Then, characterize the underlying technology by the production
possibility set L(y); which represents the set of all input vectors x; which can produce the output
vector, y: Throughout this chapter we assume that the set L(y) satises the following properties
(i) 0 2 L(y), i.e. nothing can be produced out of a given set of inputs; (ii) non-zero output
levels cannot be produced from zero level of inputs; (iii) L(y) satises strong disposability of
outputs; (iv) L(y) satises strong disposability of inputs, i.e. if y can be produced from x, then
y can be produced from any x  x; (v) L(y) is closed and convex13. Given the above, Shepard
(1970, p. 64-78) denes the input distance function as14,
DL(y; x) = max

f : (x

) 2 L(y)g (5.23)
The input distance function in (5.23) can be used to generate the input requirement set
IRL(y) = fx : DL(y; x)  1g as well as the frontier isoquant of a production set ISL(y) =
fx : DL(y; x) = 1g (Shepard (1970, p.67)). The properties of the input distance function
can be easily dderived using the assumptions made with respect to the production technology.
12Farrell provided an illustration of these methods using agricultural data for the 48 continental states of the
US.
13Convexity implies that if two combinations of output levels can be produced with a given input vector x, then
any average of these output vectors can also be produced. This assumption implicitly requires the commodities
to be continuous and divisible.
14Note that the denition of the input distance function in equation (5.23) could be made more rigorous by
replacing max (which stands for maximum) with sup (which stands for supremum). This allows for
the possibility that the maximum does not exist (i.e.,  = +1 is possible). However in this chapter we assume
existence of a maximum and adopt the simpler notation of a max.
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Given the general axioms describing the production set, it is easy to show that (i) the input
distance function is non-decreasing in x and increasing in y; (ii) it is linearly homogenious in
x; (iii) if x belongs to the input set of y then DL(y; x)  1; and (iv) distance is equal to unity
if x belongs to the frontier of the input set. Note that the input distance function completely
characterizes the technology L(y), and measures the proportional (or radial) reduction in all
inputs x that would bring the rm to the frontier isoquant ISL(y):
As already mentioned, the input distance function has been of great interest in e¢ ciency
analysis. It is the reciprocal of the Farrell (1957) measure of technical e¢ ciency graphically
explained in gure 5.3.1 for the two input - one output case. That is, 1=DL(y; x) = 1 corresponds
to technical e¢ ciency while 1=DL(y; x) < 1 identies technical ine¢ ciency. In this latter case,
1=DL(y; x)measures the proportional (or radial) rescaling of all inputs that would bring the rm
to the frontier isoquant ISL(y) (Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985)). Similarly, [1 1=DL(y; x)]
can be interpreted as the proportional reduction in production cost that can be achieved by
moving to the frontier isoquant15.
5.3.2 The Model.
In this section we model production possibilities of a vertically integrated agricultural rm,
by employing the input distance function measure. By using Shephards input distance function
to represent technology rather than a cost function, we can employ a dual Shephards lemma to
retrieve rm and input specic shadow prices. Let L(Q) denote the input set which satises the
15Shepard (1970, p. 206-212) alternatively denes the output distance function as,
FL(y; x) = min

f : (y=; x) 2 Lg (5.24)
The output distance function can be used to generate the production correspondence PCL(x) = fy : FL(y; x)  1g
and the frontier correspondence FCL = fy : FL(y; x) = 1g (Shephard (1970), p. 209). It follows that FL(x; y) in
(5.24) denes the substitution alternatives among the outputs (y), given inputs (x): As with the input distance
function in (5.23), note that output distance function in (5.24) provides a complete characterization of the
underlying technology. Also, note that 1=FL(y; x) measures the proportional rescaling of all outputs (y) that
would bring the rm to the frontier production correspondence FCL(x): Then, [1=FL(y; x) 1] can be interpreted
as the proportional increase in revenue that can be achieved by moving to the frontier correspondence. The
properties of the two functions DL(y; x) and FL(y; x) have been analyzed in detail by Shephard (1970, p. 207-
208). Note that there exists a simple relationship between these two functions under constant returns to scale.
Indeed, (y=s; x) 2 L implies (y; sx) 2 L for s > 0 under constant returns to scale. From (5.23) and (5.24),
this implies that DL(y; x) = 1=FL(y; x): In other words, each distance function in (5.23) and (5.24) is a reciprocal
function of he other under constant returns to scale.
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properties mentioned in the previous section of this chapter. Then the restricted input distance
function for the ith agricultural rm may be dened as,
DRi (Q;X
p; Xw;W;H; T ) = max

' > 0 :
X

2 L(Q;W;H; T )

(5.25)
where (X) is a vector of input quantities, i.e. [X= (Xp; Xw)] ; L(Q;W;H; T ) is the input set
which represents the set of all input vectors which can produce the output vector (Q); and (')
measures the proportional (or radial) reduction in all inputs (X) that brings the ith rm to the
frontier isoquant. The remaining parameters are dened as in section 5.2. As already mentioned,
the input distance function DRi (:); is non-decreasing, positively linearly homogeneous and con-
cave in inputs, increasing in output and will take a value which is greater than or equal to one,
if the input vector is an element of the feasible input set. That is, (Xp; Xw) 2 L(Q;W;H; T ) if
and only if DRi (Q;X
p; Xw;W;H; T ) = 1. Furthermore, the distance function will take a value
of unity if (X) is located in the inner boundary of the input set.
Given the restricted cost function in equation (5.26) below, Shepard (1953, 1970) has shown
that the input distance function may also be obtained as a price minimal cost function, as given
in (5.27) below,
CRi (Q;Pp; Pw;W;H; T ) = min
Xp;Xw

PpX
p + PwX
w : DRi (Q;X
p; Xw;W;H; T ) = 1
	
(5.26)
DRi (Q;X
p; Xw;W;H; T ) = min
P p;Pw

PpX
p + PwX
w : CR(Q;Pp; Pw;W;H; T )
	
(5.27)
The Lagrangian of the cost minimization problem postulated in equation (5.26) is given by,
 = PpX
p + PwX
w + 

1 DRi (Q;Xp; Xw;W;H; T )

(5.28)
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Applying the envelope theorem to this Lagrangian equation we get,
@CRi
@W
=
@
@W
=  @D
R
i
@W
(5.29)
@CRi
@H
=
@
@H
=  @D
R
i
@H
(5.30)
@CRi
@Xp
=
@
@Xp
= Pp   @D
R
i
@Xp
= 0 (5.31)
@CRi
@Xw
=
@
@Xw
= Pw   @D
R
i
@Xw
= 0 (5.32)
The rst-order conditions of (5.28) with respect to input prices imply that,
@CRi
@Pp
=
@
@Pp
= XP (5.33)
@CRi
@Pw
=
@
@Pw
= Xw (5.34)
@CRi
@
= 1 DRi (:) = 0 (5.35)
Following Shephard (1970) or Jacobsen (1972) one can show that  =  = bCR(:) at the
optimum16; where bCR(:) is the minimum restricted cost. However, bCR(:) depends on the
shadow prices we seek. Therefore, in order to obtain bCR(:) we adopt the assumption suggested
by Färe and Grosskopf (1990, p.125) that rms satisfy a balanced budget, and thus minimum
restricted cost can be retrieved since costs must equal revenues. Thus, when the distance
function (5.25) is known, then we can estimate the derivatives of the restricted cost function
from the restricted distance function as given below,
16Theorem 1. Let v(p) = max
x
fpx : G(x)  1g; p;x 2 Rm+ ; G(x) = G(x); for every x 2 Rm+ and  > 0:
Then v(p) = (p) where (p) is the optimal Lagrangian multiplier associated with L(x; ) = px+ [1 G(x)].
Proof. Let x = x(p);  = (p) > 0 be the solution to the Lagrangian problem, then the rst-order conditions
for this problem imply
 5x G(x) = p (A1)
1 G(x) = 0 (A2)
Multiplying (1) by x(p) we obtain
px(p) = (p) = (p)5x G(x)x(p)
Then by linear homogeneity, 5xG(x)x(p) =G(x) and by (A2), G(x) = 1: Thus (p) = (p):
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 

@DRi
@W
cCiR = @CRi
@W
(5.36)
 

@DRi
@H
 bCRi  = @CRi@H (5.37)
Going back to equation (5.22) and using the relationship between the derivatives of the restricted
distance function and the derivatives of the restricted cost function given in equations (5.36)
and (5.37), we can estimate the level and time path of the in situ groundwater scarcity. That
is, 
@DRi
@W
 bCRi  = i
Lemma 2: The current value of the in situ resource price for the individual producer of a
vertically integrated natural resource producing rm, is equal to the absolute shadow price of
the resource as derived from the restricted input distance function that describes rm-specic
technology.
Moreover, combining equation (5.37) with equation (A1) in footnote 5, the derivatives of the
distance function can be used to characterize the dynamic optimality condition of resource
extraction and test the implications of the Hotelling principle.
It remains to show that a distance function can be estimated. As already mentioned, the
assumption that L(:) is a closed convex set, implies that the two approaches (5.25) and (5.27),
yield the same distance function. From this observation it follows that DRi (:) can be calculated
using the formulation in (5.25) which only requires data on input and output quantities and not
on prices, which given the possibility of market regulation and additional sources of ine¢ ciency,
might be less reliable. Moreover, once we have estimated the distance function we can discuss
e¢ ciency issues.
5.3.3 Econometric Specication, Empirical Estimation and Results.
Five alternative methods of estimating distance function frontiers have been used in recent
years. Namely, (1) construction of a non-parametric piecewise linear frontier using linear pro-
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gramming (DEA) (e.g. Färe et al., 1989; 1994), (2) construction of a non-parametric frontier
using the integer programming method known as exible disposable hull (FDH) (Deprins et al.,
1984), (3) construction of a parametric deterministic frontier using linear programming (e.g.
Forsund and Hjalmarsson, 1987; Färe et al., 1993 ), (4) estimation of parametric deterministic
frontier using corrected ordinary least squares (COLS) (e.g. Lovell et al., 1994; Grosskopf et
al., 1997), and (5) estimation of parametric stochastic frontiers using maximum likelihood (e.g.
Hetemaki, 1996; Coelli and Pereman, 1996).
These ve approaches to estimating distance functions have a range of advantages and
disadvantages which may inuence the choice of method in each particular application. The
principle advantages of the DEA approach is that it does not require the specication of a
particular functional form for the technology. However, the principle disadvantage of the DEA
method is that when the calculation of shadow prices are desired, only a range of prices can
be derived for the e¢ cient rms17. One disadvantage shared by all four methods except the
stochastic frontier estimation procedure, is that they are susceptible to the inuence of outliers.
More specically, deterministic frontier methods do not account for the possible inuence of
data noise (e.g. as a result of measurement error or model mispecication) upon the shape
and positioning of the frontier. The stochastic frontier method attempts to account for this
problem. The stochastic frontier production function was independently proposed by Aigner,
Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977). The original specication
involved a production function specied for cross-sectional data which had an error term which
had two components, one to account for random e¤ects and another to account for technical
ine¢ ciency.
As suggested by Färe and Grosskopf (1990), the frontier distance function di¤ers from the
more familiar frontier production function mentioned above, in that it readily allows for multiple
outputs and its frontier value is unity. In the remaining of this section we empirically estimate
17This is because the production surface constructed by DEA is a series of intersecting planes. The e¢ cient
frontier points, that dene this frontier surface (primarily) lie at the intersections of these planes. Hence, when
one attempts to measure shadow prices for these e¢ cient points, only a range of price ratios can be observed
(corresponding to the slopes of the planes involved). This was the principle reason why Färe et al. (1993)
used parametric methods to repeat the analysis of electricity utilities that were originally analyzed using DEA
methods in Färe et al. (1989).
176
an input distance function that characterizes the production technology of vertically integrated
agricultural rms, in order to derive the shadow price of groundwater left in the aquifer. One
of the rst decisions that must be made in a parametric empirical analysis is the selection of
an appropriate functional form. The functional form for the distance function would ideally
be exible, easy to calculate and permit the imposition of homogeneity. The translog form
has been selected by the majority of the authors in this literature since it satises these three
requirements18. The translog distance function for the case of (K) inputs and (M) outputs is
specied as,
lnDi = 0 +
MX
m=1
m ln ymi +
1
2
MX
m=1
MX
n=1
mn ln ymi ln yni +
KX
k=1
k lnxki
+
1
2
KX
k=1
KX
l=1
kl lnxki lnxli +
KX
k=1
MX
m=1
km lnxki ln ymi
i = 1; 2; :::; N (5.38)
where (i) denotes the (ith) rm in the sample. Note that to obtain the frontier surface (i.e.,
the transformation function) one would set Di = 1, which implies that the left hand side of
equation (5.38) is equal to zero. The restrictions required for homogeneity of degree +1 in
inputs are,
KX
k=1
k = 1 (5.39a)
KX
l=1
kl = 0; k = 1; 2; :::;K (5.39b)
KX
k=1
km = 0; m = 1; 2; :::;M (5.39c)
18The Cobb-Douglas form, which has been a popular choice in production analyses for a number of decades,
although easy to calculate and make homogeneous, it is not exible, because of its restrictive elasticity of substi-
tution and scale properties. Furthermore, as noted by Klein (1953, p. 227), the Cobb-Douglas transformation
function is not an acceptable model of a rm in a purely competitive industry because it is not concave in the
output dimensions. This is not a serious issue when the primary interest is in obtaining technical measures and
optimizing behaviour is not an issue.
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and those required for symmetry are,
mn = nm; m; n = 1; 2; :::;M (5.40a)
kl = lk; k; l = 1; 2; :::K (5.40b)
Moreover, the restriction required for separability between inputs and outputs are,
km = 0; k = 1; 2; :::;K m = 1; 2; :::;M (5.41)
A convenient method of imposing the homogeneity constraint upon equation (5.38) is to follow
Lovell et al. (1994) and observe that homogeneity implies that,
D(y; !x) = !D(y; x) for any ! > 0 (5.42)
Hence by arbitrarily choosing one of the inputs, such as the K-th input, and set ! = 1=xK ; we
obtain,
D(y; x=xK) = D(y; x)=xK (5.43)
For the translog this provides,
ln(Di=xKi) = 0 +
MX
m=1
m ln ymi +
1
2
MX
m=1
MX
n=1
mn ln ymi ln yni +
K 1X
k=1
k lnx

ki
+
1
2
K 1X
k=1
K 1X
l=1
kl lnx

ki lnx

li +
K 1X
k=1
MX
m=1
km lnx

ki ln ymi
i = 1; 2; :::; N and xk = xk=xK (5.44)
With the selection of a suitable functional form for our input distance function completed,
we must now select an appropriate method of obtaining estimates of the unknown parameters
of the function. That is, we must obtain estimates of the parameters of the function such that
the function is a good t to the data. This task can be described using simple algebra by
rewriting equation (5.42) as,
ln(Di=xKi) = TL(yi;
xi
xKi
; ; ) i = 1; 2; :::; N (5.45)
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ln(Di)  ln(xKi) = TL(yi; xi
xKi
; ; ) i = 1; 2; :::; N (5.46)
As already argued, one method that can be used to account for the inuence of noise upon an
estimate frontier is to apply the stochastic frontier approach proposed by Aigner, Lovell and
Schmidt (1977), which involves the specication of a frontier function with an error term with
two components: a symmetric error to account for noise and an asymmetric error to account for
ine¢ ciency. We begin by appending a symmetric error term (Vi) to equation (5.45) to account
for noise, and also change notation ln(Di) to (Ui). We thus obtain a stochastic input distance
function,
  ln(xKi) = TL(yi; xi
xKi
; ; ) + Vi   Ui i = 1; 2; :::; N (5.47)
Given appropriate distributional assumptions for (Vi) and (Ui), the parameters of this sto-
chastic translog distance function can be estimated using maximum likelihood. (Vi) are random
variables which are assumed to be identically and independently distributed with zero mean
and constant variance [iid N(0; 2v)] and independent of (Ui) which are assumed to be iid trun-
cations at zero of the N(; 2U )] distribution
19: (U 0is) take account of technical ine¢ ciency in
production. The predicted value of the input distance for the ith rm, Di = exp(Ui); is not di-
rectly observable because (Ui) only appears as part of the composed error term, (
i = Vi   Ui) :
Predictions may, however, be obtained using the conditional expectation,
Di = E[exp(Ui) j 
i] (5.48)
as suggested by Battese and Coelli (1988). This conditional expectation measures rm-specic
technical ine¢ ciencies relative to the e¢ cient isoquant. The stochastic frontier model is not,
however, without problems. The main criticism is that there is generally no a priori justication
for the selection of any particular distributional form for the Uis: The specications of more
general distributional forms, such as the truncated-normal (used in our empirical estimation)
and the two-parameter gamma, have partially alleviated this problem, but resulting e¢ ciency
measures may still be sensitive to distributional assumptions.
19The abbreviation (iid) stands for independently and identically distributed. Moreover, see appendix A4 of
chapter 4, for a brief reference to the normal truncated distribution.
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The maximum likelihood estimates of the unknown parameters and the distance function
predictions obtained in this paper, are calculated using computer programme FRONTIER,
Version 4.1, by Coelli (1996). The data used in this chapter were extracted from Production
Surveys conducted by the Department of Economics, University of Cyprus, for the years 1991,
1997 and 1999. Our analysis focuses on a sample of 228 agricultural farmers located in the Kiti
region. The data-set consists of a balanced panel that is composed by the same 76 farmers over
the three years of the survey. The variable (Output) represents rm-specic total value of output
(in Cyprus Pounds) from production of agricultural crops20, (Non-Irrigated Land) represents
rm-specic total area (in 0.1 hectares) of non-irrigated land, (Costs) represents rm-specic
total value of input costs (in Cyprus Pounds21) involved in crop production (these include
fertilizers, manure, pesticides, fuel and electric power for groundwater extraction). Groundwater
extraction is measured in cubic meters and the water table head (specic to each rm, given
non-homogeneous aquifer) is measured in meters above sea level. The negative of (Irrigated
Land), representing total area of irrigated land (in 0.1 hectares) is the dependent variable in
the estimation of the stochastic frontier. Given that the results are based on estimation of a
stochastic distance function, time invariance of the parameters is assumed. This means that
the presence of technical progress is not accounted for in the empirical model to be estimated.
The maximum likelihood estimates of the unknown parameters are given in table 5.3.1.
20The most common crops cultivated in the area under investigation, are grapefruits as far as permanent crops
are concerned and bran, cauliower and tomatoes as far as temporary crops are concerned. Unfortunately, given
the absence of crop-specic data, we can not estimate a multi-output distance function.
21Final output (Q) and agricultural inputs costs (Costs) ; both measured in Cyprus Pounds are deated by
the wholesale agriculture price index.
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Table 5.3.1
Estimated Stochastic Input Distance Frontier.
Dependent Variable: Irrigated Land.
Variable Parameter ML Estimates T-ratios
Constant 0 -0.48 0.60
Output 1 -0.30 5.68
Non-Irrigated Land 1 0.28 9.44
Labour 2 0.19 4.02
Costs 3 0.04 0.81
Water Extraction 4 0.09 4.15
Head 5 0.02 1.98
Irrigated Land By homegeneity condition 0.38
Log (likelihood) 378.14
 -6.11 -1.37
LR  test 22.87
 = 2U=(
2
U + 
2
V ) 0.88 1.36
 1.40 2.02
Cross-sections: 76
Number of time periods: 3
Total number of restrictions: 228
 Hypothesis tests are carried out at 95% condence level.
The estimated parameters presented in table 5.3.1 have the anticipated (positive for inputs
and negative for outputs) signs22. The coe¢ cient of  is not signicantly di¤erent from zero,
suggesting support for the half-normal distribution as far as ine¢ ciency e¤ects are concerned.
22Gross products and squared coe¢ cients are not reported because they where excluded from the empirical
model after a preliminary estimation, which indicated that their estimated e¤ects were not signicantly di¤erent
from zero. Hence the stochastic distance function estimated in this chapter, has a restricted translog form in
which all second order parameters associated with inputs are set to zero. This formulation imposes separability
between inputs and outputs.
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The one-sided likelihood ratio (LR) test, reported in table 5.3.1, tests the null hypothesis that
there are no technical ine¢ ciency e¤ects in the truncated-normal model. If the null hypothesis
is true, then the generalised likelihood-ratio statistic is asymptotically distributed as a mixture
of chi-square distributions. The critical value for this mixed chi-square distribution is 5.138 for a
ve percent level of signicance23. The calculated likelihood ratio reported in the table strongly
suggests rejection of the null hypothesis, indicating presence of technical ine¢ ciency e¤ects in
the model. Moreover, a value of  (which is given by 2U=(
2
U + 
2
V )) of zero indicates that the
deviations from the frontier are due entirely to noise, while a value of one would indicate that all
deviations are due to technical ine¢ ciency24. In our empirical estimation, the null hypothesis
that  = 0 is rejected at 95% level of signicance, whereas the null hypothesis that  = 1 is
rejected at 95% level of signicance, indicating the existence of technical ine¢ ciency and the
choice of a stochastic model, respectively.
Given the availability of panel data we are able to test for time-varying technical e¢ ciencies.
Following Battese and Coelli (1992), technical ine¢ ciency e¤ects in our model are assumed to
be dened by;
Uit = (Ui exp( (t  T ))) (5.49)
where Uis are assumed to be iid as the generalized truncated-normal random variable dened
above, and () is a parameter to be estimated. If the hypothesis that  = 0 is accepted, then we
can conclude that rm-specic ine¢ ciencies are time invariant. In the specication of equation
(5.49), if the ith rm is observed in the last period of the panel (T ), then UiT = Ui, because
the exponential function exp( (t  T )) has value one when t = T . Thus the random variable,
Ui, can be considered as the technical ine¢ ciency e¤ect for the ith rm in the last period of
the panel. For earlier periods in the panel, the technical e¢ ciency e¤ects are the product of the
technical ine¢ ciency e¤ect for the ith rm at the last period of the panel and the value of the
exponential function exp( (t T )); whose value depends on the parameter , and the number
of periods before the last period of the panel,  (t  T )  T   t. If the parameter  is positive,
then  (t T )  (T   t) is non-negative and so exp( (t T )) is no smaller than one, which
23The critical value, 5.138 is taken from Table 1 in Kodde and Palm (1986).
24 It should be stressed, however, that  is not equal to the ratio of the variance of the technical ine¢ ciency
e¤ects to the total residual variance. This is because the variance of Ui is equal to [(   2)=]2 not 2:
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implies that Uit  Ui: The calculated t  statistic for () reported in table 5.3.1 indicates that
the estimated coe¢ cient for () is signicantly di¤erent from zero and positive. This result
suggests that rm-specic technical e¢ ciencies are increasing over time. These are reported in
appendix A5, where it is shown that average mean technical e¢ ciency for agricultural rms in
the sample increased rather rapidly from 0:47 in 1991, to 0:78 in 1997, and nally to 0:94 in
199925. Given that technical change is assumed to be constant in the estimated model over the
relevant time period, these results allow the conclusion that the managers of the agricultural
rms in the sample under consideration, learn from their previous experience in the production
process and as a result their technical ine¢ ciency e¤ects change in a persistent pattern over
time. The reported substantial increases in the technical e¢ ciency of agricultural rms can
be attributed to the major restructuring of the agricultural sector that took place in the last
decade in an attempt to harmonize the Cypriot agricultural policies with those of the European
Union, in the light of Cyprus accession in the EU26. Alternatively, these increases may indicate
the existence of technological progress in the agricultural sector under consideration, which is
not accounted for in our empirical model. These are the rst estimates of the e¢ ciency of the
Cypriot agricultural sector and as a result there is no scope for comparison at the present.
At this point it is important to note that our empirical analysis identies signicant rm-
specic technical ine¢ ciencies, a result that suggests that if we used lemma 1 to derive the
shadow price of the resource in situ instead of lemma 2 to be used below, our estimates would be
biased. That is, the behavioural assumptions implied by cost-minimization are not satised by
the rms in the data-sample under consideration. Hence, employing a restricted cost function
for the estimation of marginal scarcity rents of the resource, as suggested by Halvorsen and
25Another characteristic of the time-varying ine¢ ciency model of equation (5.49) is that the technical inef-
ciency e¤ects of di¤erent rms at any given time period t, are equal to the same exponential function of the
corresponding rm-specic ine¢ ciency e¤ects at the last period of the panel. This implies that the ordering of
the rms according to the magnitude of the technical ine¢ ciency e¤ects is the same at all time periods. Thus
the time-varying model of equation (5.49) does not account for situations in which some rms may be relatively
ine¢ cient initially but become relatively more e¢ cient in subsequent periods.
26A priority goal of this restructuring was the reduction in subsidies given to the agricultural sector. These
subsidies amounted to lump-sum amounts of money, given to producers irrespective of their production e¢ ciency.
These subsidies were given for socio-political reasons and their aim was to help the agricultural population of the
island to sustain their income levels in the face of increased foreign competition. However, the end e¤ect of this
policy was incentive reducing, and it can provide the intuition behind the very low levels of technical e¢ ciency
derived from the econometric analysis of this chapter for year 1991.
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Smith (1984, 1991), would provide misleading results. This criticism is relevant for empirical
analyses of most vertically integrated natural resource producing rms, as they traditionally
su¤er from ine¢ cient management. Hence, the use of the dual input distance function for
deriving marginal natural resource scarcity rents is indeed appropriate in such settings and
generally useful27.
In table 5.3.2 we present the calculation for the derivation of the mean estimated shadow
price of in situ groundwater for each year relevant for our sample data, using lemma 2.
Table 5.3.2: Mean Groundwater Scarcity Rents.
Year bCRi @ lnDRi@ lnWi DRi W i i = h bCR  @ lnDR@ lnW  DRW i
1999 $4312:33 $0:09=m3 1:06m3=$ 42567:34m3 $0:0097m3
1997 $5003:56 $0:09=m3 1:22m3=$ 62000:76m3 $0:0089m3
1991 $5687:39 $0:09=m3 1:53m3=$ 88978:90m3 $0:0088m3
As established in section 5.3.2 of this chapter, the mean annual per farm minimum restricted
cost function
 bCRi  is approximated by the mean annual per farm revenue, which is measured
in Cyprus pounds, 1999 constant prices. The change in the restricted distance function per
unit change in groundwater extraction

@ lnDRi
@ lnWi

; measured in pounds per cubic meter, is the
estimated parameter of the quantity of groundwater extraction from the stochastic distance
function estimation, the results of which are presented in table 5.3.1. Moreover,
 
DRi

and
(Wi) are the mean annual estimated distance function and mean groundwater extraction per
farm, measured in
 
$=m3

and
 
m3

, respectively. The mean shadow value of the per cubic
meter in situ groundwater calculated in the table above28, is slightly increasing over the years29,
27Of course, adopting the method proposed in this paper assumes acceptance of the notion of maximality.
Thus failure to produce at the frontier is taken to be worth discovering, regardless of the reason for this failure.
28These values are calculated by taking into account that our empirical results give estimates of the derivatives
of the natural logarithm of the input distance function, which equals,
@ lnD
@ lnW
=
W
D
 @D
@W
where D = E[exp(U) j 
]:
29 If a long enough time series of data was available, one could test the implications of the Hotelling principle
by following the exact same procedure that Halvorsen and Smith (1984, 1991) suggested. See appendix B5 for
further elaboration on relevant literature.
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but very small compared to the optimal value of groundwater scarcity rent derived from the
optimization model of chapter 3. In table 3.6.2 of chapter 3, we indicate that under a regime of
optimal groundwater extraction this value should be equal to £ 0.2017 per cubic meter of water,
which is approximately twenty one times larger than the corresponding value derived in this
chapter for year 1999. In appendix B3 of chapter 3, we argue that the area behind a general
equilibrium demand curve in an input market, measures the sum of rents to producers selling
in all higher markets plus nal consumer surplus. Moreover, existence of a general equilibrium
non-distorted water demand implies that the marginal value for groundwater should be equal
for both sectors of the economy. Hence, the in situ scarcity values of groundwater per cubic
meter, derived from simulating the optimal control model of chapter 3 and by estimating the
stochastic distance function in this chapter, should be equal, even though this chapters analysis
does not take into account the demand for groundwater by the residential sector. However, the
two derived values of groundwater scarcity rents are markedly di¤erent.
What could rationalize this divergence? Given that the model developed in this chapter
derives estimates of the marginal opportunity cost to the agricultural rm of one unit of natural
resource left in the aquifer, the approximate inexistence of such scarcity rents indicates that
agricultural producers in the region are not willing to pay the full social cost of their unit
extraction. This implies that externalities arise as current users of the resource are willing to pay
only the private cost of their resource extraction, and as a result the resources scarcity value goes
unrecognized. This pattern of behaviour is consistent with perfect myopic resource extraction,
which arises because of the absence of properly allocated property rights in groundwater. That
is, myopic extracting behaviour, also identied in the estimation of the hedonic shadow price of
groundwater quality in chapter 4, can be rationalized because there exists no incentive for the
individual producer to pay today for conserving groundwater in the aquifer that will probably be
extracted by somebody else tomorrow. Thus, scarcity rents go unrecognized and groundwater
extraction is dynamically ine¢ cient. Hence the need for optimal management of this aquifer
emerges, so that current users of the resource pay the social cost of their groundwater extraction
and not only its private component. The signicant improvement in welfare realized under an
optimal control regime derived in chapter 3, implies that imposing the true scarcity rents of
in situ groundwater on current users of the resource is practically important. Thus, the non-
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internalized costs of the currently observed myopic groundwater extraction are signicant and
benets from optimally managing this resource could be non-negligible.
5.4 Conclusion.
This chapter derives shadow prices of inputs by modelling technology with a restricted
input distance function, and through its duality with the cost function, retrieve shadow prices
of natural resource inputs of vertically integrated agricultural rms. Then these shadow prices
are used to calculated the scarcity rents of unextracted groundwater. This method has a wide
applicability in modelling and empirically analyzing production possibilities of natural resource
extracting/vertically integrated industries, and can be considered as an alternative methodology
to deriving shadow prices of unmarketed resources. This method is particularly e¢ cient when
the industry under consideration is ine¢ ciently managed or regulated, which is a very common
phenomenon. Moreover this method can be employed to derive a series of in situ resource
price, which can then be used to test the implications of the Hotelling principle as done in the
literature reviewed in the appendix B5.
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Appendix A5.
Predicted Technical Efficiencies of Agricultural Firms.
Technical E¢ ciency Estimates
Year 1991 Year 1997 Year 1999
Firm E¤. Firm E¤. Firm E¤. Firm E¤. Firm E¤. Firm E¤.
1 0.58 39 0.61 1 0.86 39 0.87 1 0.96 39 0.97
2 0.54 40 0.13 2 0.84 40 0.55 2 0.96 40 0.86
3 0.54 41 0.18 3 0.84 41 0.61 3 0.96 41 0.88
4 0.53 42 0.66 4 0.83 42 0.90 4 0.95 42 0.97
5 0.60 43 0.62 5 0.88 43 0.87 5 0.96 43 0.97
6 0.54 44 0.30 6 0.84 44 0.70 6 0.96 44 0.91
7 0.53 45 0.52 7 0.83 45 0.83 7 0.95 45 0.95
8 0.54 46 0.53 8 0.84 46 0.83 8 0.96 46 0.95
9 0.53 47 0.51 9 0.84 47 0.82 9 0.96 47 0.95
10 0.66 48 0.58 10 0.89 48 0.86 10 0.97 48 0.96
11 0.62 49 0.33 11 0.87 49 0.72 11 0.97 49 0.92
12 0.30 50 0.64 12 0.70 50 0.88 12 0.91 50 0.97
13 0.45 51 0.55 13 0.79 51 0.84 13 0.94 51 0.96
14 0.43 52 0.05 14 0.78 52 0.44 14 0.94 52 0.81
15 0.42 53 0.10 15 0.78 53 0.52 15 0.94 53 0.85
16 0.44 54 0.35 16 0.79 54 0.74 16 0.94 54 0.92
17 0.47 55 0.20 17 0.80 55 0.62 17 0.94 55 0.89
18 0.63 56 0.10 18 0.88 56 0.53 18 0.97 56 0.85
19 0.43 57 0.43 19 0.78 57 0.78 19 0.94 57 0.94
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20 0.39 58 0.17 20 0.76 58 0.60 20 0.93 58 0.87
21 0.47 59 0.08 21 0.80 59 0.49 21 0.95 59 0.84
22 0.36 60 0.17 22 0.74 60 0.60 22 0.93 60 0.88
23 0.58 61 0.70 23 0.86 61 0.91 23 0.96 61 0.98
24 0.52 62 0.66 24 0.83 62 0.89 24 0.95 62 0.97
25 0.48 63 0.69 25 0.81 63 0.90 25 0.95 63 0.97
26 0.25 64 0.73 26 0.67 64 0.92 26 0.90 64 0.98
27 0.56 65 0.05 27 0.85 65 0.42 27 0.96 65 0.81
28 0.61 66 0.08 28 0.87 66 0.49 28 0.97 66 0.84
29 0.29 67 0.68 29 0.70 67 0.90 29 0.91 67 0.97
30 0.29 68 0.71 30 0.69 68 0.91 30 0.91 68 0.98
31 0.60 69 0.69 31 0.86 69 0.90 31 0.96 69 0.97
32 0.68 70 0.61 32 0.90 70 0.87 32 0.97 70 0.97
33 0.55 71 0.61 33 0.84 71 0.87 33 0.96 71 0.97
34 0.61 72 0.60 34 0.87 72 0.87 34 0.97 72 0.96
35 0.64 73 0.70 35 0.88 73 0.90 35 0.97 73 0.97
36 0.27 74 0.67 36 0.68 74 0.90 36 0.91 74 0.97
37 0.07 75 0.66 37 0.49 75 0.89 37 0.83 75 0.97
38 0.20 76 0.72 38 0.62 76 0.91 38 0.88 76 0.98
Mean E¤. in 1991 = 0.47 Mean E¤. in 1997 = 0.78 Mean E¤. in 1999 = 0.94
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Appendix B5.
Testing the Hotelling Principle by the Use of Derived in Situ Natural
Resource Shadow Prices.
The value of having available a procedure for estimating the price of unextracted
groundwater, or any other natural resource, from data for a vertically integrated natural re-
source industry can not be overemphasized if one wants to test the relevance of the theory of
exhaustible resources. Does the economic theory of exhaustible resources adequately explain
producer behaviour? Extant empirical tests show mixed support and are not encouraging in
terms of usefulness of the theory in describing producer behaviour. There are many di¤erences
in extant tests, including di¤erences in resource(s) and market structure analyzed; aggregation
over time and resources; whether and, if so, how the in situ resource price, which is not directly
observable, is estimated; and the type of test employed.
In an attempt to emphasize the contribution of this thesis that aims to suggest ways, in
accordance with economic theory, to derive the in situ scarcity of a natural resource, in this
appendix we review a relevant literature that can be enlightened and extended by suggestion
of di¤erent approaches to deriving natural resource scarcity rents. First we give a summary of
the implications of the theory of exhaustible resources (in its complete certaintyversion) for
the dynamic behaviour of private markets for exhaustible resources. Then we review existing
tests of the Hotelling principle. These test could be applied to in situ resource prices derived
by employing the methods suggested in the chapters of this thesis. However unavailability
of long enough time-series restricts our analysis to theoretical suggestions without empirical
application.
The Hotelling rule provides the fundamental no-arbitrage condition that every competitive
or e¢ cient resource utilization path has to meet. In its basic form it indicates that along such
a path the price of exhaustible resource has to grow with a rate that equals the interest rate.
Although the Hotelling rule is in principle relevant for all models of non-renewable resource
use, its simplest application is that of a cake eating economy where consumption results from
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depleting a given stock of natural capital. In the basic resource model30, the capital market
clears when the price of the unextracted resource at time (t), which gives the in situ scarcity
of the resource represent by (t), increases at a rate rt (the risk-adjusted interest rate). The
extraction period is assumed to be innitely long. This assumption together with prot max-
imization imply that no resource should be left at the end of time. Letting Q(p; z) be the
demand curve where z represents demand shift variables, equations (5.50) and (5.51) together,
are the capital market equilibrium conditions.
t+1 = t(1 + rt) (5.50)
x(0) =
1X
t=0
q(t) (5.51)
Equation (5.52) indicates that the price of the resource product equals the cost of the raw
resource plus the marginal cost of converting the raw resource into that product. It ensures
prot maximization in the processing industry.
pt = mct + t (5.52)
The equilibrium condition in equation (5.53) says that the market for the resource product
clears.
q(t) = Q[p(t); z] (5.53)
As it is obvious from equations (5.50)-(5.53), the basic theory of natural resources di¤ers
from the theory for any other good only in its assumption that there is always storage of the raw
resource. The holding of stocks does not depend upon demand conditions. The consequence of
stock holding is that resource rents always rise at a rate su¢ cient to compensate their owners
for holding them rather than another asset. In the basic model this rate is the rate of interest.
Since it is continuous stock holding and continuous price increase that are unique to resource
30The model can most easily be analyzed as conditions for equilibrium in a capital market for the unextracted
resource, in a ow market for a resource product, and in the processing market for making the product from the
unextracted resource.
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theory, any test of the theory must make use of this information.
The implications of increased natural resource scarcity and its e¤ect on economic growth
have been discussed since the 18th century. Malthus (1798) and Ricardo (1821) held that
agricultural land scarcity implied strict limits on population growth and the development of
living standards. Harold Hotelling o¤ered his well-known counterargument in his seminal article
of 1931: competitive rms would manage exhaustible resource stocks to maximize present-
value prots, competitive extraction paths would therefore match those chosen by a social
planner seeking to maximize intertemporal social surplus, and subject to the caveat of social
and private discount rates equality, equivalence between competitive and the work of a rational
social planner would be achieved. This result implies that the invisible hand was su¢ cient and
policy intervention inappropriate. However, the ability of the Hotellings theory to describe and
predict the actual behaviour of exhaustible resource markets remains an open question. The
theory was not empirically tested until the second half of the 20th century. Slade and Thille
(1997) categorized the existing empirical tests as (a) price behaviour, (b) shadow price, and (c)
Hotelling valuation tests.
The earliest tests were price behaviour tests, which as the name implies focused on price
paths as indicators of scarcity. Included in this group are Barnett and Morse (1963), Smith
(1979), and Slade (1982). Barnett and Morse examined trends in the prices and unit costs
of extractive goods (including agricultural, mineral, and forest products) in the United States.
They found that the unit cost of extractive output fell by 55 percent between 1870 and 1957.
Although the price of forest products increased somewhat over the period, agricultural and
mineral prices exhibited no clear long-term trends. These ndings suggested that natural re-
sources were becoming less scarce, not more scarce, in an economic sense. The authors argued
that technological progress o¤sets declines in the physical quality and abundance of resource
stocks31.
31This optimistic assessment came under renewed scrutiny in the 1970s when Meadows et al. (1972) argued
that exponential growth in resource extraction and environmental degradation could not be sustained through the
twenty-rst century. According to the authors, fundamental reforms in technology and social institutions would
be required to maintain the quality and physical environment for the benet of future generations. The response
from economists was uniform and emphatic. The model employed by Meadows et al. lacked price feedbacks and
other mechanisms through which economic agents could adapt to changing physical conditions. Some argued that
191
Smith (1979) employed an econometric analysis of annual (1900-1973) price data of four
aggregate resource groups and concluded that the trend in mineral prices was negative with the
rate of decline decreasing over time in absolute magnitude. A similar study of twelve major
metals and fuels by Slade (1982) concluded that the price paths for nonrenewable natural
resources were U-shaped32. Slade hypothesized that the declining, at and increasing price
trends implicit in U-shaped price paths, come at di¤erent points in the life cycle of the exhaustive
resource.
Limitations of these early tests include the level of aggregation33. Also, the hypothesis that
unit prices increase over time at the rate of interest implicitly restricts the test to marginal costs
being independent of extraction rate and costs being independent of cumulative extraction,
or remaining reserves. Given the level of restrictions, it is di¢ cult to think support for the
theory of exhaustible resources would be found. Moreover, Ahrens and Sharma (1997) examine
deterministic versus stochastic trends in resource prices. Their results suggest there may be a
specication problem in these time series tests.
The empirical tests based on the shadow price can further be categorized by their use of
either explicit price expectations or implicit price expectations. Tests that rely on explicit
price expectations include Stollery (1983), Farrow (1985), and Slade and Thille (1997). Tests
that employ implicit price expectations include Halvorsen and Smith (1991) and Chermak and
Patrick (1999). Stollery (1983) extended the basic Hotelling model to account for the e¤ects
of depletion, possible technological change, and exogenous discoveries. He proceeded in stages.
First he estimated a log-linear demand function for nickel and a Cobb-Douglas production
the approach constituted measurement without data (Nordhaus, 1973) and was therefore wholly unjustied.
The ndings of Hotelling and Barnett and Morse were brought into the debate and new developments from the
theory of economic growth added a third strand to the argument. By introducing an exhaustible resource to
a standard model of intertemporal development, Solow (1974) established that a sustainable consumption level
could be achieved, in principle, given su¢ cient substitutability between resource and capital inputs.
32When Slade (1982) performed her tests on real prices, she used the then current technology of tting the
observed series with a quadratic trend with autoregressive error. Using this trend model, the chance that prices
in the year 2000 will be higher than they were in 1985 is 99.92 percent, which is certainly an a¢ rmation of the
theory that prices will almost certainly rise. There are two major reasons to believe that the case for rising
prices is overstated by these results. First, the parameters of the quadratic trend model change with the period
estimation. The second reason to doubt the prediction is that the series may be stationary around a stocastic
trend rather than a deterministic one. This is the problem of spurious regression (Nelson and Kang, 1981).
33For further discussion of the di¢ culties associated with aggregation, see Backorby and Schworm (1982).
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function for mining nickel. From these he found marginal revenue34 and marginal cost, and
resource rent was estimated as the di¤erence between the two. The estimated values for rent
were then treated as data and were used in an estimation of the capital market rule. The
parameter to be estimated was the interest rate (r). The recovered estimate of the interest rate
from this procedure was compared with an estimate of the required rate from the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM35). Since the two estimates were not dissimilar, the exercise was seen as
conrming the theory. The unobservable rents did rise at the rate of interest.
Farrow (1985) tested the exhaustible resource theory using monthly price and cost data
(01/1975 through 12/1981) from an underground hard rock mineral mine that produced sev-
eral joint product metal commodities. Their theoretical model is analogous to the Hotelling
extension where costs are a function of current extraction, remaining reserves, and input prices.
The cost function was estimated using data from company accounting records, which included
monthly income statements from January 1975 to December 1981. The income statements
were supplemented by information from invoices to obtain input prices, inventory records, and
miscellaneous operating reports. The functional form of the empirically estimated cost function
was a translog. The coe¢ cients were restricted to be homogeneous of degree one in input prices.
Employing information from the cost function, Farrow directly estimates the transition equa-
tion and then tests the appropriate restrictions on the transition equation parameters. In an
AR(1) model, the parameter estimates are signicant. However, Farrow points out the weak
linkbetween the data and theory, in that the sign of the parameter of the rms discount rate
is negative. Farrow derives a number of alternative tests that allow for, among other things, a
changing discount rate. In all cases, the theory of exhaustible resources is rejected at the level
of this single mine with joint products.
Slade and Thille (1997) integrated the theory of exhaustible resources with CAPM. They
estimated user cost as the di¤erence between price and marginal extraction costs under sev-
eral di¤erent restrictions including certainty and risk. They directly estimated the transition
equation employing a translog cost function and tested the statistical signicance of the restric-
34Marginal revenue rather than product price is used in calculating the implicit in situ price, because the rm
is assumed to be a monopolist with a competitive fringe.
35CAMP is a form of equation (5.50) that is conditional on information observed at t+ 1.
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tions. A generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator was used with lagged values of the
variables plus year rate of change of producer price index, and the rate of growth of aggregate
consumption included as instruments. A Wald test indicated the basic Hotelling Model is not
rejected. However, the parameter estimates are not statistically signicant from zero, rending
the results suspect. Additionally tests, which incorporate risk into the model via the Capital
Asset Pricing specication, are not rejected, based on the Wald statistics. The addition of
nancial variables leads to a model with some empirical support.
Turning to tests that rely on implicit price expectations, Halvorsen and Smith (1991) as
already argued in the main text of chapter 5, used duality theory to derive an econometric model
that provides a statistical test of the theory of exhaustible resources. Following Halvorsen and
Smith (1984), a restricted cost function was used to obtain estimates of the shadow prices of
unextracted resources from cost and production data for vertically integrated natural resource
industries. The restricted cost function used, also provided estimates of the e¤ects of cumulative
extraction on the marginal cost of extraction. The implications of the theory of exhaustible
resources were expressed as parametric restrictions on the restricted cost function model and
were tested using a Hausman (1978) specication test. The procedure was illustrated with data
for the Canadian metal mining industry. For this industry the parametric restrictions implied
by the theory of exhaustible resources were strongly rejected.
Moreover, Chermak and Patricks (1999) theoretic development refer to a price-taking rm
that produces and, at least partially, renes the resource. An indirect nal cost function is
econometrically estimated, as are gross production cost and average cost functions. Each is
then restricted by the dynamic optimality condition. Monthly production and cost data from
29 individual natural gas wells, located in three geographic regions in the US. and owned by
ve di¤erent rms is was employed to estimate the indirect nal cost function. The dynamic
optimality condition was tested under a range of discount rates. The results indicated support
for the theory under all discount rate levels and all specications. That is, relevant production
decisions were found to e¤ectively taking into account the opportunity cost of current production
(the in situ resource price) and the path is economically optimal according to the theory.
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Slades and Thilles third category of tests are the Hotelling valuation approach. These
include the test formulated by Miller and Upton (1985), which is based on the following im-
plication derived from Hotellings analysis: the value of a unit of reserves in the ground is the
same as its current value above ground less the marginal cost of extracting it, regardless of
when the reserves are extracted. Miller and Upton called this the Hotelling valuation princi-
ple36 and tested it with a cross-section of oil properties. They found that (except for very small
properties, which they excluded) the stock-market value of a property was its Hotelling value,
x00 and the size of deposit had no e¤ect on value37. However, as noted by Swierzbinski and
Mendelsohn (1989), this is not equivalent to showing that the actual time paths of resource
prices are consistent with the Hotelling predictions. Swierzbinski and Mendelsohn show that
when the stock of a resource is uncertain, the Hotelling Rule may provide the best available
prediction of future resource prices, even though unanticipated changes in expectations due to
the arrival of information cause the actual time paths of resource prices to deviate from the
Hotelling predictions.
Yet another approach to testing Hotellings theory was suggested by Livernois and Uhler
(1987), who argued that a marginal cost of extraction function for a particular deposit should
have the form mc(q; n; xt); where q is quantity extracted per year, n is the number of deposits
discovered before the deposit in question, and xt is the amount remaining in the deposit.
Marginal cost is expected to increase in q and n; and decrease in x. Livernois and Uhler tested
a stock-dependent cost function of this form for a cross-section of 166 Canadian oil wells that
were producing in 1976 and found that costs do increase when stock decreases.
As it is obvious from the literature reviewed here, the primary di¤erence in testing method-
ologies of the theory of exhaustible resources are: (a) directly estimating the dynamic optimality
condition and testing whether the estimated parameters conform to the theory, which is the
predominant test in the literature, and (b) estimating an indirect cost function restricted by
36On a theoretical level, a di¤erent result could be derived from the valuation principle in a number of ways.
Allowing for shut-down, abandonment, and positing denite xed operational costs gives the Brannan and
Schwartz (1985) model in which the option of operating is valuable. Rather trivially, a known but not operated
deposit cannot be valued in this fashion, because its nonoperation indicates that it has more value in future then
in current extraction.
37The same type of analysis with redwood stumpage prices has been done, with a slightly di¤erent conclusion
(see Berck (1988) for more details).
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the dynamic optimality condition and testing whether the parameters of this restricted cost
function are consistent with those of the unrestricted cost function. Chapter four builds on
the second methodology to suggest yet another way of estimating the relevant derivatives of
a cost function, which is less data intensive in input prices, a considerable advantage we be-
lieve given the problems of pricing natural resources and other inputs used in heavily regulated
or ine¢ ciently managed industries, and does not impose any behaviour assumptions, again
a considerable advantage given the diversity of rm objectives possible in heavily regulated
industries.
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Chapter 6
Epilogue.
E¢ cient pricing of a resource incorporates marginal cost of extraction and scarcity rents.
Since groundwater resources exhibit natural supply constraints, scarcity rents must be imposed
on current users. Due to the absence of clear groundwater ownership rights, extracting behav-
iour is myopic and extracting agents are willing to pay only the private cost of their groundwater
extraction. As a result, scarcity value goes unrecognized and as such is di¢ cult to estimate.
This results in ine¢ cient pricing and misallocation of the resource, and calls for intervention in
the relevant resource market. The main aim of this thesis was to propose alternative theoretical
and empirical methodologies that allow indirect estimation the shadow scarcity rents of in situ
groundwater and the shadow price for groundwater quality, and derive inference on the poten-
tial for managing this resource. Empirical analyses are based on economic and hydrological
data collected for the region of Kiti in the island of Cyprus, representative of coastal semi-arid
regions.
In chapter 1 we establish the potential scarcity of groundwater and discuss the need for
managing this resource in order to achieve its optimal dynamic allocation. In chapter 2 we
investigate the potential for managing this resource through a review of the relevant theoretical
and empirical literature, which suggests that under particular circumstances this potential
is severely limited through the presence of the Gisser-Sanchez e¤ect. More specically, we
identify the conditions under which this e¤ect persists and we establish that the most important
contributing factor to the practical insignicance of optimal price management of groundwater
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extraction, is the inelastic demand for this resource. Moreover, we argue that a number of factors
that have been ignored by the Gisser-Sanchez literature, could prove important in establishing
the practical signicance of optimal groundwater management.
One of this factors is recognizing the possibility of complete depletion of the resource. In
chapter 3 we develope an optimization model of groundwater extraction that incorporates the
possibility of endogenous adoption of a backstop technology (namely desalination) and we apply
this model to an aquifer that is seriously depleted. This model is used to derive scarcity rents
of in situ groundwater as well as the benets from optimally managing the resource. Empirical
simulation of the model establishes that the potential for groundwater management is big, as it
increases the value of welfare benets by 409:4% (given sustainability of aquifer recharge to the
indenite future) if compared to the value of benets derived from the competitive-commonality
solution of groundwater allocation (where current users incur only the private cost of their
extraction and free-ride on relevant scarcity rents). Hence our empirical results suggest the
absence of the GSE in aquifers that face complete exhaustion in the near future, and establish
that groundwater management is welfare increasing. Moreover, the initial optimal scarcity
value (in year 1999) per unit of the resource derived from simulating the optimal solution of
the problem, is equal to $0:2017 per cubic meter.
In chapter 4 we model the simultaneity between hedonic valuation and sample selection in
the context of producer behaviour and investigate it empirically through an econometric model,
in the case of land demanded for use as an input either in agricultural production or touristic
development. The empirical analysis suggests that failing to correct for sample selection results
in a biased valuation of groundwater scarcity rents. This argument has implications for hedo-
nic price analyses applied to housing and other goods whose quality characteristics can a¤ect
sample selection. The estimated marginal producers valuation for groundwater quality as far
as reduced salinization is concerned, is statistically insignicant and equal to $1:07 per (0:1)
hectare of land. The statistical insignicance and small magnitude of the marginal WTP for im-
provements in groundwater quality derived from the hedonic model with selectivity correction
in chapter 4, could imply that extraction behaviour is myopic. That is, agricultural produc-
ers are not willing to pay a large amount for preserving groundwater quality today, because
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salt-free water might be extracted by free-riding extracting agents tomorrow. This is of course
an artifact of the inexistence of properly allocated property rights in a common-pool aquifer.
Moreover, another contributing factor towards a low marginal WTP for groundwater quality
and existence of myopic extracting behaviour, is that current farmers value the prospect of
switching to the more lucrative touristic sector of the economy (as compared to the agricultural
sector), which is an economic sector that utilizes other existing sources of water (other than
groundwater).
In chapter 5 a stochastic restricted distance function was estimated and through it duality
with the cost function we were able to derive shadow groundwater scarcity rents. We argue
that when price information is not available, or alternatively when price information is avail-
able but cost, prot or revenue functions representations are precluded because of violations of
the required behaviour assumptions, distance functions provide an excellent analytical tool for
deriving e¢ cient input shadow prices. Violation of conventional behaviour assumptions are the
norm rather than the exception in ine¢ ciently managed and regulated industries like agricul-
ture. The estimated technical rm-specic ine¢ ciencies present in production technologies of
agricultural rms in the sample under consideration, suggest that cost minimization is not the
relevant behaviour objective in the industry under investigation. This empirical result provides
support for the use of the distance function approach to deriving in situ resource shadow prices.
Moreover, these results indicate that the shadow values of the unit in situ groundwater is
approximately equal to zero
 
$0:0097m3

. Given that the model developed in chapter 5 derives
estimates of the marginal opportunity cost to the agricultural rm of one unit of natural resource
left in the aquifer, the above comparison indicates that agricultural producers in the region are
not willing to pay the full social cost of their unit extraction. This implies that externalities
arise as current users of the resource are willing to pay only the private cost of their resource
extraction, and as a result the resources scarcity value goes completely unrecognized. This
pattern of behaviour is consistent with perfect myopic resource extraction, which arises because
of the absence of properly allocated property rights in groundwater, and is consistent with the
results on WTP for groundwater quality of chapter 4.
The main message that can be derived from the empirical application of the theoretical mod-
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els developed in this thesis, is that in seriously depleted aquifers (where groundwater scarcity
really matters) there is a signicant di¤erence between benets realized under optimal manage-
ment of the resource and those derived under myopic extraction of the resource; that is, the GSE
is absent (chapter 3). Moreover, alternative empirical estimations of the marginal willingness
to pay for in situ groundwater quantity and marginal improvements in groundwater quality,
result in insignicantly small valuations for groundwater shadow prices (chapters 4 and 5). As
already argued, these results imply myopic extracting behaviour, which is rationalized by the
absence of properly dened property rights for groundwater. That is, in the absence of property
rights dening ownership of the resource, there exist no incentive to conserve water quantity
and quality today in order to reduce future costs, as water conserved by one agent today can
be extracted tomorrow by another free-riding agent. The combination of a potentially signi-
cant increase in social benets from managing the resource and evidence of myopic behaviour,
point to the need and potential for optimal management of groundwater in the region under
investigation, representative of arid and semi-arid regions in general. Hence, future research
should be directed towards estimating cost and benets from implementing optimal dynamic
management of groundwater.
As mentioned in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the main conclusion of the work
presented in this thesis amounts to the following statement:
When groundwater scarcity is very acute and complete depletion of the aquifer is due
in the near future, the GSE disappears; thus evidence of the empirical prevalence of
myopic groundwater extraction should constitute a signal for the need for managing
groundwater resources. Implementing optimal extraction is going to be neither easy,
nor costless, hence future work should be directed towards deriving cost and benets
of di¤erent regulatory regimes of groundwater extraction.
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